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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate by critical consideration the suitability of various
approaches of inquiry for exploring and enhancing motivation intervention in
contemporary organisations; in particular, to spell out the need for a critical systemic
-
approach of inquiry in relation to a social context based on critical systems thinking ideas.
The thesis explores the question concerning the inducements associated with motivation
(to work) and what this may mean in different organisational contexts, while taking into
consideration cultural differences that affect the way that motivation is addressed.
Furthermore, it raises questions,
 about power relations in terms of processes involved in
developing motivation. It also poses questions about ideological differences in the way
that performance orientations may affect general lifestyles and ways of working. It is
-) suggested in the thesis that it is important to consider motivation by looking at a diversity
of motivation approaches and by seeing what can be learnt from each, and how each can
be developed. It is shown how critical systemic learning can be advanced as a way of
encouraging learning by means of ideology-critique. The need for a critical systemic
approach to motivation is also shown by drawing on aspects of critical systems thinking
and extending such thinking to cover motivation explicitly.
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PART ONE .
AN INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1: Introduction
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
-
1.1 Background
As a manager who has to deal with staff on a day-to-day basis, I have concerns about how
to motivate them, how to get the best out of them, how to help them to achieve their own
potential. As an academic, I also have an interest in why certain researchers suggest this or
that way of motivating individuals is best. Since my practice as a manager is based in
Taiwan, where motivation is seen as a "big" issue,I needed to find out whether some
.,-
./-motivation research could afford me any insights into managing my staff.
Taiwan has an older generation who still possess traditional Chinese cultural values, while
the younger generation are moving increasingly towards individualism and its associated
values. There can be seen to be ideology conflicts between the two generations which
causes tensions when the question of motivation is addressed. Furthermore, the way in
which the two parties see the world is distinctive. They often appear to live in alien
worlds.
Questions that I wanted to explore for my doctoral research, then, included:
• What could Western motivation literature reveal about the best ways to motivat
individuals?
• How (if at all) relevant might this be for the Taiwanese context? 7-
To consider these questions, it was necessary initially to review the literature on
-
motivation. From this, it was possible to infer that motivation in organisations refers to
processes by which people are enabled and induced to choose to behave in particular
ways. However, this formulation already raises the question concerning whether and to
what extent it is legitimate to attempt to induce people to behave in certain ways
(Moorhead and Griffin, 1995). It also stimulates questions about power relations and
ideological differences (or conflicts) in terms of processes involved in developing
motivation to work and to adopt certain ways of living (Sinha, 1994). Furthermore, it (rv
poses the question concerning the process of enablement as associated with motivation to
work and what this may mean in different cultural contexts (Mendonca and Kanungo,
1994). Again it raises questions about wider social awareness that people might have and
about the way that people in society may become motivated to explore these. These
questions and surrounding issues in looking at the questions will be examined in the
thesis.
My review of the literature on motivation revealed a wide diversity of approaches, each
claiming to be the "best" way for motivating people. Given the wide variety of
_.-
approaches, I felt that it was necessary somehow to evaluate the different methods, to
asses whether, how and when any single approach might be better than another. By
examining the wider literature on management and organisation studies, I found that there
were 2 main frameworks commonly referred to that were used to explicate the differences
between approaches to organisational analysis (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and to
management problem-solving (Jackson and Keys, 1984; Jackson, 1987). Each framework
appeared to provide some potential for illuminating the subject of motivation, so I
undertook an examination of the motivation methods that I had identified, using each of
,
the two frameworks.
Here I was trying to answer questions such as:
• How can we make sense of the diversity of motivation approaches?
• How can we organise the range of approaches to make them useful for a practicing
manager?
Having looked at ways for organising the many approaches to motivation, and having
shown that both frameworks have problems in answering the above questions, it was
necessary to look for other means for handling the plurality of approaches that were
available. My research here turned to critical systems thinking (CST)- a theoretical and
practical approach to intervention developed in the 1980s and 1990s. It was clear to me
that the question of motivating people required an intervention of some sort in a situation.
I wanted to see whether CST offered a critical systemic view of learning that would take
account of the differences in values that people might have in a situation. Did CST offer a
view of learning that could indicate how people can be encouraged to achieve their
potential, whilst still being part of a wider collectivity (i.e. preserving elements of both
value-systems)? In order to consider these themes, it was necessary to review the literature
on critical systems thinking and to compare this with the literature on motivation. Here I
wanted to enrich and expand upon ideas drawn from both sets of literature towards
improving motivation interventions.
1. 2 The need for improvement in motivation interventions
It is no longer sufficient to give employees simplistic, behavioural motivators. Employees
today are better informed than ever before. They are too sophisticated for the quasi-
manipulative tactics that have worked for managers in the past. Employees want greater
satisfaction from their work. They are rarely bought with money alone or artificial
rewards. Therefore, when considering the question of intervention in relation to issues of
motivation much attention will be given to the idea of CST as it has been developed in the
UK, which looks to develop holistic solutions to complex problems such as this (e.g.,
Jackson, 1983, 1991a, b, 1997; Flood, 1990, 1995, 1996; Flood and Jackson, 1991a, b;
Gregory, 1992, 1996a, b; Midgley, 1992, 1995a, b, 1996; Mingers, 1992, 1997; Flood and
Romm, 1995a, b, 1996a, b, 1997; and others). Other arguments about intervention which
concentrate more on ideology (or powerful knowledge formations) and other forms of
power are also looked at (e.g., Foucault, 1972, 1979, 1982; Habermas, 1976, 1982, 1984;
Clegg, 1989; Thompson, 1990; Brand, 1990; Oliga, 1990; Mingers, 1992; Gregory, 1992,
1994; Rahman, 1993; Midgley, 1995a; Flood and Romm, 1996a; Oliga, 1996), and
additional ideas about organisational (or individual) learning are a focus too (e.g., Katz,
1960; Nurius, 1991; Stryker, 1991; March, 1991; Brown and Duguid, 1991; Simon, 1991;
Burrell, 1992; Gregory, 1992; Mullins, 1993; Cook and Yanow, 1993; Hassard, 1993;
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Townley, 1994; Dachler and Hosking, 1995; Gergen, 1995; Salipante and Bouwen, 1995;
Midgley, 1995b; Argyris and SchOn, 1996; Burgoyne and Reynold, 1997; Willmott,
1997). This research also looks at cross-cultural influences on motivation, and an attempt
will be made to examine how motivation may not necessarily be the same in different
cultures (e.g., Hofstede, 1980a, b, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993; Cox and Blake, 1991; Sowell,
1991; Rivera, 1991; Schein, 1992; Huo and Steers, 1993; Mendonca and Kanungo, 1994;
Harvey and Allard, 1995; Brocklesby, 1994, 1995; Brocklesby arid Cummings, 1995,
1996).
To successfully meet this new challenge, I argue that a manager should consider the
following issues in motivation interventions, which I highlight throughout the thesis:
1. How to employ a range of approaches in motivation interventions;
2. How to understand the basis for ideology conflicts in organisations;
3. How to address issues arising from specific power relations in organisations;
4. How to facilitate critical systemic learning in organisations; and
5. How to recognise and effectively utilise cross-cultural influences on motivation.
In order to help managers to address these issues, I will develop a critical systemic
approach to motivation which draws on some appropriate literature. I will argue that a
wider literature base than only the motivation literature, can provide invaluable insights
towards managing the motivation process.
6
1. 3 Organising for improvement in motivation interventions
This thesis is primarily based on literature review. There is much literature on motivation
theories and also much literature on the need for critical theories to examine social issues
such as power formations, ideological legitimisation of social systems, the sort of
systematic efforts needed to address the issues of social awareness etc., but none of this
has as yet been compared with literature on motivation. There exists a gap between
motivation theories on the one hand and critical theories aboUt society on the other, with
no connecting literature to tie up these separate bodies of thought. This thesis critically
looks at the various literatures and seeks to fill this gap by pointing out along the way the
need for a critical systemic approach to motivation.
I want to examine, from a critical systemic perspective, how world views (which
necessarily have ideological aspects to them) will influence managers to choose particular
approaches in motivation interventions. Commonly, managers are affected by decisions to
use particular approaches but are not themselves involved in the intervention process.
This means that we should not predetermine what approach will be applied without first
understanding the current situation, especially who is included and excluded from the
procedure by which approaches are selected. The question therefore arises, how can we
escape from our own value assumptions (ideological traps) and socio-cultural
judgements? Moreover, what can we do to deal with different ideological judgements and
individuals' assumptions, in order to deal with or accommodate ideological conflict?
7
This thesis also desires to go some way towards providing an approach by which
managers (who still, in Taiwan, tend to be the older generation) can make themselves
aware of how to motivate employees from their positions for the benefit of all in
organisations. Managers should have a new thinking that enables them to handle greatly
increased complexity, change, and uncertainty and at the same time use fewer resources;
and need to know far more about motivation than just how to use a specific approach in
interventions.
This thesis argues that the current motivation approaches need to be critically appreciated,
and different perspectives should be taken into account so that managers can gain an
improved awareness of their own organisational circumstances and the likely effects of
implementing the available approaches. In developing a critical systemic approach to
motivation, I use some ideas from CST and relate these ideas to literature about
motivation and to other literature where I felt that motivation approaches are falling short.
This thesis suggests that motivation intervention involves dynamic processes and should
not be classified into fixed ways. Instead, the growing available approaches should be
subject to critical appreciation and, as far as possible, be made transparent and open to
change by those who will be affected by intervention. But attention is also given to ways in
which subjects can act to transform themselves and the social formations in which they are
embedded. Thus, we need to consider the problems of power relations and ideology
conflicts in a given organisational circum* stance, and attempt to see how new styles of
working can be explored, in a way which is not considered to serve the interests only of
certain individuals or groups. Within an organisational circumstance, we should be careful
of just adopting motivation approaches uncritically. We also have to be careful of simply
8
adopting an ideological stance which accepts past habitual patterns without looking at
alternatives - especially when there are cultural constraints of some sort which can be
-
identified (e.g., Hofstede, 1980a, b; Mendonca and Kanungo, 1994). This thesis assumes
that sometimes it is necessary to extend the boundaries of what is taken as given in a
particular cultural setting -- especially, if one is aware of tensions that are being caused by
the restrictions of a culture (e.g., Brocklesby and Cummings,1995). Therefore, the focus
on intervention will form an important part of this thesis, where ideas -from CST regarding
intervention are thoroughly explored.
1. 4 The research methodology
Although my initial concerns were with how to improve motivation practice in Taiwan,
the focus of my doctoral research was on what could be learnt from the literature. Whilst,
on the face of it, this would appear to be a purely theoretical, desk-based piece of research,
I wish to point out that much of the literature used (from both the field of motivation
theories and the field of critical systems thinking) itself is grounded in empirical work.
Thus, the development of a model of a critical systemic approach to motivation can be
argued to bridge the theory-practice gap through the empirical work on which it draws.
The methodology used involved a thorough investigation (critical analysis) of the
literature followed by some theory building with iterations back to the literature and
further refinements of the theory being developed. Through several iterations and returns
to critiquing the literature eventually an approach to motivation which, it is felt, is robust
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and will stand up to the test of practical implementation, was developed. It is this approach
-----
that I term a critical systemic approach to motivation.
1.5 Aims of the thesis
From the above explanation of my rationale for carrying out this doctoral research and the
-
description of the problem-context and literature perused, it is evident that a number of
aims are to be addressed in the thesis:
1. to critically analyse the literature on motivation;
2. to evaluate and organise the range of approaches available;
3. to develop a means by which managers can utilise the plurality of motivation methods
available to them;
4. to show why managers need to be socially aware when seeking to motivate people;
5. to show why managers (and others) need to adopt a critical systemic learning
approach during motivation interventions; and
6. to show how cross-cultural influences should be addressed in a motivation
intervention.
Through tackling the third, fourth, fifth and sixth aims a further two aims were realised:
7. to show why a critical systemic approach to motivation is necessary; and,
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8. to demonstrate the importance of each of the strands of the critical systemic approach
to motivation.
These inter-related aims will be addressed through different parts of the thesis.
1.6 The structure of the thesis
-
The thesis is divided into four separate, yet interlinked parts. Part One consists of the
introductory material presented in this chapter and two additional chapters that examine
prominent theories and research into human motivation in work organisations. Chapters 2
and 3 contain an extensive introduction which reviews and comments on the past
development of the theories in this field. On the basis of the groundwork laid in Part One,
Part Two looks at several central issues in motivation interventions. Included here are
issues such as pluralism (e.g., the nature of pluralist systemic approaches), social
influence (e.g., ideology conflicts and power relations), organisational and individual
learning, and cross-cultural considerations, as each relates to motivation interventions.
This is followed by Part Three which is concerned with why the new thinking (the need for
a critical systemic approach to motivation which is underpinned by stressing concerns
with critical awareness, pluralism, critical reflexivity, and critical systemic learning) is
necessary for motivation interventions (especially, in Taiwan). Finally, Part Four provides
some concluding implications and comments on motivation in organisations.
After this introductory chapter, the remainder of this thesis will be divided into the
following chapters.
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Chapter 2: Review of the literature on motivation -- In this chapter, a number of different
approaches to motivation are discussed. Criticisms of the various theories from the
points of view of other theories will be offered. The theories will all be classified
according to the framework developed by Moorhead and Griffin (1995), in order to give
some clarity to the discussion. Hence, the approaches discussed are seen as need-based
oriented; process-based oriented; and learning-based oriented. The theories discussed by
Moorhead and Griffin will form a starting point for the discussion =-- but other theories
will also be included.
Chapter 3: Critical commentary on the literature on motivation-- In this chapter, I
concentrate on examining the assumptions of different motivation theories in terms of
their implications for the organisation of working life in a society. In order to evaluate
and differentiate the methods, I draw on the 'sociological paradigms' framework
developed by Burrell and Morgan (1979), which defines different approaches to
organisational analysis by intersecting subjective-objective debates in the theory of
social science with regulation-radical change debates in the theory of society. They
point out that people always hold a particular Paradigmatic perspective, which is
derived from their own experiences and personal beliefs. This model clearly shows how
different social theories can be located according to their theoretical assumptions. Each
paradigm represents a distinctive view of reality. This discussion of paradigms raises
some difficult problems for motivation interventions. In particular, if we can learn
about paradigms and make choices, can we be bound to a single tradition? Moreover,
can we be based in different paradigms and yet communicate with each other, and if so,
how? I will show that Burrell and Morgan's framework gives us one method for
evaluating motivation approaches, but that as practising managers we really need a
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more practical way to relate the approaches to the specific situations facing us. An
alternative approach, that of Jackson and Key's (1984), later extended by Jackson
(1987), provides a "system of systems methodologies" framework which focuses on
problem-situation characteristics. In this framework, the assumptions made by a variety
of methodologies in terms of the complexity of the problem situation and the nature of
participation in problem solving are highlighted. However, I will argue that it ignores
the importance of the role of manager (problem solver) in methodology choice,
focusing too much on the problem context. In my view, managers need to reflect on
their own assumptions about various approaches to motivation and their understanding
of problem contexts as part of intervention. In this way the first and second aims, to
critically analyse the literature on motivation, and to evaluate and organise it, will be
realised. Finally, I highlight some key issues arising during motivation interventions
that will be the subject of the rest of the thesis, and look at what can be learnt from my
critical commentary on the literature on motivation.
Chapter 4: Issues in motivation interventions (1): Allowing pluralist systemic approaches
in interventions -- In this chapter, I examine some arguments of critical systems thinkers
who have contributed to the development of a number of pluralist systemic approaches
for dealing with issues in interventions. CST as a field dealing with plurality will be
introduced and it will be shown how this can enrich our understanding of social contexts
and problem solving by providing a critical, theoretical basis for contextualising other
systems ideas.
The motivation literature is cross-referenced with the critical systems literature in order
to facilitate enrichment of them both. For example, from the motivation literature,
MacGregor (1960) argues that managers view employees differently depending on the
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assumptions that they make about human nature. CST shows us that it is necessary to
understand the different assumptions that people make, as these influence what they do
and how they behave. These assumptions, though, are not static and can change with the
context. Through a discussion of the literature, I argue that pluralist systemic
approaches allow managers (and others- e.g., researchers) to dynamically appreciate
issues and questions, instead of expecting methods to be used "off the shelf". Here I am
beginning to address the third aim of developing a means by which managers can
utilise the plurality of motivation methods available to them.
Chapter 5: Issues in motivation interventions (2): Power relations and ideology
conflicts. --This chapter will take up the matter of intervention further. I will look at
issues of power and ideology. A focus on human potentiality, social awareness, and
emancipation will form the background for this chapter. Attention will be given to
social-cultural patterns in societies (which include particular orientations to the more
natural environment), considering when they can become defined as ideological and
how this can be criticised. In particular, ideology is important in the choice of
motivation interventions. Thus, to be critical, managers should not rely only on their
personal understanding (their own ideology); rather, they should be open to wider
perspectives. Through exploring issues about power relations and the ideological basis
of many motivation approaches. I will show that it is important for managers to have a
critical social awareness when intervening in motivation situations (the 4th aim).
Chapter 6: Issues in motivation interventions (3): The need for learning during
interventions -- This chapter focuses on difficulties that have been isolated as issues of
concern in various perspectives, such as the devaluation of certain languages, which will
14
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be discussed in terms of a critical systemic view of learning. A view of "multiloguing"
(communication taking account of multiple meaning and contexts) will be explored by
relating this view to a discussion about self-society dynamics and by considering
implications of such dynamics for organisational learning. It will be suggested that the
self-society dynamic shows that the two cannot be separated, but that individuals are
part of the community. When we look at personal growth as a motivator, we change the
-
way our employees think about their work, we help them become more capable, and we
give them a meaningful purpose in coming to work. Multiloguing is especially
important because otherwise ideologies will not be challenged. In this way the fifth aim,
to emphasise critical systemic learning will be elaborated.
Chapter 7: Issues in motivation interventions (4): Harnessing cross-cultural influences --
This chapter aims to answer the question, should cultural difference be considered in
motivation interventions? This thesis argues that it is necessary to respect cultural
differences, as an ideological adherence to any one perspective can lead to tension and
also may lead to a form of decision making where the whims of certain powerful
individuals rules. Thus, to judge the possible result of applying an approach in
motivation interventions, we need to understand whether there is ideological harmony
or friction between the various cultural differences. Here the sixth aim, to show how
cross-cultural influences should be addressed in a motivation intervention, is realised.
Chapter 8: The need for a critical systemic approach to motivation -- This chapter aims to
introduce the substance of the new approach, by drawing together the strands from the
previous 4 chapters. This approach helps managers gain an improved understanding of
the different assumptions made in motivation interventions. It will be argued that
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motivation interventions should be concerned with ideology-critique of the beliefs and
assumptions which lie behind different perspectives. This thesis presents a critical
systemic understanding of work motivation which it is argued, is ethically more sound
than 'traditional' motivation approaches. From this perspective, I argue that
individuals are not just motivated to maximise utility on the basis of some rational
calculus; In addition, individuals are seen as motivated to maintain and increase their
self-reflection and ideology-critique, and are seen as motivated to maintain consistency
between self-society dynamics (the process through which individuals and societies are
created and maintained) and behaviour. The critical systemic perspective to motivation
that I propose is based on CST and the motivation literature and focuses on three
commitments: critical awareness, pluralism, and critical reflexivity. In this way the
seventh aim, to show why a critical systemic approach to motivation is necessary, will
be detailed.
Chapter 9: Proposals for using a critical systemic approach to motivation for building a
critical learning organisation -- In this chapter, all the aspects of the critical systemic
approach to motivation developed throughout the thesis are brought together. A re-
categorisation of the motivation approaches discussed in Chapter 2 is offered. It is
shown that this categorisation helps us to spell out some views of humankind which in
turn allow us to identify a view of people as complex beings. Complex beings, it is
argued, are able to learn from alternative perspectives, from cultural diversity, from
different experiences, and from different ways of working and are therefore able to
contribute to a critical learning organisation. While this suggests that a critical systemic
approach could be a useful approach for motivation interventions, there is an
appreciation of discordant pluralist relations (persisting differences) between all
16
aspects of our experiences, thoughts and working practices. Finally, I explain why a
critical systemic approach to motivation is necessary for managers of Taiwan
enterprises to deal with problems of motivation, and some difficulties of implementing
the approach will also be revealed, giving rise to proposals for future research. Through
this discussion, the eighth aim (to demonostrate the importance of each of the strands
of the critical systemic approach to motivation) will be satisfied.
Chapter 10: Conclusion -- The conclusion ties up and summarises all the chapters of the
thesis, identifying the contributions to knowledge that I have made through my
research. Contributions have made through the critical analysis of the motivation
literature (chapter 3) and through the arguments concerning plurality (chapter 4),
power relations and ideology-critique (chapter 5), critical reflection and learning
(chapter 6), and cross-cultural influences on motivation (chapter 7). Furthermore, the
model of a critical systemic approach to motivation detailed in chapter 8 and evaluated
in chapter 9 represents the most significant contribution of my research, and represents
a substantial step towards tackling issues connected with motivation in the work place
in Taiwan.
17
Chapter 2: Review of the Literature on Motivation
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature on Motivation
2. 1 Introduction	 -
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a review of the literature on motivation. This forms
the basis for Chapter 3, where I explore the prominent motivation theories that have been
offered, by organising some platforms for critical commentary. I will try to broaden the
idea of motivation by seeing how different theories of motivation have implications for
the organisation of work life in a society. I also will consider whether it is possible to think
about motivation as part of organisational learning in a society.
In this chapter, I undertake an examination of some prominent motivation approaches,
considering their suggestions for enhancing motivation in contemporary organisations,
and offering my own brief critical input. As a start, it is useful to infer from the literature
and research that motivation in work organisations refers to processes by which people are
enabled and induced to behave in particular ways. Thus, motivation is often associated
with a search for the means by which people's job performance and productivity may be.
improved or maintained. Many theories about motivation begin by addressimthe
iltej__Telated issues of human needs and how these influence the direction and maintenance
of an individual's intentional behaviour.
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2. 2 What is the meaning of motivation?
Motivation comes from motive, which derives from the Latin verb movere, to move. So a
motive is something that moves you to_doing. However, this description is obviously an
inadequate definition for our purposes here. What is needed is a definition which
sufficiently covers the various components and processes associated with how human
behaviour is activated. One way to arrive at an answer to this question is to look at the
views of the various researches in this field of motivation. Several authors (e.g., Taylor,
1947; Mayo; 1949; Maslow, 1943, 1954; Drucker, 1954; Katz, 1960; Adams 1963;
Vroom, 1964; Herzberg, 1966, 1968; Ryan, 1970; Beck, 1978; Kantrow, 1980; Mitchell,
1973; Hollway, 1983, 1991; Child, 1984; Lee and Lawrence, 1991) sj_i_ggest.that
motivAtion refers to processes by which people are enabled and induced to behave in ways
beneficial to  the oi:gg-aa,tlon. Motivation  may be a need, _desire or emotion, but it leads
you to act and to act in a certain way. Pinder (1984) provides a good overview:
Some writers view motivation from a,strinly physiological perspective, while
others view human beings as primarilTlie—donistic, and explain most of human
behaviour as goal-oriented, seeking to gain pleasure and avoid pain. Others
stress the rationality of humans and consider human behaviour to be the result
of conscious choice processes (Pinder, 1984, p.'7).
For instance, Mitchell (1973) proposes that motivation "represents those psychological
processes that cause the arousal, direction and persistence of voluntary actions that are
goal directed" (p.162). Beck (1978) states that motivation is "broadly concerned with the
contemporary determinations of choice (direction), persistence, and vigour of goal-
directed behaviour" (p.429). Bandura (1988) defines motivation as "a multidimensional
phenomenon indexed in terms of the determinants and intervening mechanisms that
govern the selection, activation, and sustained direction of behaviour" (p.158). Steers and
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Potter (1991) suggest, people's motivation always confirms their own evaluations that
their basic attitudes are the most suitable ones, partly because these attitudes have been
moulded by the realities of their own particular paradigms and partly because they make
sense of their experiences by managing to fit them into their own values. Johnson and Gill
(1993) say that motivation refers to "the forces acting on and in an individual and that
cause that individual to behave in a particular goal-directed manner" (p.38).
From the above descriptions, motivation can be understood in terms of personal needs, in
a way that facilitates accomplishment of a specific performance. Motivation is the sum of
all that moves a person to action. Motives can be mixed. They can range from consensus
to unconscious. Motives are necessary for action but not sufficient in themselves. As
Steers, Porter, and Bigley (1996) note, "when we discuss motivation, we are primarily
concerned with (1) what energises human behaviour, (2) what directs or channels such
behaviour, and (3) how this behaviour is maintained or sustained" (p.8). When reviewing
the human motivation literature, we are confronted with what appears to be a diverse
range of approaches that often seem to contradict one another. Each approach looks at
organisations from different perspective and emphasise different issues. It is not easy to
decide how we should classify different theories of motivation. Nevertheless, as noted in
Chapter 1, I believe it is useful to use Moorhead and Griffin's (1995) classification of
approaches into need-based, process-based, and learning-based theories. Moreover, I will
try to expand upon these theories in order to develop a critical systemic approach, which
looks at problems of ideology in a society and tries to see how new styles of working can
be explored, in a way which is not consider to serving the interests only of certain
individuals or groups.
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2. 3 The need-based motivation theories
The need-based theorists of motivation (e.g., Taylor, 1947; Maslow, 1954; Herzberg,
1968) focus on the content of motivation and attempt to develop an understanding of
personal needs which are not met or satisfied. The need-based motivation theories assume
that factors exist within the individual behaviour that is initiated and sustained by an
unfulfilled need, and concluded when the need is satisfied. These approaches to
motivation are concerned with the identification of important internal factors and the
explanation of how these factors may be prioritised within the individual. As Johnson and
Gill (1993) state, "human needs are usually identified as being expressed through an
individual's feelings or experiences of physiological, psychological or social deprivation,
deficiency or imbalance" (p.39). Moorhead and Griffin (1995) also suggest that "human
motivation is caused primarily by deficiencies in one or moie important need or need
categories" (p.83). Thus, motivation is thought to be based on the desire to satisfy a range
of extrinsic or intrinsic needs. In this section, I explain and highlight some of the need-
based motivation theorienamely, the scientific management approach; the human
relations approach; Maslow's needs theory; and the motivation-hygiene theory as
examples.
2. 3. 1 The scientific management approach
Taylor's (1947) scientific management approach is based on the_assumption_that people
will be motivated to work if external rewards are tied directly to their performance.
xternal rewards are thus conditional rather than unconditional. In short, this approach
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assumes that people's needs are primarily economic ones, that they are motivated to work
so as to earn as much money as they can. For example, the use of rewards as a means of
motivating performance may be found in economic incentives. As Veen (1984)
summarises:
The scientific management approach emphasises the problem of how the
individual's working capacity can be utilised in the most efficient way
possible, and how people can themselves be allowed to reap-the benefits of
this efficiency. The solution for this problem is sought in maximalisation of
the structuring and instrumentalisation of the task, and in remuneration for
work done. (Veen, 1984, p.721)
Morgan (1997) notes that closely associated with Taylorist ideas is the notion of
bureaucracy seen in Weber's (1947) work. Weber views the bureaucratic form of
organisation as aiding the processes of mechanisation and specialisation. Bureaucracy, as
described by him, refers to an organisation where there is "precision, speed, clarity,
regularity, reliability and efficiency achieved through the creation of a fixed division of
tasks, hierarchical supervision and detailed rules and regulations" (cited from Morgan,
1997, p.17). We can see that these ideas of Weber supplemented Taylor's views on the
possibility of scientific management. Both views imply the possibility of organising
behaviour according to the dictate of efficient pursuit of goals by economic or rational
beings (although as Morgan notes, Weber was not altogether confident that this was
progressive).
The scientific management approach typically carries with it connotations other than that
of merely allocating rewards based on performance. As conceived by Taylor, it also means
maximum separation of the planning from the doing. People are effectively programmed
from outside, eliminating any need for thinking or judgment on their part about how the
work should be done. Such an external control system stems from its reliance on some
reasonably objective method of measuring or assessing performance. This is sometimes
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considered to be too materialistic to solve all the needs of people. Thus, the scientific
management approach has been criticised by, for example, Lee and Lawrence (1991), who
state that it neglects "the conflicts of interests and attitudes which exist in the organisation,
and cannot explain complex human behaviour" (p.27). This opposing view means that
motivation involves the interplay of a multitude of various elements within a very
complex social system. In this view, the scientific management approach is thus found to
be inadequate to motivate in complex social contexts, a weakness which led to the
development of the human relations approach.
2. 3. 2 The human relations approach
The human relations approach, according to Mayo (1949), places emphasis on the affiliate
or social  motives of individuals. It focuses on the intervening variable between the design
of a job and its performance which advocates enriching jobs (or job design) as a means of
enhancing_personal motivation. Fe same reason it highlights peoples needs to work
(e.g., recognition, security, and sense of belonging). It emphasises  that people's
motivation is conditioned by social demands from both inside and outside the
organisation. It offers us a more thorough_understanding of interpersonal relations in
mativatian,_ As Lee and Lawrence (1991) state,
1
 the human relations approach tends to see the organisation's goals in terms of
more than just profit. It is suggested that management also have an obligation
to provide social and psychological satisfactions to employees. (Lee and
Lawrence, 1991, p.30)
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However, they note that the human relations approach is also subject to criticism. For
example it can be seen as merely a more sophisticated way of management's gaining
	  _
control of employees.
Aside from the scientific management approach which focuses on external motivation,
and the human relations approach which focuses on internal motivation (the need for
group belonging), Maslow (1954) portrays a range of human needs which have to be
considered. He developed a hierarchy of human needs theory which assumes that there are
at least five sets of goals which are called basic needs: physiological, safety, love, esteem,
and self-actualisation.
2. 3. 3 The hierarchy of human needs theory
The hierarchy of human needs theory was developed by Maslow (1954), which assumed
that human beings are 'wanting' animals: they have needs arranged in a hierarchy of
importance, with the most basic needs at the foundation of the hierarchy. In addition,
Maslow argues that people are motivated by the desire to achieve and/or maintain the
various conditions upon which these basic satisfactions rest, and by certain more
intellectual desires. He recognises that these basic needs are related to one another, being
arranged in a hierarchy; and when a need is fairly well satisfied, the next higher need
emerges.
However, there is a limitation stemming from the kinds of rewards sought. For example, it
is clear from Maslow's analysis that there are an exceedingly large number of outcomes
which are potentially favourable to human beings and only a small number of these
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outcomes are under direct managerial control. It is particularly difficult for the external
control system to encompass the higher order needs for esteem and self-actualisation. In
addition, as Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1973) note, certain rewards relevant to social
needs are under the control of the informal organisation. It is necessary to realise that the
hierarchy of human needs theory accepts that these needs always appear in a certain order
(from lower-level to higher-level). As Wehba and Bridwell (1979) comment,
The descriptive validity of Maslow's Need Classification scheme is not
established, although there are some indications that low-order and high-order
needs may form some kind of hierarchy. However, this two-level hierarchy is
not always operative, nor is it based upon the domination or gratification
concepts. (Wehba and Bridwell, 1979, p.52)
The possibility that needs of different levels can be met at the same time is not faced.
Maslow's needs hierarchy is also subjected to other criticisms. For example, Lee and
Lawrence (1991) point out that
Maslow's needs theory does not apply neatly to specific individuals 	 An
ambitious manager will become unpopular to achieve advancement,
sometimes taking considerable risks with personal financial security and even
working to physical and psychological exhaustion 	 And an equally difficult
problem for the practicing supervisor is that employees often obtain need
satisfaction outside of the work environment. (Lee and Lawrence, 1991, p.60)
Potter (1961) argues that Maslow's theory cannot reflect people's behaviour in the real
world because it is shaped by pressures and rewards which are "often beyond the
individual's control; choices are invariably compromises between desires and what is
feasible", and fails to recognise behaviour "as a result of the interaction of individual and
environmental characteristics" (p.2). Herzberg's (1968) motivation-hygiene theory
attempts to overcome some of the deficiencies of Maslow's need theory, and proposes that
more than one need may be operative to motivate people at the same time which allows
26
more flexibility than Maslow's theory. The differences underlying needs satisfaction at
different levels are further elaborated by Herzberg, as will be discussed next.
2. 3. 4 The motivation-hygiene theory
The motivation-hygiene concept of job attitudes, as developed by Herzberg (1968), states
that, at the psychological level, two determinants of job attitudes constitute a two-
dimensional need structure: one need system for the avoidance of unpleasantness and a
parallel need system for personal growth. He suggests that this paves the way for the
explanation of the duality of job attitude results. He notes that motivation factors are the
work itself, achievement, recognition, responsibility, advancement and growth, which are
the intrinsic elements of a job; while the hygiene factors, which are present in order to
prevent demotivation but cannot motivate by themselves, are supervision, interpersonal
relationships, pay and job security, and company policies; these are the extrinsic elements
of the job. Herzberg's work thus considers both task and context factors which influence
motivation.
Herzberg's work too is subject to some criticisms. For example, it merely seeks by
distinguishing two factors to form a general framework of motivation, irrespective of
personal characteristics and different cultures. Holloway (1991) argues that Herzberg's
assumptions about motivation "are (intended to be) universalistic despite the fact that they
are expressions of American human relations values and assumptions concerning personal
commitment to work" (p.105). In other words, Herzberg fails to account for different
cultural contexts in societies (I will discuss these issues further in the following chapters).
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Above, I have reviewed motivation drawn from a need-based perspective. The scientific
management approach (e.g., Taylorism) stresses the necessity of establishing the best
method of doing each job through the application of principles and also of ensuring that
people utilise that method. People are described as being induced to work effectively
through money incentives established by time-and-motion study. Maslow furthermore
points out not only that there are many needs beginning with basic physiological drives,
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but also that personal needs are arranged in a hierarchy whereby the lower-order needs
must be satisfied before the higher-order needs come into play. The human relations
approach places emphasis on the affiliative or social needs. Herzberg argues that people's
motivation results first of all from the content of the job, whereas aversion results from the
job context. All of these approaches are criticised primarily for sharing a universalistic
orientation which is applicable to all issues of motivation regardless of different cultures.
As Lee and Lawrence (1991) state,
Human needs fall into many categories and vary according to stage of
development and total life situation. These needs and motives will assume
varying degrees of importance to each person, creating some sort of hierarchy,
but this hierarchy is itself variable from person to person, from situation to
situation, and from one time to another. (Lee and Lawrence, 1991, p.61)
For motivation, it is necessary for us to consider different values, and to capture the
complexity of behaviour. One way in which we can broaden our understanding of this
complexity is by looking at what the process-based approaches have to say about the
subject.
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2. 4 The process-based motivation theories
The process-based theorists of motivation (e.g., Drucker, 1954; McGregor, 1960; Likert,
1961; Adams, 1963; Vroom, 1964; Ryan, 1970; Klinger, 1987) attempt to describe how
behaviour is directed and sustained. These approaches to motivation are concerned with
certain psychological processes underlying action. In particular, the process-based
motivation theories place heavy emphasis on describing the _ functioning of the
individual's expection as it relates to behaviour and on ways in which individuals become
motivated by wanting fair practice, and seek to understand their values or attitudes in
which motivated behaviour is the result of their own rational choices and conscious
intention. Equity theory, expectancy theory, and goal-setting theory (e.g., management by
objectives) will be explained by way of examples, in what follows.
2.4. 1 The equity theory
Equity theory, according to Adams (1963), is based on the concept of potential, or future,
perceived equitable payment. Adams' definition of inequality states that "inequality exists
for a person whenever he perceives that the ratio of his outcomes to inputs and the ratio of
others' outcomes to others' inputs are unequal" (p.22). This implies that an inequitable
relation occurs not only when the exchange is not in people's favour, but when it is to their
comparative disadvantage as well. Thus, a certain amount of over-reward may be seen as
lucky, whereas similar deviations in the direction of under-reward will not be so easily
tolerated. The presence of inequality creates tension which creates a drive to reduce the
inequality feelings. As Adams notes, people will resist real and cognitive changes in
inputs that are central to their self-concept. Moreover, people will be more resistant to
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changing cognition about their own outcomes and inputs than to changing their cognition
about others' outcomes and inputs. The tension of perceived procedural inequality lies in
its relation to the objectives of people's value. Thus, the equity process is essentially an
assessment of people's psychological contract with the organisation which is mainly based
on a comparison with the external rewards for others in the organisation.
Equity theory offers a useful approach to understanding a variety of social relationships
and interpersonal interactions in organisations. However, equity theory is subjected to
some criticisms (e.g., Goodman, 1974; Adams and Fredman, 1976; Walster, Bercheid,
and Walster,1976). For example, it can be said that this theory . fails to capture the
complexity of the real world and to appreciate actual comparison standards, and that it also
ignores the impact of different cultural contexts on people's perceptions of inequity.
Walster, Bercheid, and Walster (1976) also note that people's response to an inequitable
situation may be an expression of tension in a power inequality position and relationship (I
discuss the issues of power relations and ideology conflicts in Chapter 5). Therefore, one
of the major problems with which equity theory must cope is a large number of variables,
the complexities of their interaction and the inadequacy of the operational definitions. As
Vroom (1964) points out, the complexity of equity theory makes conclusive tests difficult,
and "a great deal of theoretical and methodological refinement remains to be carried out
before this approach can be properly evaluated" (p.172). Vroom proposed an alternative,
expectancy theory, which will be considered next.
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2. 4. 2 The expectancy theory
Expectancy theory, according to Vroom (1964), is based on the assumption that
employees make conscious and rational choices for their behaviour. He suggests that
motivation is a function of the expectancy of attaining a certain outcome in performing a
certain act multiplied by people's valuation of the outcome. He recognises that people
evaluate various behaviours rationally and then choose what they reco-gnise will lead to the
rewards that they expect most. In other words, people have different kinds of desires,
goals, and decisions, which are based on their perceptions of the degree to which a given
performance will produce any specific outcome. So the value of expectancy theory lies in
its ability to estimate how people perceive their circumstances on the basis of subjective
processes. As Mowday(1996) notes, expectancy theory appears to say that "individuals
attempt to maximise the attainment of valued outcomes and that motivation levels should
be high whenever attractive outcomes are made directly contingent upon performance"
(p.67).
However, expectancy theory does not specify which outcomes are relevant to a particular
context. Moreover, people are assumed to calculate the rewards that they expect to attain
when making a choice. It can be argued that people are not always conscious of their
motives, expectancies, and perceptual processes. Potter (1961) thus modify Vroom's
expectancy model, which emphasises that effort may not necessarily result in
performance, and extend the relationship between valence and expectancies, and effort or
motivation. They state that the personal performance of a task may be provided with
intrinsic rewards, extrinsic rewards, or both. They suggest that intrinsic rewards can be
more closely linked with good performance than extrinsic rewards, because intrinsic
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rewards can result directly from task performance in which the rewards are assessed
subjectively, and performance leads to satisfaction, whereas the external control system
stems from its reliance on some reasonably objective method of measuring or assessing
performance. Carter and Jackson (1993) consider that is why expectancy theory failed to
come up to expectation in terms of postmodernism. In the following, I consider goal-
setting theory to motivation in organisations.
2. 4. 3 The goal-setting theory
The goal-setting theory, according to Ryan (1970), assumes that people's actions are
directed by conscious goals and intentions, and that these goals influence what people will
do and how well they will perform a task. Thus, this theory specifies the factors that affect
goals, and their relationship to action and performance. However, goal-setting theory does
not assume that people's actions are under fully conscious control. Furthermore, it
suggests there are also actions that reflect a conflict between conscious intent and
subconscious desire. As Klinger (1987) states, a goal does not have to be consciously
apprehended during goal-oriented action in order for it to regulate action. Nonetheless,
goal-setting theory provides a useful and meaningful way to understand how to motivate
people towards the achievement of various goals. If goals are specific and fair and if
people accept and are committed to those goals, they are likely to work towards them.
Management by objectives (MBO), according to Drucker (1954) can be viewed as goal-
setting applied to the organisational level. MBO is a system for motivating and integrating
the efforts of managers by setting goals for the organisation as a whole and then cascading
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these objectives down through each management level, so that goal attainment at each
level helps attain goals at the next level and ultimately the goals of the whole organisation
(Carroll and Tosi, 1973). Thus, MBO is an effective and useful system for managing
goal-setting in organisations. However, it must be handled carefully; in particular,
organisations need to tailor it to their own unique circumstances. MBO does not specify
why people may be motivated to fulfil the goals of the organisation. It only assumes that
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once goals have been set, these become a motivating force for people, as they orient
themselves towards fulfilling the set objectives. Hence, MBO aims to be a process in
which some interests rule. We should be aware of this problem, so that MBO does not
become a tool which serves only some people's interests. What is here asked for is an
effective 'clamp' on unhealthy and ambitious aspirations in organisations.
As I shall show in the following chapters, other critics have more to state about the
operation of power in organisational life. The process-based motivation theories seem not
to concentrate on power issues as such, although they do point out how people's sense of
equity, development of expectations and desire to achieve organisational objectives, may
be linked to political processes in organisations. By implication they begin to develop a
concern for how these processes can be better understood. I will now introduce the
learning-based motivation theories.
2. 5 The learning-based motivation theories
Learning-based theories are not aimed primarily at studying needs or processes supporting
motivation, but are instead directed towards studying how people's orientations are learnt
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through their interactions with the orientations of others. Several authors (e.g., Argyris,
1972, 1973, 1990, 1992, 1993; Argyris and Schän, 1974, 1978, 1996; Luthans and
Kreither, 1975; Bandura, 1977; Cellar and Barrett, 1987; Wooda and Bandura, 1989;
Hulse, Deese and Egeth, 1992; Swieringa and Wierdsma, 1992) observe that learning
processes understand that people do not have fixed needs or a fixed hierarchy of needs,
nor do they have expectations and goals outside of what they learn throughout their lives.
As Hulse, Deese and Egeth (1992) note, learning is "a relatively permanent change in
behaviour or behavioural potential, based on direct or indirect experience" (p.12). In this
sense, people can be moulded by direct and indirect experiences which occur in their lives.
However, this view cannot explain more complex forms of learned behaviour and cannot
explain situations in which employees consciously and rationally choose one course of
action among many. As Cellar and Barrett (1987) note, learning is a cognitive process
which assumes employees are conscious in how they learn. For example, Wood and
Bandura (1989) argue that there are four underpinnings of the cognitive view of learning
as follows:
First, in the cognitive view, people draw on their experiences and use past
learning as a basis for present behaviour. Second, people make choices about
their behaviour. Third, people recognise the consequences of their choices.
Finally, people evaluate those consequences and add them to prior learning,
which affects future choices. (Wooda and Bandura, 1989, p.365)
Thus, people's behaviour is seen as a social experience in relation to the potential for
continuous transformation, which is based on interaction with others in different contexts.
Learning processes are thus viewed as dynamic. Reinforcement theory is offered to help
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understand the processes of people's learning in organisational settings. I discuss this
theory first before proceeding with some other learning-based theories to motivation.
2. 5. 1 The reinforcement theory
The concept of reinforcement focuses on the notion that specific behaviours are
strengthened or weakened as a result of the consequences that follow those behaviours.
Thus, reinforcement may be used to alter the probability of occurrence of particular
actions. Through a learning process, reinforcement is a consequence which will increase
the frequency of the behaviour that preceded it, thus, in any given situation, future
behaviour choices are affected by the consequences of earlier behaviours. Therefore,
learning plays an important part of the process which is based on the idea that some
consequences when experienced as desirable can act as a reinforcement. This makes
people decide to create a behaviour which will produce such consequences again in future.
As Luthans and Kreitner (1975) state, organisational behaviour modification
characteristically uses positive reinforcement to encourage desirable behaviours in
employees. However, Moorhead and Griffin (1995) note that although organisational
behaviour modification has considerable potential for enhancing motivated behaviour in
organisations, managers should be aware of ethical issues that surround its use. They
recognise the primary ethical argument that
its use has the potential to compromise individual freedom of choice.
Managers may tend to select reinforcement contingencies that have
advantages for the organisation, with little or no regard for what is best for the
individual employee. (Moorhead and Griffin, 1995, p.146)
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Bandura (1977) also notes the role that external events (e.g., consequences) play in
influencing behaviour, and also pays specific attention to psychological processes; that is,
people's behaviour is seen as being determined by their cognition and social environment.
Thus, motivational behaviour is not only a function of the consequences but is also
influenced by interaction factors (e.g., needs, expectancies, goals). So learning is being
seen increasingly as an important component of motivation. This does not mean that all
learning approaches treat people as 'objects' to be moulded by reinforcement. It is also
necessary to show that other learning approaches have also been developed to show up the
interplay of conflicting forces in an organisation and to suggest ways of dealing with them
(e.g., Argyris, 1992; and Swieringa and Wierdsma, 1992). Their arguments are briefly
outlined as follows.
2. 5. 2 Argyris's organisational learning
Argyris (1992) suggests that the problem with most theories of organisation and
motivation is that they are congruent with what he calls "Model I type behaviour" which is
not conducive to genuine learning in organisations (p.382). Therefore he subscribes to
what he calls Model II type behaviour, which suggests that it is possible for people to learn
in order to develop an organisational learning model. He recognises that the two models
are not necessarily opposites; however, they do represent different orientations to the
world. He states that the governing variables of Model II are
valid information, free and informed choice, and internal
commitment 	 Model II ...couples articulateness and advocacy with an
invitation to others to confront one's views, to alter them in order to produce
the position that is based on the most complete, valid information possible, to
which people can be internally committed
	 Every significant Model II action
is evaluated in terms of the degree to which it helps the individuals involved
generate valid and useful information (including relevant feelings), solve the
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problem in such a way that it remains solved, and do so without reducing the
present level of problem-solving effectiveness. (Argyris, 1992, p.384)
He is concerned that many motivation approaches see people as being as articulate as they
can be about their own goals, simultaneously trying to control others and the environment
in order to ensure that their own purposes are achieved. He believes that this is a flaw in
these motivation approaches, because they assume that people always operate in terms of
Modell behaviour (that is, directed to fulfil personal goals, rather than directed at learning
with others). Argyris and SchOn (1974) suggest that Model I type behaviour involves
strategies of control, self-protection, defensiveness, smoothing over, and covering up, of
which their users themselves often are unaware. In fact, Argyris (1982) believes that most
managers utilise Model I type behaviour which is characterised by defensiveness, self-
fulfilling, and escalating error --behaviour which it is difficult to change.
Instead, Argyris (1992) recognises that it is important for managers to be aware of Model
II possibilities for learning in order to minimise defensiveness, through collaboration. He
notes that the value of Model II behaviour is the way that it treats problems in such a way
that "they can remain solved" because an important characteristic of such problem-solving
is that the manager of a suggestion "feels responsible to present the evaluations and
attributions in such a way that they will be confronted openly and constructively" (p.384).
He states that, to date, the results of trying to intervene to help managers to bring about
change from Model I to Model II type orientations are encouraging. He claims that
managers may become accustomed to operating Model II type behaviour because it can be
learnt, and Model I type behaviour which most motivation approaches now consider to be
innate, is in fact learnt behaviour which can be changed. Argyris's version of
organisational learning is based on the idea that managers can learn new cultures and new
ways to behave. He suggests that it is preferable to study people's behaviour as if it can be
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motivated by Model II learning, because this can encourage this kind of behaviour in
organisations and in society more generally.
However, Argyris's organisational learning could be criticised for being too optimistic
about the way that humankind can relate to one another. It assumes that even managers
who have the most power in organisations will be willing to operate Model II, rather than
try to control others' behaviour. But, what is important about Argyris's work is that it
opens for managers the way to see how cultural patterns can become entrenched (Model I)
unless they are challenged. Moreover, it suggests that managers may be able to learn new
patterns, and it is not innate for managers to try to control others' behaviour. So it opens
up new avenues to motivation.
2. 5. 3 Becoming a learning organisation
Becoming a learning organisation, a process developed by Swieringa and Wierdsma
(1992), emphasises collective learning which involves dealing with variety and thus
involves contradictions and paradoxes. Furthermore, these authors isolate five ways in
which variety exists in an organisation:
1. People: thinkers alongside doers, reflections alongside desires,
individualists and team players, technically oriented alongside
commercially oriented.
2. Strategies: planned rational strategies alongside pragmatic intuitive
strategies.
3. Structures: simple lines alongside complex matrices.
4. Cultures: task culture alongside individual culture, role culture alongside
power culture.
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5. Systems: complex alongside simple, systems for action and systems for
reflection. (Swieringa and Wierdsma, 1992, p.77)
Considering all of these varieties, Swieringa and Wierdsma suggest that the best way to
handle them in a learning organisation is to admit consciously and explicitly that there will
always be contradictions and paradoxes that cannot be ironed out. Swieringa and
Wierdsma recognise that the conflicts that may arise because of these paradoxes should
not be seen as a threat to be avoided, but rather as a challenge to be faced. And they believe
that this will allow ongoing debate among the managers concerned, about rules of the
workplace, ideas, and principles. They propose that it is important that managers should
realise that "a learning organisation is not a paradise" (p.78). They recognise that learning
together while following the challenges set by the contradictions and paradoxes that arise
in organisations can be "burdensome, difficult, and sometimes very painful" (p.78).
Considerable effort has to be expended by managers to sustain the learning organisation
that is able to deal with all these challenges.
Swieringa and Wierdsma (1992) offer a number of reasons why organisations should
become learning organisations by considering the changing environment which
companies have to confront. They note the rapid changes in the environment and
summarise the most significant consequences of changes for the organisation as follows:
1. Companies have less and less time in which to build up carefully planned
organisations.
2. Radical changes are taking place in working processes due to progressive
automation and information structures.
3. In growth areas there is increasing emphasis on research, development,
service and loyalty.
4. The significant increase in the level of education combined with the
tendency towards individualisation means that people are beginning to
make different demands in cooperation.
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5. Individual and collective competencies acquired become out of date at an
ever increasing rate. (Swieringa and Wierdsma, 1992, p.79)
This environment creates 'opportunities' as well as 'threats', say these writers, and they
suggest that both the opportunities and the threats can be better handled if managers can
direct themselves to "learning to learn". They recognise that learning to learn requires
self-knowledge about how and why learning takes place, and demands that one learns to
stand outside of oneself and not become too self-absorbed, so that learning can take place.
But this does require courage. They summarise their views about the learning
organisation:
A learning organisation is based on a philosophy in which its members
consider themselves and each other as adults: as people who have the will and
the courage to take on responsibility for their own functioning in relation to
the other person, and who expect the same of the other person. (Swieringa and
Wierdsma, 1992, p.78)
They recognise that the quality that makes a learning organisation is the courage and
commitment of managers to be able to learn together to deal with these. They suggest that
people are not motivated merely by trying to fulfil their own needs or goals, or by trying to
gain positive reinforcement, and they recognise that the process of learning draws on other
qualities of people as part of their motivation to work together.
However, a possible criticism is that the learning organisation may be simply a
sophisticated tool for those in control of these organisations to cause others to work better.
A criticism such as the one Wright (1979) has of the human relations approach might be
extended to the purposes of the learning organisation. The learning organisation probably
can't escape from so being. Or again, Foucault (1979) might argue that power relations in
theories about learning organisations are still not explained or explored sufficiently. This
is a possible weakness of these approaches. These comments by critics will be discussed
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in Chapter 6, where I propose it is necessary to move towards critical systemic learning in
organisations.
The learning-based motivation theories recognise that people's behaviour is not a function
of the situation but is also influenced by both internal and environmental factors. So these
authors encourage us to think about differing motivation factors, by relying on our own
experiences of working with others and how we can learn from others. However, these
approaches seem not to concentrate on ideology conflicts and power relations in given
organisational contexts.
2. 6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined some of Moorhead and Griffin's (1995) classification of
motivation theories. The first perspective views needs as socially acquired attributes of the
individual, rather than as innate psychological characteristics. It suggests factors exist
within the individual, that energise, direct, and sustain behaviour. These approaches to
motivation are concerned with the identification of important internal elements and
explanation of how these elements may be prioritised within the individual. The second
framework views motivation as a psychological processes. The process-based approaches
attempt to describe how behaviour is energised, directed, and sustained. These approaches
focus on certain psychological processes underlying action. In particular, process-based
approaches emphasis on describing the functioning of the individual's decision system as
it relates to behaviour. The third viewpoint conceives of intervening motivation as a
learning process. This perspective identifies organisational features that impede effective
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motivation and develops interventions for improving how organisations learn to change
themselves.
These theories offer significant insights for improving motivation in organisations.
However, there exist serious limitations, some of which have been outlined. These
motivation theories have a common weakness, in that all of them tend to model
organisations on their own particular assumptions, yet each of, them claims to be
'universal'. Therefore each downplays or excludes other equally important dimensions.
While each of these approaches remains a useful tool to deal with the problems of
motivation in organisations, there are three particular limitations which should be
considered. The first is imposed by the presence of multiple views on the situation when
defining motivation to be considered, thus, there is no best and all-encompassing approach
in organisations. The second is present when the system in which a problem exists is of a
highly complex character, for example, as in society that exist in different cultures. The
third concerns social effects, for example, ideology conflicts and power relations
embedded in given organisational contexts. In this thesis, reflection on such a view is
essential both for the purpose of explaining the limitations of the existing motivation
approaches and for the development of a critical systemic approach to motivation that can
overcome these limitations.
Given the first limitation, we require some means for organising the plurality of
motivation theories. In the next chapter, the theories discussed above will be further
examined through an organisation analysis framework, such as Burrell and Morgan's
(1979) 'sociological paradigms' framework. Given the second and third limitations, it is
also necessary to show how we can examine the different theories on the basis of
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assumptions we make about problem situations through Jackson and Keys' (1984)
'system of systems methodology' framework, which is designed to classify methodologies
according to the view they take of problem situations.
-
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Chapter 3
Critical Commentary on the Literature on Motivation
3. 1 Introduction
'
We have seen how there exists a diversity of approaches to motivation, each with its own
particular assumptions. We have also seen that this variety presents a number of problems
for practising managers. This chapter begins to look at ways for dealing with one of these
problems, or limitations, as identified in the preceding chapter, namely the problem of
plurality amongst the methods available for dealing with motivation issues.
Since the different motivation approaches are based on different assumptions, the
question is how we are to make sense of that as practising managers. We have seen how
Moorhead and Griffin (1995) classify motivation approaches, but this only shows us one
means for differentiating them whilst not providing managers with a means for choosing
between the various approaches. Other frameworks exist within the social sciences which
could be put to use to provide further insights into which approach to use and when, and
two such frameworks, that have been widely drawn upon, will now be used to see whether
they will provide more guidance to people wishing to intervene in motivation issues.
In order to address this problem, I will firstly consider Burrell and Morgan's
categorisation of different social theories based on ontological and epistemological
assumptions and the nature of society. They suggest that there are basically four broad
paradigms co-existing in society. Burrell and Morgan's framework will help to examine -
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paradigmatic assumptions to give us a deeper understanding of the differences between
theories of motivation. However, questions arise such as, can the problems of motivation
be solved by means of a single approach? If not, how can we relate different motivation
approaches together? Pluralism suggests that theoretical and practical developments will
be mutually informing. It recognises that different approaches address different aspects of
the management task. The system of systems methodologies (Jackson and Keys, 1984;
-
Jackson, 1987, 1990) will be given as an example to managing pluralism. Jackson and
Keys's framework will give an indication of when theories are best applied, given that we
can accept theoretical pluralism. Through the use of these two frameworks I aim to
provide a critical analysis of the motivation literature and, furthermore, to begin to
organise and evaluate the many motivation approaches in a way that will prove of use to
practising managers.
In concluding the chapter I highlight some central issues arising during motivation
interventions which are of concern for me, and for motivation theorists more generally.
My discussions in this chapter lead the way towards the following chapters where I further
explore the issues in motivation interventions and how the relations between the available
approaches can be made more critical and systemic. I provide the background to an
argument about this by indicating why a critical systemic approach to motivation is
necessary.
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3. 2 The concept of Burrell and Morgan's sociological paradigms framework
Burrell and Morgan (1979) developed a useful tool that should enable us to map different
theories in terms of the sociological paradigms which underpin them. They believe that
these paradigms can be identified by examining the kinds of assumptions made by the
theories. In this regard, Burrell and Morgan suggest that "assumptions about the nature of
social science can be thought of in terms of an objective-subjective dimension, and the
nature of society can be thought of in terms of a regulation-radical change dimension"
(p.21). They combine the objective-subjective dimension with the regulation-radical
change dimension, and produce a matrix defining the four key sociological paradigms:
functionalist, interpretative, radical structuralist, and radical humanist, as indicated in
Figure 3.1 (p.23).
RADICAL
Radical
Humanist
Radical
Structuralist
Interpretive Functionalist
REGULATION
0
V
Figure 3.1. Burrell and Morgan's Four Paradigms for Analysis of Social Theory
(Source: Burrell and Morgan, 1979; p.23)
They recognise that debate between theorists who adopt different perspectives within the
problem context of any given paradigm is allowed, and each paradigm identifies an unique
social-scientific reality. They argue:
To be located in a particular paradigm is to view the world in a particular way.
The four paradigms thus define four views of the social world based upon
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different meta-theoretical assumptions with regard to the nature of science
and society. (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.24)
This framework provides us with a way of identifying the basic different assumptions
between different motivation theories and the underlying frames of reference which we
adopt. A point worthy of emphasising is that this framework stresses that the four
paradigms offer alternative views of social reality. Burrell and Morgan suggest that: the
functionalist paradigm rests on the premises that society has a real concrete existence and
systematic character, is directed toward order and regulation, and is believed to be
objective and value-free; the interpretative paradigm, the social world possesses a
precarious existence, and social reality is the product of inter-subjective experience; the
radical humanist paradigm shares with the interpretative paradigm the assumption that
social reality is socially constructed, however, the social construction is tied to a situation
in which the consciousness of individuals is dominated by ideological superstructures; the
radical structuralist paradigm, social reality is considered to be objective, and the social
world to be characterised by intrinsic conflict and contradictions.
As indicated, the four paradigms define fundamentally different perspectives for the
analysis of social phenomena. Burrell and Morgan emphasise that "analyses based within
mutually exclusive paradigms and relying on different theoretical assumptions would
appear to be incommensurable" (p.25). This implies that sociological world is divided,
splintered, and rived with internal dispute. However, Gregory (1992) recognises a number
of deficiencies in Burrell and Morgan's work, especially when considered from the
perspective of critical systems thinking (CST), and drew attention to the limitations of
their investigation into alien and different paradigms. She argues that their approach
seems to imply that theories cannot communicate with and learn from one another.
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But before going into a discussion of this, it is important to consider whether it might be
worthwhile to apply a paradigm analysis to different motivation approaches discussed in
Chapter 2. This may enable us to see how each paradigm offered important insight
perspectives, as well as to consider the implications of the contradictory nature of many of
the assumptions on which the different theories are based. For example, Burrell and
Morgan's framework has been adopted and applied within the study of organisational
-
behaviour (e.g., Forester, 1983; Holbrook, 1987; Hirschmann, 1990), and within systems
science (e.g., Jackson, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991a, b; Flood and Jackson, 1991a, b).
Ultimately, as I show in my thesis, some way of working with these contradictions must
be developed, as an aid both to organisational analysis and to intervention.
3. 3 Using Burrell and Morgan's framework for analysis of the need-based
motivation theories
Need-based motivation theories (e.g., scientific management approach; human relations
approach; Maslow's need theory; motivation-hygiene theory) assume that when
employees' needs are not met or satisfied, then they experience tension which will
motivate them to act in order to satisfy these needs and thereby reduce or relieve the
tension. The assumptions behind the scientific management approach fit the description of
a functionalist view which is believed to be objective and value free. The idea is that it is
possible to study the way that humans behave and to organise patterns of work life which
will be ordered and regulated. Critics (e.g., radical humanists) from other paradigms are
critical of this way of seeing society, with its focus on establishing order through control
4.
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and with its suggestion (pretence) that this is an objective, value-free approach. Critics
show that this is not value-freedom, because what is valued is the assumption of order and
regulation as the basis for social relations.
Still classified under the need-based theory, the human relations school can be seen as
fitting more into the 'interpretative' paradigm. The human relations school was aware that
groups working together may be precarious, and hence they tried to develop suggestions
for making this more feasible. As we saw in Chapter 2, some critics (e.g., some of the ones
discussed by Rose, 1985) feel that this approach is still regulatory in some way. The
criticism also concurs with the description of the interpretative paradigm.
Again under the need-based theory, I consider Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory, which
suggests that people's lives depend on the way they interact with others, because he
indicates that towards the top of the hierarchy, social needs (e.g., for esteem) become
important. He also emphasises the importance of self-actualisation needs, freedom of
enquiry and expression needs, and the need to know and to understand. I indicated in
Chapter 2 that Maslow was influenced by humanistic values, and that he saw people's
actions as initiated by attempts to satisfy changing needs. This might suggest that
Maslow's theory bears similarity to the 'interpretative' block (being a voluntarist
approach). Alternatively, it also could be seen to have links with the radical humanism.
This depends on how 'radically' we wish to see Maslow's suggestions.
Probably, many critics (e.g., from the radical humanist perspectives) would argue that
Maslow's hierarchy of needs is not sufficiently radical because it still may imprison
people. It still can be used by organisational leaders as a way of getting people to fit in
with the basic imperative of the organisation, even though some scope is created for them.
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to self-actualise within it. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Maslow's theory can have
more radical consequences for ways of organising in society. But, for this to be so, more
'radical' content would have to be put into the theory, thus moving it into the 'radical
humanist' quadrant that the social construction is tied to a situation in which people find
themselves the prisoners of the social world they create. To move out of this prison,
Maslow's theory needs to be developed to provide more detail about how this may be
-
possible. The same comments can be made in respect of the last need-based theory
discussed in Chapter 2 (namely, motivation-hygiene theory). Motivation-hygiene theory
has some radical humanist potential, that is, some potential to challenge the way that work
life is currently organised, but this is, as yet, not fully developed in the theory. It could be
suggested that because of its non-radical assumptions, it is unlikely that the theory ever
will develop in a different direction. The theory will continue to see the needs that it has
identified as capable of being fulfilled in work life, without needing radical changes in our
cultural orientations. However, some sympathisers of the theory may support it by saying
that the needs which it identifies already imply that radical changes need to take place in
order to begin to satisfy those needs. This means that the theory has some radical potential.
Some of the critics whom I mentioned in Chapter 2, come from the 'radical structuralist'
framework. For example, Wright (1979) criticises need-based theories because the
theories have not explored the underlying structures that lead towards work being
organised in the way that it is. For these radical structuralists, social reality is patterned in
definite ways, and this leads to the intrinsic conflict and contradictions in work life. I have
shown with reference to need-based theories how sociological paradigms can be useful to
show some of the assumptions held by theorists and how they can be criticised by
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invoking other assumptions. Below, I continue to use the sociological paradigms to
examine the process-based motivation theories discussed in Chapter 2.
3. 4 Using Burrell and Morgan's framework for analysis of the process-based
motivation theories
-
Process-based motivation theories (e.g., equity theory; expectancy theory; goal-setting
theory) explain work behaviour in terms of the cognitive process which the individual
goes through before and during the behaviour. These theories seek to identify the process
and examine people's needs, as well as their perceptions of their ability to perform the
requisite behaviour and their expectations relative to the outcomes of the behaviour.
The equity process as seen by equity theory is essentially a personal assessment of one's
psychological contract. People form perceptions of equity or inequity by comparing what
they give to the organisation relative to what they get back and how this ratio compares
with those of others. As a result of perceptions of equity or inequity, people can choose a
variety of responses in an effort to maintain equity or reduce perceived inequity. From this
description, it seems that we can place equity theory in the interpretative quadrant. The
theory looks at people's subjective experiences of equity and their sense of whether they
are being treated fairly. It also looks at the processes by which people come to define their
own responses, as they interact with others. It is not in the functionalist theory, because it
is not about maintaining social order through control mechanisms. It is more concerned
with the way in which people act as a result of their perceptions of situations. However, it
does not appear to be a radical humanist theory, except insofar as it would prescribe
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changes to the culture which allow for more debate about how to generate equity. As with
Maslow's theory (discussed in the previous section on need-based theories), further
development of equity theory could perhaps lead to it being moved into the radical
quadrant. At the moment, the way that it describes people's perceptions of equity as
forming the basis for their motivations does not seem to suggest a concern with radical
change. As far as radical change of a structural kind is concerned, equity theory has not
,
concentrated on making structural suggestions for improved equity in the workplace and
in society more generally. So it cannot be placed in the radical structuralist quadrant.
Critics of equity theory, especially more radically inclined critics, could suggest that a
more radical theory, based on following-up the idea of social equity, needs to be further
explored. Functionalist critics on the other hand, would say that the focus of equity theory
is too much on the processes by which individuals come to see their world and make
choices. They would say that social order depends on people being concerned about the
way that the collective is functioning. People's perceptions of equity have to be modified
in relation to a concern with the proper functioning of the whole system.
Expectancy theory, another process-based motivation theory, can be seen similarly to
equity theory. It attempts to take into account humankind variability and complexity, and
presents a model that allows the impact of human subjectivity upon motivational
processes. The basic premise of expectancy theory, according to Vroom (1964), is that
motivation depends on how much people want something and how likely they think they
are to get it. Vroom suggests that the performance-to-outcome expectancy is the belief that
performance will lead to certain outcomes, and that valence is the desirability of the
individual of the various possible outcomes of performance. The theory, like equity
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theory, places considerable emphasis on individual decision-making based on people's
perceptions of what is desirable and their perceptions of the likelihood of their attaining
the desirable. The comments made above about equity theory are similarly applicable to
expectancy theory. It does not bear much similarity to the functionalist paradigm because
the focus is individualistic and subjectivistic. It might have radical humanist potential, but
only if changes to the culture were seen as something that needs to be explored by the
-
theory. It is not a radical structuralist position. It would move in that direction only if it
started to speak about the changes to the social structure that needed to be made to allow
different people's expectancies to be met.
The goal-setting theory, also is a process-based theory, that I discuss. It assumes that
behaviour is the result of conscious goals and participation. Therefore, by setting goals for
people in the organisation, it should be possible to influence their behaviour. In this
premise, the challenge is to develop a thorough understanding of the processes by which
people set goals and then work to reach them. This theory, when linked to Management by
Objectives (MBO) (as it often is) links up with some functionalist assumptions. MBO is a
generalised method of using the goal setting process throughout an organisation in a
systematic and organised fashion. As Flood and Carson (1993) note, the starting point in a
successful MBO programme is top management support, and top managers must stand
behind the programme and take the first step by establishing overall goals for the
organisation. After initial organisational goals have been set, with the support of these top
managers, supervisors and sub-ordinates throughout the organisation collaborate in
setting sub-goals. From this description of MBO, we can see some functionalist
assumptions. The assumption seems to be that order and regularity can be achieved if
goals can be set for the system and if the various subsystems can be brought in line with
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these goals, so that there will be no clashes between the whole and its parts. It also seems
to suggest a scientific examination of how goals and sub-goals can be set so as to avoid
disorder. Again, this links up with the functionalist view that value-free enquiry into the
system is possible.
I suggest that MBO also could be linked up with the interpretative perspective. The theory
can allow for subjective perceptions and group (coalition) definitions about how people
may fulfil objectives in the organisation, for example, especially when it is combined with
a theory such as that of Lee and Lawrence (1991), discussed in Chapter 2). Then, it bears
some similarity to the interpretative paradigm. However, I do not see that as yet it can be
described as falling within either radical humanist or radical structuralist paradigms. To
learn from the more radical approaches, it needs to explore further some of the issues of
power that I raised in Chapter 2.
3. 5 Using Burrell and Morgan's framework for analysis of the learning-based
motivation theories
Learning-based motivation theories (e.g., reinforcement theory; organisational learning
theory) explain work behaviour in terms of studying how people's orientations are learnt
through their interactions with others. Reinforcement theory offers us an understanding of
human learning processes in an organisational setting. People can be moulded by direct or
indirect experiences which occur in their life. Luthans and Kreitner (1975) suggest that
reinforcement theory is based upon the idea that behaviour is a function of its
consequences. Therefore, behaviour choices are affected by the consequences of earlier
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behaviours. Organisational behaviour modification, as I discussed it in Chapter 2,
represents a major motivational theory that guides managers in their application of
reinforcement theory to the behaviour of subordinates. Organisational behaviour
modification characteristically uses positive reinforcement to encourage desirable
behaviours in employees.
From this brief description we can already see that reinforcement theory has some
similarity with functionalism. The idea of reinforcement is linked to the possibility of
taking control of people's behaviours to ensure that it fits in with the regular order of the
whole system. It is not an interpretative theory (as I explained in Chapter 2, it is more
positivist oriented, seeing people's behaviour as caused by extended factors, which
condition their responses). It is also not radical humanist, nor radical structuralist. It is not
aimed at finding a way of radically changing either culture or structure in society. Foucault
(1979) shows that the way in which social order in society may be linked, in micropolitical
ways, to the control and subjugation of subjects. Foucault's criticism is from a radical
angle, because it criticises the order with a view to making people want to challenge this
type of order.
Becoming a learning organisation was developed by Swieringa and Wierdsma (1992).
They suggest that people are not motivated merely by trying to fulfil their own needs or
goals, or by trying to get positive reinforcement. They recognise that a learning
organisation is the courage and commitment of its members to live with the paradoxes and
contradictions in the organisation and to be able to learn together to deal with these. At
present, these approaches do not concentrate so much on the issue of power in work life,
nor on the question of whether and what structural changes may need to occur for change
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to take place. Perhaps, these approaches could learn from more radical perspectives. And
likewise the more radical ones might learn from them. For example, the more radical
approaches could become more aware of the processes of learning and the commitments
that may be required by people before 'change' can take place. Perhaps, furthermore,
interpretative and radical humanist and radical structuralist approaches can learn
something from the functionalist approach about the need to have some kind of order. As
long as none of the paradigms looks able to offer the final universal theory, it seems that
there is room for them all: They may all have something to offer.
In summary, as I have shown above, different motivation approaches can be located
according to their basic assumptions, and each approach represents a distinctive view of
reality. It clearly shows that people in different paradigms view motivation differently;
there is no a priori basis for deciding which paradigm has the better problem-solving
ability and thus the right to substitute for other paradigms. But, it helps us to identify
possible criticisms of a theory, seen from other perspectives which do not share its
assumptions. Before we move on to argue the need for a critical systemic approach to
motivation, the question arises concerning paradigm (in)commensurability. Burrell and
Morgan tend to argue that the separate worlds into which they divide the paradigmatic
world are incommensurable. Some authors (e.g., Reed, 1985, 1992; Gioia and Pitre, 1990;
Midgley, 1992, 1995a, b; Gregory, 1992, 1996a, b; Flood, 1995, 1996; Flood and Romm,
1996a) note that Burrell and Morgan's framework overstates the extent of paradigm
incommensurability.
As we shall see in Chapter 4, pluralist systemic approaches go further than do sociological
paradigms in helping us to deal with the diversity of available approaches in interventions.
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As Gregory (1992) notes, Burrell and Morgan's framework can be argued that the
framework may not really help us to see how the theories can learn from one another (it
leaves the issues of learning unanswered). But, at least it does help us to see the starting
points from which the theories begin their analyses, by looking at some of their underlying
assumptions.
Jackson and Keys (1984), following in the steps of Burrell and Morgan (1979), developed
another way of seeing how room can be made for the various paradigms, or systems of
thought, in their 'system of systems methodologies" (SOSM). This is discussed in the
following section.
3. 6 Jackson and Keys' "system of systems methodologies" framework
Jackson and Keys (1984) sought to provide a SOSM framework, later developed by
Jackson (1987), which was designed to make sense of the interrelationships between
methodologies. It is suggested that systems methodologies be examined along with their
relative efficacy in solving problems in various real-world problems contexts. According
to Jackson and Keys (1984), an ideal-type grid of problem contexts is made up of two
dimensions: one defining the nature of the systems (mechanical and systemic) in which
the problems of concern are located and the other the nature of the relationships between
the participants (unitary and pluralist) who have an interest in the problem context.
However, according to Jackson (1987), if there is little common interest between the
participants, there is fundamental conflict, and the only consensus that can be achieved is
through the exercise of power, then the problem context is called coercive. His extended
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version of the earlier framework yields a six celled matrix. He recognises that problem
contexts can be seen to fall into the following categories: mechanical-unitary, systemic-
unitary, mechanical-pluralist, systemic-pluralist, mechanical-coercive, and systemic-
coercive, indicated in Figure 3.2.
PARTICIPANTS
UNITARY	 PLURALIST
	
COERCIVE
Mechanical-
Unitary
Mechanical-
Pluralist
,
Mechanical-
Coercive
Systemic-
Unitary
Systemic-
Pluralist
Systemic-
Coercive
Figure 3.2 Jackson's Version of Grid of Problem Situations
(source: Jackson,1991a, p.29)
Jackson suggests that these six ideal-types of problem contexts imply the need for
different types of problem-solving methodologies. This provides a very convenient means
of classifying available systems approaches, and matching them to problem contexts.
Thus, the SOSM framework provides the interrelationship between different systems
approaches and the relationship these have to ideal-type problem contexts.
I will briefly show the utility of this framework compared with that of Burrell and
Morgan's framework. One difference between this framework and that of Burrell and
Morgan is that it introduces six cells, which therefore may allow us to classify approaches
with more richness (than a four fold framework). A second difference is that it begins to
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offer us a way of thinking about how to apply the variety of approaches, instead of just
being faced with the variety. By way of example, let us consider how the SOSM
framework could be used to address some of the motivation theories that appear in the
literature.
3. 7 Using Jackson and Keys's framework for analysis of the need-based
motivation theories
Let us first consider, within need-based motivation theories, Taylor's scientific
management approach which believed that the best way of doing each task in an
organisation can be established and, on this basis, a fair day's pay for a fair day's work can
be calculated. Taylor also assumed that people are primarily motivated by monetary
rewards in the work place. Using the six-cell approach of the SOSM framework, I suggest
that this kind of needs approach falls into the mechanical problem context because it
presupposes a relatively simple system, where the elements are the amount of work to be
achieved and the amount of pay assigned accordingly. The nature of the relationship
between participants that is assumed in this need-based theory, can be seen as unitary. The
common objective of both managers and workers is for workers to obtain rewards
according to their job performance. The suggestion is that if work can be organised in
terms of a good piece work system, the participants (employers and employees) can reach
agreement on objectives, because they share the common belief that work must be
rewarded on the basis of a fair pay for fair day's work. So, Taylor's scientific management
can be seen as applicable (ideal-typically) to a mechanical-unitary problem context. It
means that if it is the case in a situation that all are agreed that a fair day's work demands
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a fair day's pay and all can agree on how to organise this, then the need-based theory of
Taylor could be relevant to this context.
Considering another one of the need-based theories, namely, the human relations
approach, I would argue that it bears resemblance to the mechanical-pluralist position.
Social reality in this theory is seen as the product of intersubjective experience. The
relationship between the component parts of the system are seen as relatively simple by
this approach of thought. It is a matter of organising team work to allow for people to work
well together. This approach presupposes that there are differences between the subjects,
i
hence the intersubjectivity may be precarious, but that agreements can be reached. Hence,
because of this presupposition, this fits the pluralist cell. The implications of placing this
approach here means that, if there is a situation which for the most part we can consider as
having mechanical-pluralist features, then the human relations approach might be a
relevant way of looking at motivation in that situation.
3. 8 Using Jackson and Keys's framework for analysis of the process-based
motivation theories
I now consider a systemic-unitary problem context and I consider motivation theories that
might be applicable in such contexts. I suggest, by way of example, that the (process-
based) goal-setting theory called Management by Objectives (MBO) fits in with the
systemic-unitary cells. The connections between the components and the amount of
components in the system are more complex than a mere simple system would have. MBO
assumes that there are many interacting parts of the system, which means that goals and
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subgoals have to be set at a variety of levels in the system. This leads me to state that a
complex system is presupposed by the theory. In terms of the relationship between the
participants, MBO normally assumes (unless it becomes linked with a theory like the
coalition theory) that there will not be differing interests and objectives in the system. So
this fits the unitary classification. The implications of placing MBO in the systemic-
unitary category of the matrix is the following. If it is the case that there is a relatively
complex connection between goals and subgoals of levels of a system and it is the case
that participants can reach agreement on what these goals are because they share common
objectives and ideas, then MBO might be a relevant theory to apply in this problem
context. The theory could help people to see how they can become motivated to fulfil
goals that have been set.
3. 9 Using Jackson and Keys's framework for analysis of the learning-based
motivation theories
We can see Argyris's (1992) theory of organisational learning as bearing some
resemblance to the mechanical-coercive cell. I state this especially in view of the fact that
Argyris describes Model I behaviour as relatively simple terms. The connections between
parts of the system are built on a pattern of defensive responses on the part of people.
People solve problems by being defensive about their solutions, and by defending
mistakes made, too. Thus, they reduce problem-complexity. Argyris also appears to see
Model I behaviour as linked to forms of coercion and control. For this reason, we may
regard Model I in Argyris's view of learning as having some relevance in what Jackson
(1987) calls the mechanical-coercive contexts. Of course, what he hopes to achieve is a
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situation where the context can be changed (through learning) to a situation where Model
II behaviour can take root. His hope is to change such contexts through his new theory of
motivation. The theory opens the way for us to look at the way that cultural patterns can
become entrenched (Model I) unless they are challenged. It suggests that motivation
approaches which support defensive reactions need to give way to new forms of
motivating people. If the radical importance of his suggestions for a change of culture and
-
a challenge existing cultural patterns can be drawn out more fully, it provides a way of
looking at what Jackson (1987) calls mechanical-coercive contexts. It also provides a way
of challenging these contexts to create change.
The learning theory which has been developed by Swieringa and Wierdsma (1992) is
similar to the one explained by Argyris (1992), but it emphasises more that collective
learning involves dealing with variety and that this in turn involves contradictions and
paradoxes. Because of this, it might be appropriate to see this theory as falling more in the
systemic-coercive cell. Swieringa and Wierdsma suggest that the conflicts that may arise
because of these paradoxes should not be seen as a threat to be avoided, but rather as a
challenge to be faced. They propose that it is important that members of the organisation
realise that a learning organisation is not a paradise. The idea behind their proposal is that
conflicts are a result of the complex character of the connections among all the
components of a system, and furthermore, we should not expect to resolve these conflicts.
This seems to suggest that Swieringa and Wierdsma hold a complex view of the
connections between parts of systems. It also seems to suggest that they do not uphold a
pluralist view. They see conflict as taking place continuously between what may be
incompatible ways of working, as well as incompatible ways of organising. They
recognise that these conflicts can be resolved through coercion, if one way of working or
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doing in the organisation becomes all powerful. Therefore, in some ways their theory is
applicable to coercive contexts. Like Argyris (1992), they suggest a way of trying to
address this. But as shown in my discussion in Chapter 2, they do not provide a full
exploration of how this can occur. It is for this reason that some critics could argue that
their theory needs a fuller exploration of issues of power. Also a theory of ideological
forces in society, outside of specific organisations, might be needed to supplement the
approach.
It is worth noting here that the SOSM framework can also be used to show that motivation
theories to deal with either mechanical-coercive or systemic-coercive contexts are not
fully developed in terms of the purpose of bringing about change. If we wish to bring
about change, we may need to be supplemented with more detailed explorations of power
and ideology in organisations and in society. I believe that if we want to develop a critical
systemic approach to issue of motivation in organisations, we have to think more about
such issues. But in thinking about such issues, it is also important t9 consider the ideas that
have been offered by many motivation theories, such as theories discussed in this and
Chapter 2, in coming up with a critical systemic of thought. In my following chapter I
offer a discussion of pluralist systemic approach in systems thinking, and I relate this
discussion to some of the ideas that I have developed in this chapter regarding different
motivation theories.
In summary, I have shown above, by way of example, using a number of motivation
approaches, how the SOSM framework allows us to consider the available approaches in
relation to the types of organisational contexts at which they are suited to look. It also
brings in the idea of intervention, that is, the idea that a approach can be used actually to
64
deal with the problem of motivation that it identifies. I showed this problem-orientation in
relation to the examples. This may help us to see different problem-contexts in which the
available approaches may be most relevant. The SOSM framework may provide a starting
point for us to consider how the available approaches may have relevance in given
organisational contexts. It helps us to see that not all the theories need to be applied in
every context. It means that we do not have to reject any approach outright, as long as
there is some context in which it seems to be applicable. As I sho-wed, when discussing
Burrell and Morgan's (1979) sociological paradigms, this does not mean that the available
approaches cannot learn from one another. This framework helps us to see (as a starting
point) the initial assumptions of different approaches. We can still go on to see how the
available approaches can learn from one another, and thus expand their ideas as well as
their usefulness. We can also see where we feel that more work needs to be done to
develop a critical systemic approach to motivation. But, the current motivation
approaches lack sufficient breadth of view to look at the problems of motivation (seeing
only one theoretical position as valid).
Indeed, motivation is so complex that it is impossible to produce a satisfactory, unified
body of thought that can assist with all its aspects. Social circumstances and individuals'
understandings change constantly. Any review result needs to be seen as a reference point
for the next critique. We should realise that we have to view the available approaches
according to our shifting interpretations of current organisational circumstances, and
constantly update our ability and knowledge. Thus, the diversity of available motivation
approaches cannot be concretely fixed, but should be used dynamically according to the
assumptions and knowledge among interventionists.
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3. 10 What can be learnt from the use of the two frameworks?
As Schiin (1983) states, technical rationality (accepting ends as given and focusing purely
on means) is unable to open to question the underlying understandings and assumptions
by which decisions on end objectives are reached. He argues that assumptions needs to be
reflected upon and reviewed in order for us to improve our ability to learn and be
-
effective. The process to critique our assumptions is to be open to external views, beliefs,
and assumptions.
In considering motivation interventions, it is important to examine managers' experiences
in combination with the influences of social contexts, and these concerns form a basis for
our value judgements to choose from the available approaches in motivation
interventions. Brown and Wilby (1996) point out that to make interventions effective,
managers need to be responsive to the participants and various definitions of their
situations; to be willing with participants to adjust not only their actions, but also their
underlying assumptions; and to maximise the learning potential of the situation. They
argue that managers may individually reflect on an intervention, but reflective potential is
enhanced by also reflecting with the participants, to open managers to the challenge of
their views and perspectives. Moreover, managers have a moral responsibility, concerned
with individual rights and social responsibilities. This is because of the social and
individual biases that inevitably affect the intervention process. Assessment or
appreciation is a learning process which enriches our understanding through challenges to
our underlying assumptions.
66
Before coming to a more detailed discussion about how to offer procedures to integrate all
available approaches to motivation in a process which ensures that they are employed to
tackle only the issues they are best suited to, it is worthwhile exploring the issues arising
during motivation intervention. The preceding discussion suggests that following issues
should be taken into account: Pluralism in available approaches to motivation, power
relations and ideology conflicts in organisations, a critical systemic view of learning
,
during motivation interventions, and cross-cultural influences on motivation.
This section aims to explore, in terms of self-society dynamics, how these questions
influence managers when dealing with the problems of motivation. To begin with, let us
focus on the issues associated managing with managing the diversity of available
motivation approaches in a way which respects all their qualities.
3. 10. 1 The issues of pluralism in available approaches to motivation
From Jackson and Keys's (1984) point of view, to choose a suitable approach(es) in
interventions, managers firstly need to understand the problem situation. The question
arises, how can managers choose from the available motivation approaches to suit their
own organisational contexts? Some critical systems thinkers (e.g., Flood, 1989, 1990,
1995; Jackson, 1990, 1991a, 1997; Flood and Jackson, 1991a; Midgley, 1992, 1995a, b,
1996, 1997a; Gregory, 1992, 1996a, b; Flood, 1995; Flood and Romm, 1995a, b, 1996a;
Wilby, 1996; Ho, 1998) consider that managers should adopt pluralism in available
approaches to deal with the wide variety of problem situations that face them. For
example, Jackson (1991a) notes that each approach addresses different interventions in a
specific problem situation, and states that "these alternative positions must be respected,
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and different theoretical underpinnings and the methodologies to which they give rise
developed in partnership" (p.186). Flood (1995) argues that no approach should be chosen
and used in an arbitrary pattern, and available approaches need to be evaluated before
intervention. Flood and Romm (1995a) recognise that pluralism is an attempt to preserve
diversity in approaches which enhance our ability to deal with the diversity of problem
situations. Flood and Romm (1996a) note that we should continually be open to accept
-
diversity of discourse, and that we should permit different points of view about the choice
of available approaches. However, we may ask, why an approach(es) should or should not
be considered appropriate for a specific intervention? Wilby (1996) observes that different
people might make different interpretations about the consequences of applying the
available approaches for intervention in a particular time and problem situation. As she
says,
....precise interpretation is still a subjective task dependent both on the
individual's biases and the context of the situation the individual is in at that
time. The interpretation of any generated information is therefore open to both
the internal limits of the individual in terms of skill, knowledge, and biases,
and also to the external limitations of the influences of context and physical
situation on the individuals. (Wilby, 1996, p.119)
Additionally, social contexts and our understandings change constantly. Wilby (1996)
notes that any review result should be seen as a reference point for the next critique. She
argues that the critical appreciation process is a "time-consuming" activity, and believes
the available approaches cannot be concretely fixed, but should be used flexibly. Ho
(1998) also claims that the appreciation of available approaches should be operated
locally in organisations, and the procedure should extend to different perspectives. He
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also emphasises that evaluation is "a never-ending learning process", so that managers
should be ready to reassess critically their assumptions in the light of new knowledge.
Each of the above perspectives have something to say about how managers should
manage the diversity of available approaches in motivation interventions. In Chapter 4, I
will explore ways of allowing pluralist systemic approaches in interventions which
involve appreciating and recognising the differences and similarities between various
motivation approaches, rather than reducing them to only one perspective. This is to say,
motivation interventions should be interpreted critically and used in a pluralist systemic
position according to organisational circumstances at a given point in time.
3. 10.2 The issues of power relations and ideology conflicts in organisations
It is problematic to tackle a problem context in which managers are aware of issues of the
coercive use of power or ideological differences in interventions. Several authors (e.g.,
Foucault, 1982, 1984; Ulrich, 1983, 1991; SchOn, 1983; Clegg, 1989; Rahman, 1993;
Sinha, 1994; Romm, 1995, 1996, 1998; Flood and Romm, 1995a, b, 1996a; Mingers,
1997) are concerned with analysing the exercise of power because they argue that these
invariably exist in all social contexts and thus can be important social factors. For
example, SchOn (1983) expresses an awareness of the power relations involved in inquiry
processes. He notes that the processes of developing knowledge are at the same time
political processes, and that knowledge is an instrument of political power. Sinha (1994)
indicates the influence of power relations in terms of the processes involved in developing
motivation to work and adopting certain ways of living. Flood and Romm (1996a) observe
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that knowledge and professional practice are constructed in ways which lead us to make
particular choices in society. As Mingers (1997) argues, "all knowledge, and indeed
rationality itself, is inevitably constituted through and intertwined with the exercise of
power" (p.417). He considers that a universal
view of the reasoning subject can no longer be accepted. Our world is
increasingly diverse, pluralistic, transitory, and local. We can no longer expect
to be able to specify norms, values, and principles that hold for all people and
for all time. (Mingers, 1997, p.418)
However, power can be polarised positively and negatively, so that managers must deal
with different issues of power. As Clegg (1989) states, power can be considered as
creative rather than necessarily limiting. Rahman (1993) also suggests that an analysis of
power-knowledge formations creates possibilities for us to mobilise and self-develop.
Midgley (1997a) indicates that we should preserve the notion of the "subject" which "can
reinforce or challenge these formations, allowing us to evaluate the actions of subjects in
terms of their perceived positive or negative effects on power-knowledge" (p.279).
By applying above ideas in motivation interventions, managers should see how
organisational structures can create conditions that allow some employees to enforce their
will on others, and those employees in turn have to respond to other powerful forces. The
question arises, can managers critically-reflect on the inequalities of power during
motivation interventions? For example, Mingers (1997) questions, "can intervention,
conducted for and on behalf of (and paid for by) a powerful client ever be seriously
challenging to the status quo?", and "can we really expect any problem-
solving/management approach that is critical towards the status quo to be universally
applicable?" (p.415). Clearly, there are many issues (e.g., who, makes the commitment
and why) surrounding the use of power in both organisations and society which are
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relevant to motivation interventions. Before coming onto a comprehensive examination of
these issues of power relations in Chapter 5.
It is also worth noting that the operation of power relationships does not occur in a
vacuum: many authors (e.g., Foucault, 1972, 1979, 1982; Clegg, 1975; Hyman and
Brough, 1975; Hindess, 1982; Oliga, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1996) do not write about
power without linking the concept to issues around ideology, ideology conflicts, and its
-
creation and maintenance. In discussing ideology conflicts in organisations, several
authors (e.g., Habermas, 1972, 1974, 1975, 1976; Thompson, 1990; Gregory, 1992;
Billing and Simons, 1994; Flood and Romm, 1995a; Oliga, 1988, 1990, 1996) are
concerned with looking at how an ideology can become a dominant force, and with the
need for an ideology-critique process. They recognise that managers need to have an idea
of what ideology actually is and how it can be critiqued. As Habermas (1976) claims, it is
possible to launch an ideology-critique process which prevents the complete colonisation
of all thought. This is important in motivation interventions as, without such a critique, it
could be possible that one way of seeing the issue of motivation could come to dominate
(to colonise) all thought about how (and, indeed why) motivation should be improved. In
a similar view, Thompson (1990) considers that the concept of ideology is concerned with
the way in which ideas are "mobilised in the service of dominant individuals and groups",
and notes that we should offer an interpretation of different ideologies as a way to change
our thinking and our lifestyle choices in society (p.73). Gregory (1992) observes that
defining ideology as legitimating the interests of the dominant class does not look at the
ways others define belief patterns in society. Billing and Simons (1994) also indicate that
ideology-critique claims to reveal a hidden truth about the nature of ideas, disposing of
false consciousness. From above point of views, these authors argue that our beliefs and
assumptions are not naturally inherent, but are the results of interfaces between
_
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individuals and the surrounding society. In particular, ideology is important in the choice
of approach to motivation. Thus, to be critical, managers should not rely only on their
personal knowledge and understanding (their own ideology); rather, they should be open
to wider perspectives. Indeed, there are many different ideologies in our society. It is
important to respect them, rather than reject them out of hand, and the process of
ideology-critique will enrich managers' understanding and knowledge. Most importantly,
individuals should communicate with and learn from different pers-pectives. This subject
will be examined in depth in Chapter 5.
3. 10. 3 The issues of a critical systemic view of learning during motivation
intervention
An approach is created according to particular assumptions about motivation. By
examining the philosophy of the available approaches, we need to critically appreciate
these assumptions. This could enhance our understanding of the approach by means of an
ideology-critique process. It is by communication and learning the different views that a
more critical appreciation of the approach and its suitability for a given organisational
context may be gained. Therefore, in order to improve mutual understanding and
communication, I suggest that, wherever possible, a critical systemic view of learning
during interventions is necessary.
Several authors (e.g., Salaman, 1983; March, 1991; Brown and Duguid, 1991; Simon,
1991; Mullins, 1993; Cook and Yanow, 1993; Hassard, 1993; Dachler and Hosking,
1995; Salipante and Bouwen, 1995; Gergen, 1995; Cohen and Sproull, 1996; Burgoyne
and Reynolds, 1997) suggest that there may be a continuing dynamic between people's
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perspectives. Salaman (1983), for example, states that the commitment and co-operation
of employees is frequently regarded by senior management as problematic and uncertain,
and consensus and control is then sought by selection and manipulation of perspective.
He recognises that alien perspectives are indeed part of the substance that maintains the
organisational integrity, because not everything can or should be controlled by senior
management. He argues that perspectives may have a powerful influence on the
maintenance of an organisation's integrity; yet people with alien -perspectives are often
not given due recognition in terms of their own value, to introduce new ways of being to
the organisation. Sometimes it has to do with power dynamics, for often people cannot
legitimise their social base and they thus become marginalised (see Midgley, 1995a). I
believe dynamics in which alien perspectives are marginalised, need to give way to
dynamics where all alien perspectives can learn from one another. This means neither that
learning offers a fixed ideology (or perspective) for people to adhere to, nor that
rebellious elements offer a treatment that tries to win favour among them. It also means
that many alternatives are presented as ways of being in the organisation, so that
everybody can become more appreciative of these ways. A critical systemic view of
learning is possible because attitude is not simply individually formed but arises out of
interaction with others. This theme will be examined in depth in Chapter 6.
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3. 10. 4 The issues of cross-cultural influences on motivation
People do not always in all cultures become motivated by the same things. In this sense,
managers' view of motivation is based on their own ideologies which come from
different cultures, and that their paradigmatic status guides them to adopt a particular
perspective on motivation. Several authors (e.g., Hofstede, 1980a, b, 1984, 1987, 1991;
Firestone, 1990; Gregory, 1992, 1994; Mendonca and Kanungo, 1994; Brockleby, 1994,
1995; Brockleby and Cummings, 1995, 1996; Harvey and Allard, 1995; Brocklesby,
1995) note that managers should be aware of different cultures which might need
different ways on motivation. For example, Hofstede (1980a, b) believes that there is
much scope for intervention contrasts in different cultures. This is important when
thinking about motivation, because cultural differences may mean that motivation
approaches developed and effectively applied in the West may not be so easily and
effectively applied in the East. However, cultural differences which prevent the exact
replication of a motivation approach should not (I argue) be allowed to stand in the way of
learning about the possibilities for intervening in motivation issues. Of course, such
learning will not easily be achieved: Firestone (1990) states that it is very difficult for us
(steeped in our own culture) to imagine doing things differently, and that alien paradigms
communication is an alternative conception of cross-cultural understanding. Mendonca
and Kanungo (1994), in talking of cross-cultural learning, observe that it is necessary to
extend the boundaries within a organisational culture when there are cultural constraints
which can be identified. Harvey and Allard (1995) point out that in order to deal with
cultural diversity, we need to imagine ourselves in others' cultures to understand how
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they view us and how they interpret our actions. All of these authors are pointing to the
barriers to cross-cultural learning whilst also indicating means to overcome these.
The question I will be posing is, how can managers foster cross-cultural (or alien
paradigms) learning? From the systems perspective, Brocklesby (1995) also asks the
question, how can managers view the same situation from different paradigms without
involving cultural influences? Mingers (1997) notes,
Given that paradigms make fundamental, reality-shaping, assumptions about
the world, it is likely that individuals may find it hard to switch between
different paradigms, and that cultures and organisations will tend to favour
certain paradigms at the expense of others. (Mingers, 1997, p.413)
This is an issue of how alien paradigms in different cultures influence managers' choice
of the available approaches on motivation should be considered. Furthermore, the
argument between 'communication' and 'incommensurability' should be discussed. In
particular, in relation to paradigm communication, the argument should be advanced that
individual assumptions and interpretations of a approach will be influenced by social
ideology. These are issues that will be explored in relation to the literature on cross-
cultural influences on motivation in Chapter 7.
So far, I have examined some key issues which might arise during motivation
interventions. This research suggests that personal and social ideology affect both our
view of motivation and choice of approach in interventions. It emphasises that the
diversity of available approaches should not simply be taken for granted; it is necessary to
re-appreciate and understand various methods and problem situations on a continuing
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basis. We need to take various perspectives into account and reveal the reason behind any
assumptions that are made about organisational circumstances. The available approaches
are built temporarily and within the limits of our understanding. This research suggests
that people's views are not static, and believe that learning is possible. This may be a good
starting point to discuss what the various approaches are proposing by looking at the
starting premises of the approaches, and that different approaches might be more
applicable in some contexts than in others, so that the diversity of available approaches
complement each other because of their differences and their different applications.
Therefore, in order to find the most suitable approach to motivation, we need to think
about the following issues in motivation interventions: allowing pluralist systemic
approaches in interventions, understanding power relations and ideology conflicts in
organisations, needing critical systemic learning, and realising cross-cultural influences
on motivation.
3. 11 Conclusion
In this chapter, I showed with reference to Burrell and Morgan's (1979) 'sociological
paradigms' framework how the different motivation approaches make explicit or implicit
assumptions about the world they seek to understand. I also showed how they can be
criticised from other perspectives which have different assumptions (potential paradigm
incommensurability). Then, I used the SOSM framework of Jackson and Keys (1984), and
later Jackson (1987), to learn about and to reflect on what different approaches are trying
to do. The SOSM framework helps us to understand different ways to see assumptions of
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the available motivation approaches, the complexity of organisations with which they deal
and the relationship between individuals. With this preparatory theoretical background in
place, I showed how the concept of pluralism (which tries to see the different motivation
approaches as having specific strengths and weaknesses) allows for the notion that not all
approaches can deal with everything, but on the other hand that all approaches might have
something to offer. This thesis argues that it is necessary to respect the strengths and
,
weaknesses of the diversity of available motivation approaches, promote critical
awareness about the contexts of interventions, and pursue that individuals need the ability
to examine and judge the surrounding ideologies which provide the context for their
personal beliefs.
On the basis of the groundwork laid in this chapter, Part Two looks at several central
issues (e.g, allowing pluralist systemic approaches in interventions, understanding
ideology conflicts and power relations in organisations, needing critical systemic learning,
and realising cross-cultural influences on motivation) in motivation interventions. In the
following chapters, I offer a more detailed discussion about issues related to motivation.
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Chapter 4
Issues in Motivation Interventions (1):
Allowing Pluralist Systemic Approaches
in Interventions
4. 1 Introduction
This chapter will examine how systems thinking has progressed since the work of Jackson
and Keys (1984) and Jackson (1987) which was utilised in the last chapter. In particular
here, I will be looking at the literature in order to reveal any advances that have been
proposed in how managers can deal with the diversity of (motivation) approaches
available to them. I will set out to show a specific group of writers (generally known as
critical systems thinkers) have made considerable advances in understanding and
explaining the types of difficulties that people (theoreticians and practitioners) encounter
when trying to solve problems (including the problem of motivation) in organisations.
The chapter will focuses on how critical systems thinkers deal with issues in interventions,
such as: (1) the issues associated with power and its use; (2) the related issues of ideology
conflicts; (3) the issues associated with the sheer diversity of approaches from which to
choose; and (4) the scope for communication and learning across cultures. By looking at
these issues, I will show that the oblique use of methodology (Flood and Romm, 1995a),
the process of ideology-critique (Gregory, 1992), the critical appreciation process
(Gregory, 1992) and/or critical awareness (Flood and Jackson, 1991a; Wilby, 1996, Ho,
1998) together with a number of forms of pluralism (e.g., Mingers, 1992, 1997; Midgley,
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1992, 1995a, b, 1996, 1997a; Flood, 1995, 1996; Jackson, 1997 etc.), all have something
of value which can be built upon by adopting pluralist systemic approaches in
interventions. To begin with in this chapter, let us consider the historical roots of critical
systems thinking (CST).
-
4. 2 The historical roots of critical systems thinking
This section aims to review the emergence of CST. It begins by introducing the concept of
systems thinking. Emery (1969) states that systems thinking has been shown that living
systems, whether individuals or populations, have to be analysed as "open systems"
which cannot be isolated from their environment (p.8). According to Kast and
Rosenzweig (1981), systems thinking within the domain of organisational problem
solving is an analogy for the analysis and design of organisations, and its major
implication is the necessity to revise or broaden our view of what constitutes science.
Jackson (1991a) notes that systems thinking is an attempt to provide an integrated
understanding of the complexity of the world and create a unified way of thinking about
all systems, in order to get a better understanding of system complexity. Flood and Carson
(1993) also argues that" systems thinking is a framework of thought that helps us to deal
with complex things in a holistic way" (p.4). In the following examinations, an attempt is
made to focus on the application of various types of systems thinking in problem solving.
I will look at the strengths and weaknesses (as they have been discussed in the literature)
of hard systems thinking, soft systems thinking, and critical systems thinking, which will
be examined.
,
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Concerning hard systems thinking, as Jackson (1991a) notes, implies machine-like
systems which are designed as means to achieve pre-determined ends. Keys (1991) also
observes that the key assumption underpinning hard systems thinking to problem-solving
is "the ability to construct and manipulate a model of a situation under study" (p.178).
That is, hard systematic approaches (e.g., operational research, systems analysis, systems
engineering) are concerned with engineering optimal goal-seeking strategies for
manipulating complex systems through systematic techniques. Hard systems thinking can
apply its engineering principles smoothly where there is agreement among participants
about the objective to be achieved and the need to find an efficient method of achieving it.
It views systems as organised wholes in the objective real world. With increasing
empirical knowledge and expert judgements, it is suggested, the boundary between the
system and environment can be clearly defined, components and contributions in the
system can be identified, relationships, communication and feedback mechanism within
the system can be modelled, the behaviour of systems can be predicted and controlled, the
objectives of the system can be defined and the system can be engineered to achieve
objectives by means of science and technology. As Tsoukas (1994) states
more specifically, it conceives of management as a regulatory process
consisting of four elements: objectives for the management of an organisation
must be explicitly spelled out; the outcome of managing must be measurable;
the manager must have a predictive model under control specifying causes
and effects, and deviations will subsequently be reduced via taking corrective
action. (Tsoukas, 1994, p.3)
In this sense, human motivation could be another factor that has to be geared to reaching
said objectives. This applies to engineering type approaches and also to some extent to
cybernetics, especially when cybernetics (e.g., Beer, 1972, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1989)
sees the people in the system as having the function of working towards a defined
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objective. However, systems can be problematic, especially if we focus on systems in
social situations, where different systems thinkers have different interests and
presumptions. The formulations of hard systems thinking are less successful in
unstructured problems, defined as problems which it seems do not admit easily of
engineering types solutions.
Soft systems thinking opens up a new perspective which is based on inter-subjectivism
which tends to respect various different perspectives and brings these into the problem-
solving procedure. Soft systems theorists (e.g., Ackoff, 1974, 1979, 1981, 1988, 1989;
Churchman, 1979a, b; Checkland, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1987, 1993; Mason and Mitroff,
1981) do not seek to study objective social facts or to search for regularities and causal
relations in social reality. There is an increasing appreciation of language and, thus,
interpretation in the shaping of social reality. The social world is seen as being the
creative construction of human beings, and it is necessary to proceed by trying to
understand subjectively the points of view and the intentions of human beings who
construct social systems. Hence, the importance in soft systems thinking of probing the
world view, that individuals employ in understanding and constructing the social world.
However, several authors (e.g., Mingers, 1980, 1984; Ulrich, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1988;
Jackson, 1990, 1991a, b; Schecter, 1991, 1993; Alvesson and Willmott, 1992) suggest
that soft systems thinking seems to lack the abilities to deal with the effects of unequal
status within the wider society, especially in coercive situations where power relations
determine the outcome of debate. For example, Jackson (1991a) suggests that "the
exercise of power in the social process can prevent the open and free discussion necessary
for the success of work and interaction" (p.12).
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Some systems thinkers (e.g. Jackson, 1991a; Flood and Jackson, 1991a) have realised that
there are problems with all the systems approaches mentioned so far. CST was therefore
developed to reflect upon and enhance the use of systems thinking. It was created partly
because of the limitations of hard and soft systems thinking, and partly because of the
perceived need to focus on human emancipation and power relationships. It arose as an
attempt to harness the strengths of all of the ways of seeing that had been developed
,
within the systems tradition and within other research traditions (for example, it also is
able to look critically at various theories of motivation, as I showed in Chapter 2). It is a
holistic concept, which aims to
1. deal flexibly and responsively with complexities;
2. learn from the strengths and weaknesses of different strands of systems
thinking;
3. emphasise the importance of humanbeings` freedom from social
constraints.
CST accepts the contradictions in social systems, the existence of conflict at many points
and the domination of some groups over others, as they exercise power in definite
circumstances. It is concerned when it sees reality becoming tied to the operation of
ideological or other forces in society which express power relations. But, it also sees that
there may be times when participation is not a matter only of coercion, especially if some
kind of communication has been set up between them, and if they can exercise both
ideology-critique and critical reflection to develop better ways of organising their work
and other parts of their lives (this is discussed further in Chapter 5 where issues of power
and ideology are explored in more detail).
What CST brings to our attention is that human beings face a wide range of complex
problems which consistently interact with each other in an unforseeable manner. It seems
that no singular view or method alone, no matter how systemic it may be, is sufficient to
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handle such situations. In this sense, we no longer have such things as the systems or the
only feasible and effective way. We should learn to think systemically, not to reduce the
whole into separable part(s), isolated from contact with other ways of doing things. An
essential prerequisite to the competence of systems science as a whole, is to recognise
critically the richness in the diverse whole, and not to accept a particular part alone. CST
is thus powerful, both because of the strength and diversity of its various strands and
-
because those strands can be seen as complementary/discordant pluralist -- at least as able
to support each other through their differences, so that interventions will not be reduced to
the one way of always approaching problems.
This section has reviewed the development of systems thinking up to, and including, the
emergence of CST. This chapter claims that by allowing pluralist systemic approaches in
interventions, then can be seen to involve a deeper understanding of all the approaches
that I presented in Chapter 2. Before coming to a more detailed exploration about why the
need for pluralist systemic approaches in interventions, I need to review how critical
systems thinkers deal with issues in interventions. This is explored in the following
section.
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4. 3 Reviewing how critical systems thinkers deal with issues in interventions
The purpose of this section is to overview a number of intervention ideas sharing the
philosophical underpinnings of CST. I focus on some themes such as: Dealing with power
relations and ideological conflicts, managing the diversity of available approaches in a
way which respects all their qualities, and debating on paradigm commensurability and
learning. Critical systems thinkers emphasise that intervention should be used in a
pluralist systemic way (although many of them differ as to what this means) in order
adequately to address problem situations, so that our thinking does not become
imperialist and one-sided. I start out by considering some responses to issues of power
relations and ideology conflicts from critical systems thinkers.
4. 3. 1 Responses to issues of power relations and ideology conflicts
Several authors (e.g., Foucault, 1982, 1984; Ulrich, 1983, 1991; SchOn, 1983; Clegg,
1989; Rahman, 1993; Sinha, 1994; Romm, 1995, 1996, 1998; Flood and Romm, 1995a,
b, 1996a; Mingers, 1997) are concerned with analysing power relations and the exercise
of power because they argue that these invariably exist in all social contexts and thus can
be important social factors. It is also worth noting, some authors (e.g., Habermas, 1972,
1974, 1975, 1976; Gregory, 1992, Flood and Romm, 1995a; Oliga, 1988, 1990, 1996)
look at ideology conflicts which can become a dominant force. Questions arise here such
as: How can we reflect on the knowledge created in power relations in society? How can
we respond to ideology conflicts in organisations? In the following discussion, I will look
at how critical systems thinkers have sought to address these issues.
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Flood and Romm (1995a) suggest that practical situations may be encountered where
political dynamics prevent the implementation of chosen theories. They argue for the
"oblique" use of models and theories in which "the idea of an oblique use of a method is
to achieve some purpose other than its immediate and given one" (p.390). They recognise
that to use theories not for their given purpose is to fulfil another expectation, i.e. to
confront the coercive situation from an indirect angle. As they state,
when we proceed by operating a method obliquely, we operate it with
knowledge drawn from our experience of, and insight into, what other
theoretical positions can offer. In the case of oblique use, a theoretical agenda
not written into the framework is used to penetrate (as far as possible) the
framework. This enables the (powerful) clients to be addressed in a way that
does justice to that agenda - but in a way that we might find less threatening.
(Flood and Romm, 1995a, p.390)
In addition, they emphasise that we not only have to consider which theories could be
used, but also how to use them suitably regarding both time and a specific problem
situation. Flood and Romm (1995b) recognise that
The chosen purposes cannot be (absolutely) defended on the grounds that they
have been agreed or that they are in tune with what the situation calls for. This
is because at the moment of research action, there may still be other
possibilities for both inquiry and intervention. This is why we do admit a
degree of incomparability between options. (Flood and Romm, 1995b, p.481)
Thus, there appears to be a need for ideology-critique to urge us to reflect on our own
awareness and to act critically.
In considering the available approaches for dealing with the problem of motivation, we
should reflect on perspectives which are not ideologically neutral. We also should look at
the limitations of single points of view, and how they have become socially constructed.
Oliga (1990) suggests that "any penetrative account of systems stability and change must
lie in an historical rather than naturalistic explanation" (p.269). He also notes that "every
theory of society defines its own problem of order, and critically, we must ask of that
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theory, for whom is order a problem?" (p.272). In other words, when we consider to
choose motivation theories we must be aware that different theories might hold a
particular interpretation of the facts, according to the assumptions implied by the theories.
Oliga argues that
Insofar as socio-cultural systems are concerned, system theory literature
should begin to pay greater attention to the historical processes (such as power
relations and exercise of power, and ideological formation of human
subjectivities), which ultimately circumscribe individual and social
behaviour. (Oliga, 1990, p.283)
Gregory (1992) calls for a more critical view by utilising ideology-critique, because it is
concerned with changing our lived relations in society. As she says:
Ideology-critique enables ....actors to be enlightened about their situation. The
process of ideology-critique will enable them to understand their historical
embeddedness, and thereby to identify their own means for achieving
emancipation. Moreover, ideology-critique serves to produce new belief
systems, new ideologies, and as such must be subjected to an evaluation.
(Gregory, 1992, p.289)
She also believes that
the critic of ideology would need to continuously re-evaluate and amend his
or her ideology-critique in the light of new evidence or observation which
would be facilitated through the cyclical nature of the critical appreciation
process. (Gregory, 1992, p.305)
She thus notes that "one cannot predict that a particular norm or value will 'win out' in the
end, only the possibility of getting people to talk and think critically" (p.370). Brown
(1994) also considers how knowledge constructions can be subjected to ideology-critique
by helping us to detect where others have failed to concentrate on the processes of our own
construction. Flood and Romm (1995a) observe that
Ideology-critique can be a way of considering the processes of knowledge-
creation that may be regarded as allowing maximum inventiveness for people
to think and live alternative relationships to 'the world'. (Flood and Romm,
1995a, p.2)
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According to these critical systems thinkers an ideology-critique process is a good way to
appreciate others' ideological position, and allows our ideologies to evolve and change.
The extent to which these authors provide guidelines on how to conduct processes of
ideology-critique varies, and what guidance they provide may or may not be useful when
applied to the motivation intervention. As Midgley (1995b) notes, an ideology-critique
process involves debating the different assumptions on the available theories, making
-
them transparent to us: if this were undertaken for motivation theories, then we would
have a different way of viewing them. However, this has not been done so far, and
applications of motivation theories appear, to a large extent, to be based on any
individual's specific predilections or ideological stance. This is a significant point to note,
as it suggests that a further investigation of the issues arising from (i) the use of power and
(ii) the influence of specific ideological factors/features on motivation choices would be
worthwhile. This will be undertaken in Chapter 5.
The fact that different theories are based on different ideologies (or paradigms) also leads
to another associated issue to which I now turn: the issues of pluralism in available
approaches.
4. 3. 2 Responses to issues of pluralism in available approaches
Some critical systems thinkers (e.g., Flood and Jackson, 1991a, b; Midgley, 1992, 1995a,
b, 1996, 1997a, b; Gregory, 1992, 1996a, b; Flood, 1995, 1996; Mingers, 1997; Jackson,
1997) consider that we should adopt the pluralism in available approaches to deal with the
variety of problem situations that face us. The question arises, how can we make informed
choices from a diversity of available approaches to tackle the specific issues in a given
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context? Different perspectives in systems thinking have something to say about how we
manage the diversity of approaches available to us -- Whether by using combinations of
methods, evaluating alternatives, mapping approaches with contexts, or some other
management process.
The organisational problem-solving methodology, Total Systems Intervention (TSI --
Flood and Jackson, 1991a), is a process that uses the system of -systems methodologies,
and it is that pluralist systems approach which I will review first. TSI, is a
metamethodology (according to Flood and Jackson, 1991a), which utilises a variety of
systems methodologies in order to promote creativity, choice of appropriate methodology,
and implementation. The concept of TSI was developed by Flood and Jackson (1991a)
(which is now referred to as TSI(1)), and later amended by Flood (1995) (which is called
TSI(2)). Flood and Jackson claim that TSI is "complementarist" because it offers
directions for managers about how to examine problem situations in terms of different
perspectives during the 'creativity' phase, and how to choose appropriate intervention
methodologies which are suitable to tackle the current problem situations. Moreover, they
argue that:
As the intervention proceeds, using TSI, so the nature of the problem situation
will be continually reviewed, as will the choice of appropriate systems
methodology. In highly complex problem situations it is advisable to address
at the same time different aspects revealed by taking different perspectives on
it. This involves employing a number of systems methodologies in
combination. (Flood and Jackson, 1991a, p.i)
However, TSI(1) is accused of picking out inappropriate methodologies for the definition
of problem situations. For example, Tsoukas (1993) notes: "different paradigms constitute
different realities, and as such, they provide answers, either explicitly or implicitly", to all
problem situations (p.313). Brocklesby (1995) questions how managers can view the
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same problem situation from different paradigms without involving different perspectives
and cultural differences. Midgley (1997a) observes that "TSI(1) did not give sufficient
encouragement to participants in debate to generate their own metaphors" (p.270).
TSI(2) was developed by Flood (1995) in response to criticisms of TSI(1). He has
accepted the criticism that TSI(1)'s exploration of the problem situation was overly
limiting. Flood (1995) claims that TSI(2) does not only focus on Problem solving, but also
emphasises the critical awareness of different methodologies and considers how
intervention will be influenced by organisational contexts. He stresses three things:
divergent metaphorical analysis; the use of creativity-enhancing techniques; and an
awareness of the "ergonomics of reflection". At the same time, he considers that an
organisation should be understood in terms of four key domains: organisational process,
organisational design, organisational culture, and organisational politics. He recognises
that each methodology has a domain where it can be most suitably used. He also considers
what changes could be needed in each of the four domains, not focusing on only one
domain to the exclusion of the other three. TSI(2) is thus a pluralist approach, and argues
that problem situations cannot be simply defined as simple-unitary, complex-unitary,
simple-coercive, etc. Flood believes that problem situations are multifaceted and shifting,
for example, the four key organisational domains should be considered simultaneously.
He also considers that organisations are dynamic, and points out that "an organisation can
be understood in terms of interacting issues and intervention as being part of a continuous
process of managing these issues" (p.176). However, Jackson (1997) notes that "TSI
assumes an inextricable link between paradigm-based methodologies and the methods,
models, etc., with which they are associated" (p.370). He argues that "this makes TSI .
inflexible in use; unable to respond to the exigencies of particular problem situations"
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(p.370). Mingers (1997a) also observes that TSI "does not really address the question of
mixing parts of methodologies from different paradigms" (p.247).
Midgley (1992, 1995a, b) wishes to resist meta-methodological approaches consistent
with his view of CST as a paradigm in its own right, and proposes the design of mixed
methods to maximise flexibility and openness during intervention. Midgley (1992)
focuses on Habermas's (1984) view of good argumentation that truth statements (about
the objective, external world), rightness statements (about our normative, social world),
and statements about the individual's subjectivity (about a personal, subjective, internal
world) can be made and challenged. He believes that "all existing systems methods
prioritise the investigation of one of these kinds of statements", which he views as
problematic for legitimate intervention since no method can be broad enough to cope with
human problems of the 20th century. Midgley goes on to argue that "if our inquiries are
going to have any legitimacy in tackling some of the major issues of today, we must
indeed embrace methodological pluralism" (p.20). For Midgley, there is no one best or
right approach which always predominates; and no methodology should be ignored, but
all should be respected and adopted where most suitable. He believes that different
methodologies contribute differently towards 'improvement'.
Midgley (1997a) notes that in any situation, it is best to be flexible and responsive during
interventions. He recognises that one way of creating such flexibility and responsiveness
is by being able to mix methods in a creative way, and believes that people should think
creatively in order to "manage the possible tensions between their own, and various
stakeholders', different viewpoints", that means, a synthesis is created that lets different
research questions join together in a unique way for each situation. He suggests that
creative design of methods often involves creating syntheses. It shows how managers can
be involved creatively in any situation, forging a way of dealing with every situation in a
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unique way which depends on all those involved. Midgley also believes that the synthetic
approach is often a better explanation of how managers operate in their real practice. He
emphasises that his version of creative design of methods is not the only way to operate
pluralism. As he notes, "we can accept that there may be many different visions of
methodological pluralism" (p.22). He provides us with one in his consideration of the
creative design of methods.
Mingers (1997) proposes the idea of a multi-paradigm multimethodology which also tries
to move away from paradigmatic constraints, and in a sense builds on Midgley's idea of
mixing methods. He wants to explore multimethodology in its multiparadigm form in
order to investigate working with different paradigms and different ideas on what reality
looks like. He states that in paradigm isolationism, many methods may be used but they all
derive from one basic paradigm (or way of looking at reality). He notes that
multimethodology combines together "more than one methodology (in whole or part)
within a particular intervention" (p.2). He believes that multimethodology is
not the name of a single methodology, or even of a specific way of combining
methodologies together. Rather it refers to the whole area of utilising a
plurality of methodologies or techniques within the practice of taking action in
problematic situations. (Mingers, 1997, p.2)
The essence of multimethodology, according to Mingers and Gill (1997), "is linking
together parts of methodologies, possibly from different paradigms" (p.38). Thus,
managers cannot use exclusively one type of method when intervening in the world, for
this will lead to a one-dimensional (too selective) approach. Mingers (1997) argues for a
"critical pluralist" position which emphasises an acceptance of plurality from different
paradigm levels, but also grounds this from a perspective that "is fundamentally critical of
unequal and constraining nature of current social arrangements" (p.410). Further, he
emphasises that:
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The different methodologies that we might employ are all embedded in their
own paradigms, embodying particular and partial views of the world. With
critical reflection, we must be aware of the underpinning paradigm in order to
properly appreciate the methodology, but we do not simply accept this. We
should always reinterpret the methodology or technique within a critical
framework. (Mingers, 1997, p.437)
Mingers's philosophical grounding for intervention is to employ different methodologies
which can help managers to grasp different parts of reality. Also over time different
methodologies might be more useful than others. Mingers'i view emphasises that
managers should have all the necessary capabilities to be able to use a diversity of
methods, as well as have a full understanding of the theories behind the use of the diverse
methods. Mingers believes that "the actual process of critical multimethodology will be a
continual cycle of reflection, judgement, and action" (p.43'7). In this way managers can
learn more about pluralist systemic approaches and also difficulties on the theoretical and
practical levels that face them when trying to develop multiple skills for moving beyond
alien paradigmatic boundaries.
A further example of this essentially complementarist approach to pluralism is Jackson's
(1997) coherent pluralism which also argues for pluralism as a meta-methodology.
Jackson (1997) states, we should be careful about aligning methodologies with certain
problem situations and simply saying that each methodology can do only a certain thing.
He recognises that methodologies "owing allegiance to different paradigms should be
employed in the same intervention unless good reasons are given for temporary relapse
into imperialism. They should also be used....at all stages of an intervention." . (p.365). He
also emphasises that,
Pluralism must be employed in the most complex of problem situations; that it
must accept and manage a degree of incompatibility between paradigms at the
theoretical level; that it should encourage diversity in the use of
methodologies embodying different paradigms; and that it should encourage
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the maximum diversity of use of different methods, tools and techniques
without lapsing into pragmatism. (Jackson, 1997, p.36'7)
He views pluralism as seeking to respect the different strengths of various methodologies
and to choose which methodologies are most suitable to confront particular situations. He
states, "pluralism as a meta-paradigm; pluralism as a new paradigm, pluralism as a
postmodernist approach, and pluralism as critical systems practice" (p.370). Firstly, he
aims to establish a coherent pluralism as a meta-pluralism which- can guarantee paradigm
diversity. Although it might be difficult to demonstrate in practice, Jackson argues that a
constructive communication between different perspectives in alien paradigms should be
possible if it is recognised that the different methodologies address different aspects of the
same problem situation. Secondly, he claims that pluralism is a new paradigmatic
approach which "resolves the difficulty of having to combine methodologies based upon
divergent philosophical and sociological assumptions" (p.371). Thirdly, he considers
pluralism as a postmodernist approach which is "committed to promoting difference in the
world" (p.371). He considers that it allows "the flexibility of method use so that they can
cleave closely to what is appropriate in the problem situation confronted and to the twists
and turns required in the intervention" (p.372). This is similar to Flood and Romm (1997)
who argue that "critique and self-critique can lead to a quality of choice making that
avoids relativism as well as absolutism". Finally, Jackson believes that:
In critical systems practice a meta-methodology is required which protects
paradigm diversity and handles the relationships between the divergent
paradigms. The meta-methodology accepts that paradigms are based upon
incompatible philosophical assumptions and that they cannot, therefore, be
integrated without something being lost. It seeks to manage the paradigms not
by aspiring to meta-paradigmatic status and allocating them to their respective
tasks, but by mediating between the paradigms. (Jackson, 1997, p.372)
Jackson also recognises that in a critical systemic approach, "no paradigm is allowed to
escape unquestioned because it is continually confronted by the alternative rationales
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offered by other paradigms", and that we should seek to understand paradigm diversity
and to address the complexity and heterogeneity of problem situations (p.373). Jackson's
view also tries to be a unifying perspective. However, a critical systemic approach to
motivation is preferable to a form of pluralism that tries to be a final "coherent" pluralism,
since it allows for dynamism, development, and learning. It should be concerned with
issues such as what individual or organisational learning may be achieved, or the way that
-
the diversity of views on learning as a route to motivation can be managed. This forms the
basis of the discussion in Chapter 6, but draw on Gregory's (1992) idea of a 'discordant
pluralism' which tries to show how to manage the burgeoning heterogeneity of
approaches, and to identify how and why managers might see the world differently and
offer competing views which they bring to bear on problem situations, without the
unnecessary burden of producing a totally unified vision of what should be done.
Gregory (1992) believes that complementarism is unable to provide for learning between
radically different perspectives. She proposes an alternative pluralism which is called
"discordant pluralism". She suggests that discordant pluralism is a position which
"represents a 'shifting nodal point' in which different, competing and conflicting
perspectives may interact in a tension which lasts only a critical moment" (p.441). This
means that methodologies can be appreciated differently from alien ideologies or social
contexts. Gregory states, the discordant pluralist perspective involves appreciating and
supplementing the differences between various methodologies, rather than them
competing with one another. She also recognises that discordant pluralism seeks to
"facilitate a transformation process through understanding of self and others" (p.442).
That is to say, discordant pluralism can promote managers' abilities to choose from
available methodologies which can be interpreted critically and used in a pluralist pattern
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according to their knowledge and local contexts at a given point in time. Gregory suggests
that there are three main features in discordant pluralism as follows:
The first of these is its local, contingent, and historically situated nature.
Second, discordant pluralism promotes communication with other, radically
different and alien perspectives. The third feature concerns the use of insights
gained through such communication to provide for ethical decision-making.
This is achieved through the juxtapositioning of oppositional view-points
within a constellation that supports both one perspective and the other.
(Gregory, 1992, p.443)
Thus, discordant pluralism can deal adequately with different perspectives, and provides a
guidance on how to undertake either the processes of ideology-critique or critical self-
reflection. Gregory argues,
Discordant pluralism wishes to facilitate a transformation process through
understanding of self and others
	
 The discordant pluralist's position is
legitimated by its critique of both similarities and differences, in which
methodologies are viewed as challenging and supplementing one another.
(Gregory, 1992, p.459)
This may be a good reason to discuss what the various methodologies propose by looking
at their starting premises. It can reveal that different methodologies might be more
applicable in some problem situations than in others. A discordant pluralist position
accepts some complementary between alien perspectives, whilst also exploring what
managers can learn from each. Gregory (1996b) concludes that
discordant pluralism pays tribute to the differences, otherness, and alterity of
alien paradigms or traditions, but has to be coupled with a critical appreciation
in order to answer ethical questions about the rightness or legitimacy of a
particular perspective. (Gregory, 1996b, p.58)
This idea will be used to make sense of the newly evolving and diverse field of
organisational and management learning. It is not to be a one-way process of "informing",
since CST can also learn from organisational learning and management learning.
In the following, in facing divergent cultures (or alien paradigms), it will be shown that we
should be open to communicate with and learn from each other.
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4. 3. 3 Responses to the scope for cross-cultural (or alien paradigms) learning
Harvey and Allard (1995) point out that in order to deal with cultural diversity, we need to
imagine ourselves in others' cultures to understand how they view us and how they
interpret our actions. The question arises, how can we overcome cultural boundaries or
paradigm incommensurabilities? This is also an issue for alien paradigms in the same
culture. So we may ask, how can we really understand one paradigm from the perspective
of another? How can we communicate with and learn from different cultures (or alien
paradigms)? The extent to which operational guidance is given varies, and its for this
reason that I will review the work of critical systems thinkers who have proposed
workable models of cross-cultural learning. For example, Gregory (1992) suggests that
"those who wish to understand alien paradigms may encounter difficulties through the
imposition of their own concepts (imperialism) or in assuming they can [really] know
what the other paradigm knows and does" (p.142). She calls for a 'critical appreciation
model' which "strives to promote certain features of incommensurable paradigms that
make them antagonistic to one another" (p.159). Flood and Romm (1996a) also talk about
"paradigm (in)commensurability" which indicates learning between alien paradigms is
possible.
Gregory (1992) proposed a critical appreciation model, as indicated in Figure 4. 2, which
consists of two distinctive cycles: "scientific inquiry" and "reflexive inquiry", and
comprises four dimensions of critical research practice: empirical-analytic (based on
observation of the problem situation), historical-hermeneutic (two way communication
with others), self-reflection (revealing one's own assumptions), and ideology-critique
(examining the social construction).
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R: Researcher	 : Direction of relation
P: Alien paradigm	 ....): Scientific inquiry
-
PR: Researcher's paradigm	 Ci : Reflexive inquiry
Figure 4. 1 The critical appreciation model
(Source: Gregory, 1992, p.188)
Gregory suggests that scientific inquiry involves the nature of available methodologies in
terms of their philosophy to reveal the assumptions of methodologies; reflexive inquiry
concerns the output of the scientific inquiry which seeks to understand intention by means
of two way communication with others which can support managers in reflecting on their
understanding of the available methodologies; critical self-reflection is to encourage
managers to reveal their understanding and consider its legitimacy in the light of possible
alternatives; ideology-critique is brought into dialectical debate and is challenged by
others. As she notes,
Individual's self-awareness (through critical self-reflection) coupled with
sociological awareness (through ideology-critique) appears to be the most
appreciative means available to today's individual who wishes to deal morally
with the pluralistic environment confronting him or her. (Gregory, 1992,
p.355)
Gregory (1994) recognises that "interventions must incorporate elements of self-reflection
and ideology-critique (which operate at the individual and societal levels respectively) in
order to be more satisfactorily grounded" (p.1555). Furthermore, she argues that
The dialogue community can assist in revealing or uncovering examples of
mismatch between "espoused theory" and "theory in practice". If individuals
are open to such communications (i.e. are critically self-reflexive), then the •
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possibility of learning through dialogue will be significantly enhanced.
(Gregory, 1994, p.1555)
She notes that critical reflexivity should involve both processes of critical self-reflection
and of ideology-critique. As she says,
Critical self-reflection without ideology-critique cannot hope to change the
status quo of individual subjugation. Similarly, ....ideology-critique, even
when linked with action, may not bring about the desired changes (wider
emancipation) in the social system without corresponding (and more general)
individual self-reflection. (Gregory, 1994, p.1572)
In her view, managers have to keep in touch with the context in which they are embedded,
because the social context will also affect their interpretation and understanding of
different cultures (or alien paradigms). And it is also necessary to note that managers can
only interpret (or understand) different cultures (or alien paradigms) through their own
perspectives, because they cannot escape their own paradigms. Thus, Gregory concludes
that
critical self-reflection may change the individual self, but it need not have any
deep impact on society. Ideology-critique may challenge the norms of society,
even legitimising new norms, but if other oppositional individuals do not
critically reflect on what those norms mean for them as individuals then the
system will continue as it had been prior to the critique. (Gregory, 1994,
p.1572)
Critical appreciation provides managers with an evaluation process of available
methodologies which is necessary because no single methodology can be used
universally. Moreover, it also emphasises learning across different cultures (or alien
paradigms).
Flood and Romm's (1996a) in 'triple loop learning' suggest that managers should be
aware of what is being done when managers or others are using their own skills in
organisations. They concentrate on what it means to tackle issues in a critical and
reflective way, instead of informed agreement acting as the basis for deciding how to
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confront core issues that have been surfaced. They believe that exercising the critically
reflexive capacity allows people to experience a deeper level of learning which has fruitful
social consequences because it permits more diversity in social life and more tolerance
between the people involved.
In Flood and Romm's view there are three main areas in which people can become
obsessive: structuralism which highlights power as a collective property of the system;
intersubjective decision-making which highlights interpersonal interaction as the arena
where power is used; and might-right management which highlights power as entrenched
in the forms of social relationship. These three arenas imply the three different questions
that govern triple loop learning and corresponding to each of these a single criterion is
identified for the purpose of evaluation through reflection. They follow Flood (1995) in
seeing that there are three types of core issues (defined as design, debate and
disemprisoning). They describe issues of design as linked to the way of organising
structures; issues of debate as tied to activating debating faculties that may need
improving; and issues of disemprisoning connected with what they call the might-right
problematic, which allows in-depth consideration of power-knowledge dynamics and the
way they are being played out at points in time.
Flood and Romm (1996a) argue that triple loop learning is valuable because it allows
people to move to new levels of learning (learning by looping around various questions
and various discourses). This implies that people are continually open to accept diversity
of discourse and to tolerate that people may have different visions. Flood and Romm
define 'triple loop learning' as a process of
establishing tolerance between all three centres of learning to preserve the
diversity therein. It does this by bringing together the three questions from the •
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three loops into one overall awareness, are we doing things right, are we doing
the right things, and is rightness buttressed by mightiness and/or mightiness
buttressed by rightness? (Flood and Romm, 1996a, p.228)
Flood and Romm propose reflexivity as a way of learning to accept the discomfort of
taking in information which appears as hostile information for a position. As they note,
The purpose of reflexivity is to question in deliberate fashion the relevance
and consideredness of unchallenged yet favoured points of view. It enables
and prepares theoreticians and interventionists for the enriching process of
confronting alternatives. Reflexivity is indeed a means by which disciplines
are able to retain and encourage diversity and tension. (Flood and Romm,
1996a, p.35)
They believe that reflexivity can be helpful in terms of creating room for diversity in
organisational and social life, which is the aim of triple loop learning. They also
emphasise that combining methods has to be carefully thought through in order to avoid a
particular perspective or purpose becoming dominant, because uncritical managers may
use a particular approach without considering other possible ways of addressing the
problem context.
Flood and Romm in their discussion of triple loop learning concentrated on what it means
to tackle issues in an informed way, that is, in a critical, reflective way. Instead of saying
that informed agreement is the basis for deciding how to tackle core issues that have been
surfaced. They try to look at intervention by saying that it is not always that people need to
be directed to informed consensus. They are also aware of micropolitics and therefore
need to act with this in mind. One implication is that interventionists have to take more
personal responsibility for choices made. In this way, Flood and Romm try to utilise more
fully some postmodern ideas and to see them as incorporated into CST intervention
choices.
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4. 3. 4 Reflections on learning from critical systems thinkers
Midgley (1995b) argues that "all acts are interventionary, yet not all interventions are
critical or systemic" (p.61). He recognises that to develop critical and systemic
interventions, we should see how we conceptualise improvements, the critique that we
embrace, and the appropriateness of the methods we use (and the way we use approaches
creatively). All these criteria form an essentially interdependent set which must be used
simultaneously. Midgley's discussion of intervention towards improvement is similar in
many respects to that of Gregory (1992), who states that there are no definite guidelines
for matching methods with problem; there are only criteria and themes that need to be
considered so that some methodological expression for intervention can be worked out.
However, Gregory offers her analysis on the level of showing how different perspectives
can communicate with and learn from one another. She leaves it to learners to learn
sufficiently to be able to act with critical appreciation.
As far as the issue of motivation goes, what is done by Midgley (1995b) and Gregory
(1992) is to widen the discussion about intervention so that the pressure falls on people to
act in critical awareness or with critical appreciation. For example, critical appreciation
allows us to consider a range of available approaches, to interpret them and to decide how
to use them if we want to deal with any issue at any point in time (such as motivation). It
also lets us consider self-society dynamics (linked to ideology-critique and critical self-
reflection) as part of the process of learning to be critically appreciative (I discuss this in
Chapter 6). It does not tell us how to act in any circumstance, and cannot give a method (or
a range of methods from which to pick off the shelf) for suitable action. But it can tell us to
be on the look-out to utilise knowledge from a variety of sources, while not being caught
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up in any particular knowledge-power dynamic. More detail on this from the perspective
of Gregory's conception of self and society, and comparing this with other views on power
and ideology, is given in following chapters.
Flood and Romm (1996a) create a pathway which points to the dilemmas involved for
interventionists who want to make improvements. One of the dilemmas is that it is not
easy to tell what is the best way to act. People can try to rely on scientific knowledge (for
example, Taylorism, which offers a scientific view of how to motivate people or how to
make people act in accordance with system viability), but the moment science is used, one
wonders whether the facts referred to could be seen in another way. One wonders whether,
for example, it would be better to try and introduce an equity theory of motivation, which
sees people motivated by how they see fair play in the organisation and society. One
wonders whether this is a better way to treat people than to regard them as just a part of a
performance system. As soon as we see a way of treating people in order to motivate them,
there is the worry that formation of knowledge will become dominant, and expressions of
people will be lost. Flood and Romm (1996a) argue that "the important part of handling
diversity of theories, methodologies and models is to admit that at a certain point we have
to act, otherwise their 'inaction' becomes the action of inaction" (p.12). They recognise
that choice-making leading to action (even inaction) is part of handling diversity. They
introduce the term "(in)commensurability" to show that
Interventionists have to be aware that there are radical differences between
theories, methodologies and models. However, some points of comparison
are still possible and these points of comparison allow people to make better
informed decisions. The decisions are better informed but there is not
necessarily consensus. (Flood and Romm, 1996a, p.55)
Flood and Romm therefore part company with Flood and Jackson (1991a) who relied
heavily on Habermas's idea of informed agreement. Instead of informed agreement, they
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speak of intelligent and responsible action in the face of dilemmas. They offer some
guidelines for people to recognise types of issues that may need to be addressed, although
they state that people have to make their own decisions regarding what are primary at
points in time and what purposes interventionists need to pursue in trying to address the
issues. They suggest that power seeps into all three areas of concern. They believe that
exploration of power-knowledge formations can therefore allow criticism of power to
treated as a structural question or as a question of spreading the consultative and
participative capabilities of people. Because Flood and Romm's ideas are tied up with
issues of power and ideology in society more generally, I discuss their argument in more
detail in Chapter 5.
In this section, critical systems thinkers argue that it is important to consider the strengths
and weaknesses of the great variety of available approaches, promote critical awareness
about the contexts of interventions (and possible available approaches), and pursue
emancipation. In the following section, I will show that it is necessary to allow pluralist
systemic approaches in motivation interventions.
4. 4 Allowing pluralist systemic approaches in motivation interventions
For the moment it should be noted that the arguments of critical systems thinkers, like
Midgley's and Gregory's veers in the direction of not so much aligning methods to
problem contexts, but rather developing people's critical capacities in various ways. This
then allows them to look at any topic, for example, questions surrounding motivational
processes, in a more critical way than might otherwise have been the case. It also allows
people to draw, in an informed way, on a variety of theories, methodologies, and models
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of motivation; to compare them with one another in some way (though not completely
commensurable) and then to see how they need to address the situation at hand. This
means that different motivation approaches are compared by looking at how they each can
become informed through the existence of the others. It is then believed that
interventionists, by being thus informed, will not work solely with one way of seeing
people, one way of seeing how they can be motivated, one way of seeing organisation in
-
society, and one way of seeing prospects for improvements. As Flood and Romm (1996a)
state, "one way leads to assimilation; one way leads to complacency; one way leads to
ennui; one way leads to nausea" (p.233). This applies both to theorists and
interventionists. For example, in the domain of motivation, it applies to considering and
reflecting on the range of theories, so that one can be informed about this; and in the
domain of practice, it requires that people do not just apply one way at all times. Mingers
(1997) suggests that people need to perform different actions, because the world is
composed of lots of different realities, and people need to be able to practice
interdisciplinary, because they must get together to deal with different aspects of reality.
From these points, Jackson (1997) provides a conclusion:
An approach to managing complex problems which employs a meta-
methodology to take maximum advantage of the benefits to be gained from
using methodologies premised upon alternative paradigms together, and also
encourages the combined use of diverse methods, models, tools and
techniques, in a theoretically informed way, to ensure maximum flexibility in
an intervention. (Jackson, 1997, p.369)
From all of the above arguments between different perspectives, managers should learn
more what can be involved when they undertake motivation interventions because all have
something of value which can be built upon in allowing pluralist systemic approaches in
motivation interventions.
,
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Pluralist systemic approaches argue that more perspectives provide a more complete
picture of the suitability of the available approaches than a single perspective could
generate without others' participation. By investigating the philosophy, principles and
process of the available approaches, we can critically assess their assumptions about
interventions. Indeed there may be different views of the suitability of the approaches. It
is necessary to encourage them to enter into a dialectical process of debate that will be
capable of promoting self-reflection and ideology-critique amongst participants.
According to Gregory (1992),
Individual's self-awareness (through critical self-reflection) coupled with
sociological awareness (through ideology-critique) appears to be the most
appropriate means available to today's individual who wishes to deal morally
with the pluralistic environment confronting him or her. (Gregory, 1992,
p.355)
Gregory also argues that "one cannot predict that a particular norm or value will 'win out'
in the end, but the possibility of getting people to talk and think critically" (p.370). She
suggests that the problems of intervention need to be considered from wider points of
view than other approaches have done, and it is not the case that there is one best approach
which should always predominate. She holds that no approach should be ignored, but
should be respected and adopted where appropriate. It seems reasonable that different
approaches should be used, depending on the problem situation of intervention being
faced. It is also necessary to elucidate the relations between social circumstances and the
theoretical assumptions underlying various approaches. This is to say, social
circumstances (e.g., cultural influence, political power, social ideology, etc.) will affect
the success with which approaches can be applied, while conversely, interventions will
also affect social circumstances. Pluralist systemic approaches thus argue that the
available approaches cannot be adequently understood by means of one perspective
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alone. Once the different views have been surfaced, they need a dialectical process so that
managers can improve mutual understanding and enhance their learning about the
available approaches and their potential effects. This chapter claims the need for pluralist
systemic approaches in interventions, thus, to judge the possible result of applying a
approach to motivation in an organisation, managers need to understand whether there is
ideological harmony or friction between the various perspectives.
-
Before going to the next chapter, I need to indicate briefly why I believe that CST can
offer a good way of developing a critical systemic approach to motivation. Because,
'harder', 'softer', and some 'critical' attempts to introduce emancipation which impose a
definition of emancipation, can lead to an uncritical appreciation of issues of motivation
in organisations. Therefore, to develop a critical appreciation of issues of motivation, we
need to be aware of many different theories, what they state about motivation, how they
treat motivation, what effects they have when applied in organisations, how people
respond to the theories, what means they have for challenging theories (and ideologies),
how they can reflect on whether issues of motivation can be addressed in new ways, to
improve motivational practices. We also need to understand how people can learn from
different theories and from their own reflection on practices in organisations.
I believe that CST has the basic commitment to look at a range of theories with the
purpose of increasing the full potential of people while also looking after the
environment. It is a paradigm which allows people to develop their critical appreciation of
issues while also learning all the time from different theories and different practical
applications. In this respect, I agree that Gregory's (1992) critical appreciation is a critical
systems approach which best enables learning to occur, as people come to terms with
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empirical-analytic and interpretive knowledge, while considering problems of ideology in
society and also while being critically reflective. I believe that the question of motivation
cannot be dealt with by having only one theory or by expecting all organisations in a
society and all cultures within and between societies to adopt one approach. CST allows
us to consider a range of theories and a range of factors when considering what a critical
systemic approach to motivation involves. A critical systemic approach to motivation can
-
be seen to involve a deeper understanding of all the theories that I presented in chapters 2
and 3.
4. 5 Conclusion
On the problem of motivation, this chapter has shown why the need for pluralist systemic
approaches, and a critical systemic one to intervention, surpasses ones which concentrate
on only one aspect of issues connected with motivation. CST is an appropriate approach
because it considers ethics, not just embraces plurality. CST argues that it is important to
consider the strengths and weaknesses of the great variety of the available theories (or
methodologies), promote critical awareness about the contexts of interventions (and
possible candidate theories or methodologies), and pursue emancipation. Part of this
project of how to look more closely at issues of power relations and ideology conflicts in
organisations is developed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Issues in Motivation Interventions (2):
Power Relations and Ideology Conflicts
-
5. 1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I was concerned with looking at motivation intervention in terms
of pluralist systemic views. However, ideology and power could become a dominant force
which constrains our reflective capabilities and even could make us act in a certain way.
This chapter, I will develop some understanding of ideology conflicts and power relations
in order to see how this affects motivation in interventions. It focuses on human
potentiality, social awareness, and emancipation. It will look at socio-cultural patterns in
societies, considering when they can become defined as ideological and how this can be
criticised. Work cultures, including people's assumptions about what other people are like
and how they themselves should behave, are examined. This will help me to develop my
argument about the need for a critical systemic approach to motivation. I look at a number
of theories of ideology, and then I show links to questions of power relations, and I relate
all of this to the problems of motivation. I start out by showing that the term ideology is
used in many different ways in the literature. Some of these ways are discussed as follows.
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5. 2 Ideology as a pejorative concept
Thompson (1990) states that there are two general conceptions of ideology: a neutral one
and a pejorative one. He calls the first a general conception of ideology which is a neutral
one referring to people's belief systems in society. From this perspective, Thompson
recognises that ideology simply means sets of ideas and values that are held by people, and
that
neutral conceptions are those which purport to characterise phenomena as
ideology or ideological without implying that these phenomena are
necessarily misleading, illusory or aligned with the interests of any particular
group. (Thompson, 1990, p.53)
In other words; he observes that ideology can either be held generally between people in
society, or else can refer to ideologies linked to forms of systematic inquiry (and the ideas
that are created during these forms of inquiry). Thompson believes that ideology, in either
of these cases, is not considered as something that is problematic. In fact, ideology can be
considered as something inspiring -- sets of ideas which inspire people to act.
In this section, I will not concentrate on this general view of ideology; I want to develop
and extend what Thompson calls the second general type which is described as "critical
conceptions of ideology". He notes that critical conceptions are those which express a
negative, critical or pejorative sense of the term, and imply that ideology or ideological
beliefs are "misleading, illusory or one-sided" (p.54). He states that the analysis of
ideology in this pejorative sense is concerned with the ways in which symbolic forms
(belief systems) intersect with relations of power, and in which an ideology may become
another vehicle of power, as some people's ideas come to /32 dorainant in organisations (or
society). He recognises that ideological analysis is thus concerned with the "ways in which
meaning is utilised in the social world and serves thereby to bolster up individuals and
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groups who occupy positions of power" (p.56). So, in studying ideology, managers should
examine how ideas can bë used to entrench and sustain patterns of domination in
organisations (or society). Thompson recognises that ideological phenomena serve to
entrench relations of domination, and ideology is actually defined by this fact. He
considers that the concept of ideology is concerned with the ways in which ideas are
mobilised in the service of dominant individuals and groups, that is, the ways
in which the meaning constructed and conveyed by symbolic forms serves, in
particular circumstances, to establish and sustain structured social relations
from which some individuals and groups benefit more than others.
(Thompson, 1990, p.73)
He also observes that some people will prefer to retain ideological thought and that it will
penetrate their own thoughts so deeply that they do not consider challenging it, while
others might try to contest it. Therefore the concept of ideology-critique arose as an
approach to criticise those perceptions of the status quo that try or serve to legitimate it.
Gregory (1992) notes that defining ideology as legitimating the interests of a ruling class
does not help us to define the belief patterns in society. As she states,
the problem with this definition is that it does not tell us what to call the
discourse of a subordinate group which equally seeks legitimation of its
beliefs or interests through 'distortion and dissimulation'. (Gregory, 1992,
p.24'7)
So the problem is that this definition gives the impression that the process of creating
ideology derives only from the dominant class, and it does not look at the ways that others
might be involved, and at the value of each of these efforts.
Foucault (1984) prefers not to speak of 'ideology' (also see Oliga, 1990) because he
believes that people are all the time involved in creating definitions of reality, and it is
difficult to judge which ones are true or false. He does not use the.term 'ideology', because
ideology is viewed as false and truth is seen as what really is the case. He also sees
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knowledge as closely tied up with power penetration in the social and micropolitical
world, so that it is impossible to decide what is true or false. As shown in later sections,
Oliga (1990) criticises this refusal to use the term 'ideology', because it appears to suggest
that it is not worth challenging anything in the name of something better.
Meanwhile, Gregory (1992) refers to a particular definition of ideology that identifies
changes in material reality as part of the process of ideology-critique. She calls for a more
sharply focused view of ideology, because it is not concerned only with possible
distinctions between truth and falsity but with changing our lived relations in society. This
ties in to some extent with what Oliga (1996) calls a relational view of power, which sees
that it is important to transform the way that relations are lived. Gregory (1992) in turn
shows that actually describing and trying to change the material reality involves inter-
subjective processes as well as subjective processes. Therefore, she feels that it is
important to apply an ideology-critique process to discuss ways of transforming lived
relations, and also ways of developing critical self-reflection as part of the whole process.
This is linked to her idea that empirical-analytic knowledge, hermeneutic involvement in
interpreting material reality, ideology-critique and critical self-reflection all need to be
related in the cycle of her critical appreciation process. I now refer more fully to various
conceptions of ideology.
5. 3 An outline of some views of ideology and how they have developed
In one view of ideology, linked to a pejorative meaning of the term, Thompson (1990)
notes that ideology is "conceptualised as a cluster of values and beliefs which are
produced and diffused by agencies of the state, and which serve to reproduce the social
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order by securing the adherence of individuals to it" (p.75). He recognises that "social
reproduction theory" (as a Marxist approach) tried to explain the association between the
rise of industrial capitalism and the creation of specific values and beliefs: "capitalist
relations were strongly tied to certain ideological beliefs that served to muster the power
of the capitalist class and at the same time reproduce the whole social system" (p.75).
However, Thompson (1990) states that post-industrialists question the social reproduction
approach, because the ideas that were being disseminated in the media and accepted by
people, failed to confront the need which Marxists felt for an entire change of material
conditions. He also asserts that people did not want such a complete change and were
content with the development of society along existing lines, and subsequent development
of modern societies did not need radical change. As Thompson (1990) explains:
the end of ideology theorists discerned the emergence of a new consensus: the
old 'ideological politics' were giving way to a new sense of pragmatism in the
developed industrial societies. The end of ideology in this sense was not
necessarily the end of political debate and conflict, of contrasting political
programmes which expressed genuine differences of interest and opinion. But
these debates, conflicts and programmes would no longer be animated by
totalising, utopian visions which incited individuals to revolutionary action
and blinded them to any considerations which were contrary to their view.
(Thompson, 1990, p.77)
So he considers that the end of ideology was a way of defending the media's way of
representing issues in society, as things that did not require a "utopian" vision to tackle
them, but which could be confronted in the politics which had been developed in modern
times, this being a more pragmatic politics. However, he points out that the Frankfurt
school sought to take account of the centrality of mass communication in modern
societies, and to show how this created another form of ideology. For example,
Horkheimer and Adorno (1972) provided a systematic account of the way modern culture
was being created by the media, and attempted to draw out the implications of this process
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for the analysis of ideology in modern societies. In opposition, Thompson believes that the
excessive concentration on the grand narrative created by the media implies that there is a
definite system of beliefs that are contained in discrete single units (like the state
apparatus or the media), and so diverts our attention away from the "multiple ways in
which symbolic forms are used, in the varied contexts of everyday life" (p.85). This is also
one of the criticisms against the use of the term 'ideology' as a systematic set of beliefs.
-
A Foucauvian analysis tries to look at many ways where power becomes exercised.
Thompson (1990) takes a critical approach to examine the meaning of work in different
social periods. He does not refer to this as ideology-critique, but more an uncovering of
the way in which people come to accept certain definitions of work, because he doubts
that these ideas are "mere ideology" concocted by a state apparatus. He wants to see them
as seeping into the way everyday life is experienced. He states that the malaise caused by
the pursuit of productivity for its own sake is what has led to the inducement offered by a
range of local improvements in the regime of work. He also criticises the tendency for
people to be induced to see work as a good in itself, aiding the process of continuing
productivity in society. He states that whole lifestyles have developed in all areas of
society which seem to shape much of the way that work life is addressed and motivation
secured. He shows that knowledge about, for example, job enrichment and work teams as
developed by the human relations approach, have become linked to relations in the
organisation where employees do not question the prevailing patterns. He states that the
pursuit of people's happiness has come to dominate, and its way of dominating is by
making people working subjects, so that their subjectivity has thus become penetrated.
Midgley (1995a) argues that a Foucauvian analysis is careful not to create the impression
that we cannot challenge the "power-knowledge" formations in a society. Therefore,
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although Foucault (1984) does not want to use the term 'ideology' or 'ideology-critique',
the concept is useful because it shows that people can challenge conceptions and are not
simply ruled by "knowledge-power" formations. So all in all, I claim that managers can
continue to speak of ideology-critique, as long as this is coupled with critical self-
reflection which lets them consider the value of any belief system or, more strongly, to
question its value. This links up with Gregory's (1992) statement that the ideology of
groups in society, other than those that appear to be the dominant groups, can also be
looked at critically. This means that all ideas can be criticised but also, in the process,
managers can learn from one another, in order to develop new ways of creating ideas and
new ways of putting their ideas into intervention. Now, I go into more detail on each of the
different arguments about ideology, relating them also to motivation intervention in
organisations.
5. 4 Ideology and social reproduction
In general, ideology is concerned with analysing the conditions under which societies, and
contemporary capitalist societies in particular, are sustained and reproduced. As
Thompson (1990) states, ideology attempts "to identify some of the mechanisms which
secure the reproduction of existing social relations" (p.86). He explains that the
continuous creation of symbolic forms which legitimate social relations also create an
ongoing submission of people to the rules and conventions of the existing patterns of the
social order; and people become moulded to fit the parts which are scripted for them.
Midgley (1995b) would apply a similar criticism to this theory as to the Foucauvian one
which seems to make people merely role-players, performing the parts scripted for them,
without showing how subjects can create new knowledge. The social reproduction theory
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tends to exaggerate the extent to which people are moulded by social processes. As
Thompson notes, "individuals are treated essentially as the products of the processes of
socialisation and inculcation to which they are subjected" (p.89). The socialisation
process is seen as one where people become fitted to their social parts. For example,
employees might learn to participate in a production system to gain maximum profits and
also to increase productivity. But, as Thompson observes,
,
individuals are never simply the sum total of processes of socialisation and
inculcation; they are never simply actors who obediently perform the roles
which are scripted for them. It is part of their very nature qua human agents
that they are capable, to some extent, of distancing themselves from the social
processes to which they are subjected, of reflecting on these processes,
criticising them, contesting them, ridiculing them and, in some circumstances,
rejecting them. (Thompson, 1990, p.89)
Although Thompson states that it is part of people's nature to reflect, criticise, contest and
ridicule patterns scripted in social processes, there is a state in which people cannot see
how it may be possible to transform these patterns. This is also part of the ideology
machinery in society. He suggests that here there is no other perceived way of doing
things, and so people may come to accept what exists as the only way open to them. He
recognises that the pull of ideology is a pull that people feel, as they experience a
powerlessness to challenge the ideas, and with this, the social processes legitimated by the
ideas; and they may find it difficult to think of ways of changing the social setting in which
they are operating, which is reproduced in the institutions of society. In spite of this
importance, Thompson declares that criticising the norms of a society in a way which will
not be self-defeating, and in a way which can have the intended consequence of actually
challenging the substance of the order (towards the creation of something different) is an
important process for people. I claim that an ideology-critique needs to emulate this in its
processes.
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Thompson (1990) notes that the dominant ideology proposition thus draws our attention
to the difficulty of creating objectives for the self which will not be self-defeating and
which might help to create a different order, and reminds us that patterns in society can
reproduce themselves, even while they challenge us or try to thwart us. However, he
recognises that the dominant ideology proposition seems to exaggerate the way in which
idea-systems serve continually to establish, sustain and reproduce relations of domination.
This is not to deny that the concept of ideology is relevant in the analysis of everyday life,
including our working lives and general lifestyles. Thompson states that the problem with
the dominant ideology proposition is
simply that it offers a much too simple account of how ideology works in
modern societies. It assumes that a particular set of values and beliefs
constitutes the elements of a dominant ideology which, by being diffused
throughout society, binds individuals of all strata to the social order; but the
ways in which symbolic forms serve to maintain relations of domination are
far more complicated than this account would suggest. (Thompson, 1990,
119 1)
Another view of ideology which has tried to offer a less simple account is the one
developed by those concentrating on the media of mass communication as public
discourse with regard to how people act in exercising power and in responding to the
exercise of power by others. This view is discussed in the following section.
5. 5 The Frankfurt school and ideology-critique
Horlcheimer and Adorno (1972) argue that the entertainment industries as capitalistic
enterprises have had a great effect on modern society, stultifying the capacity of the
individual to think and act in a critical and autonomous way. They state that the cultural
goods produced by these industries are actually designed and manufactured to suit the
aims of capitalist accumulation and profit realisation. Therefore, they see the rise of the
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culture industry as tied up with these aims. They state that cultural ideas do not arise from
the masses, but rather, are created for consumption by the masses in terms of an ideology
which supports capitalist ideas and practices. Moreover, the masses are manipulated by
the mass media and are tailored to create non-thinking and non-critical people. Thompson
(1990) notes that the process tempts people to "identify with the prevailing social norms
and to continue to be as they already are" (p.100). He also observes that in Horlcheimer
and Adomo's conception, the culture industry is a process which is "rendering individuals
less and less capable of independent thinking and more and more dependent on social
processes over which they have little or no control" (p.100). However, he recognises that
the general approach adopted by Horkheimer and Adorn° is too limited, in that they
neglected to consider that the media are double edged. On the one hand, he believes that
the media are shapers of people, but on the other hand the media are mechanisms which
people can draw upon to express challenge and critique, and thereby to envisage new
forms of existence.
Thompson (1990) has the following two main criticisms of Horkheimer and Adomo's
(1972) analysis. First, as he notes, "it is by no means clear that, by receiving and
consuming these products (of the media), individuals are impelled to adhere to the social
order" (p.104). He thus states that individuals might consume the products without
necessarily believing in the social order as sacred. Second, he argues against Horkheimer
and Adomo's account of the new form of ideology, that it presents an overly restrictive
view of the ways in which ideology operates in modern societies. So as with the social
reproduction proposition, he suggests that the assertion viewing the culture industry as
disseminator of ideology between recipients, is also too restrictive. This also applies to
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Habermas's (1984) proposition to some extent, although he does find Habermas's "depth
hermeneutic" promising, because it shows that ideology can be interpreted.
Thompson's position is that people need to concentrate on uncovering the way that
meaning is constructed in the service of power. As Thompson (1990) states, this lays open
the way for explicating "the connection between the meaning mobilised by symbolic
forms and the relations of domination which that meaning serves to establish and sustain"
(p.293). He recognises that the interpretation of ideology "involves the active construction
of meaning, the creative explication of what is represented or what is said" (p.293). In this
view of ideology, the meanings of ideas 'disseminated' are always being interpreted, and
therefore subjects are seen as actively involved with ideas, rather than as being passively
moulded by them. Meaning is something that is subjected to the ongoing process of
interpretation. This links in with Midgley's (1995b) ideas of the way that subjects can
relate to knowledge in society. People are not formed simply by knowledge (or
ideological) formations.
In Thompson's view, when looking at the issue of ideology-critique in relation to mass
media dissemination, is that the principle of "self-reflection" must apply both to the
individuals analysing any ideology and to the object domain (which is also a subject
domain because there are people as subjects involved). He states that the process of
interpretation is "connected in principle to the subjects who make up this domain, and that
this connection in principle may serve in practice to stimulate reflection between and by
these subjects" (p.322). In this way he takes up a depth-hermeneutic view of ideology
where "interpretation becomes a potential intervention in the very circumstances about
which it is formulated" (p.323). Thus, he argues that a depth interpretation given by any
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individual is a symbolic construction, "capable in principle of being understood by the
subjects enmeshed in the circumstances which form in part the object of interpretation"
(p.323). He notes that as an interpretation which may differ from people's understanding,
the depth interpretation may
enable them to see themselves differently; it may enable them to re-interpret a
symbolic question or revise their prior understanding and prior assessment of
the symbolic form and, in general, to alter the horizons of their understanding
of themselves and others. (Thompson, 1990, p.323)
Therefore he believes that looking at ideology and offering an interpretation of ideology
(which involves ideology-critique) already goes along with helping people to change their
thinking and their lifestyle choices. Thus, ideology-critique (or interpretation of ideology)
is a relevant activity. However, Thompson recognises that the plausibility of the
interpretation is a matter of applying "conditions of non-imposition" so that subjects will
not feel that the interpretation is imposed on people, and is also a matter of offering the
"evidence and arguments adduced in support of the interpretation" (p.323). He states that
this process, furthermore, must be "open in principle to the subjects who make up the
social world" (p.323). He argues that if the interpretation is plausible in the light of the
evidence and arguments adduced in its support, then it should be plausible "not only for
the analysts involved in the to and fro of interpretation and counter-interpretation, but also
for the subjects who make up the social world" (p.324). Nevertheless, the subjects may not
at first accept or find persuasive the arguments and evidence, because people are still
caught up in the old ideological traps of thinking. Hence, Thompson recognises that as
part of the process of making a credible argument, people's interpretation has to
"stimulate a process of critical self-reflection between subjects who, as actors, are capable
of deliberation" (p.324).
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Furthermore, Thompson (1990) believes that the critique of ideology is possible, but must
be "integrated into a theoretical framework which focuses on the nature of symbolic
forms, the characteristics of social contexts, the organisation and reproduction of power
and domination" (p.330). He postulates that people are "self-reflective agents who can
deepen their understanding of themselves and others and who can, on the basis of this
understanding, act to change the conditions of their lives" (p.330). This can be linked to
Gregory's (1994) statement that managers can alter their positions through their own
actions as well as by joining forces with others, and this is part of the process of
developing critical reflexivity. She recognises that critical reflexivity can "through
ideology-critique, challenge the norms (value systems) of the society" (p.1566).
This can be applied to motivation intervention. If employees are being motivated only by
external forces which make them feel that rewards can only be gained through, for
example, material compensation (scientific management approach); or which make them
feel that rewards can be gained only through team-work (human relations approach); or
which make them feel that they must work through learning (learning-based approaches),
then employees are probably not being sufficiently critically reflexive. In order to be
critically reflexive, employees must accept these as motivations only after critically
reflecting on their importance, and not simply because there are ideologies of work being
disseminated in organisations which make them become mere subjects of (manipulated
by) the ideology. This view will be discussed in more detail later. First, however, I shall
consider in more depth Habermas's (1976) position, and also that of Foucault.
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5. 6 Habermas on ideology
Habermas's (1976) view of ideology is a kind of depth-hermeneutic which incorporates
standards of knowledge creation as a way of criticising ideology. He claims that it is
possible to launch an ideology-critique process against situations where whole fields of
action colonise all other aspects of human life. As Brand (1990) in discussing Habermas's
theory states, there is in a society based on the capitalist mode of production, an
expansionist tendency in the system. This tendency is kindled by the systemic need to
harmonise the tensions generated by capitalist expansion. In other words, capitalist ways
of living, involving whole competitive and career-based lifestyles, also may create
motivation issues. Brand recognises that the system (money and power)
intrude into areas of the Lifeworld which remain vitally dependent on
integration through communicative action, namely those areas which have to
do with the Lifeworld's symbolic (rather than material) reproduction. By
penetrating into these areas as 'colonial overlords in a tribal society', they
generate a social pathology for which the great sociologists of the past had
already found various terms (alienation, anomie, loss of meaning and of
freedom) but not the right analysis of its cause. (Brand, 1990, p.xiii)
In Habermas's view, as Brand notes, the cause of these pathologies is linked to the fact
that evolutionary gains made by modernity are not duly reflected upon with a view to
controlling their momentum. Here, Habermas answers the question of why there is so little
resistance from a rationalised "Lifeworld" to its own "colonisation". Brand states that
Habermas sees the basic cause for this in the "prevention of that global type of
interpretation which is found on the level of ideology. This prevention has to do with the
fragmentation of everyday consciousness which robs it of its synthetic power" (p.xiii).
That is to say, Habermas feels that ideology occurs because there is a fragmentation in our
thinking (it is not sufficiently systemic) and a fragmentation in our experiences. Habermas
also suggests that sometimes legitimisation crises, coupled with motivation crises occur.
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But the experience of these crises is not integrated into an overall critique of the system,
including a critique of the way in which the steering media of money and power are
penetrating into the "Lifeworld". He notes that what is necessary is to create the
conditions for ideology-critique by renewing possibilities for the kind of discourse that the
"Lifeworld" promises.
For Habermas, understanding in the "Lifeworld" is reached- through the interpretive
efforts of people who coordinate their actions through criticisable claims to validity. He
suggests that the human species maintains itself through socially coordinated activities,
and that this coordination has to be established through interaction and communication,
and communication in turn is oriented to reaching agreement. Therefore, he recognises
that the reproduction of the species also requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality
that is inherent in communicative action. Habermas's view is that "reason" as
communicative reason, can help people to prevent the complete colonisation of all
thought and experience through the steering media of money and power. Although there
have been advances in our existence because of the technical capabilities served through
these media, "reason" is becoming muted by the penetrating powers of the ideologies
linked to the service of money and power. He states that "reason", as communicative
thought and action, is not situated in any one particular subject but rather, in subject-
subject relations. He suggests that for the analysis of the evolution of society,
"communicative rationality" is the inter-subjectivity of shared understanding which now
becomes central.
Therefore, as Brand (1990) notes, that the focus of investigation thereby shifts from
cognitive-instrumental rationality to communicative rationality. Habermas (1984)
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believes that people's use of language implies a common endeavour to achieve consensus
in a situation in which they are free to have their ideas and have equal chances to express
their views. This does not, of course, mean that situations in society in which language can
become fully communicative will in fact be reached. Brand states that ideally, the process
of communicative action
depends on a factor which goes beyond the bounds of the immediate historical
situation. This factor is found in the claim for the validity of the reasons which
induce people to take their particular share in communicative action. (Brand,
1990, p.11)
There is thus always some reaching towards something more universal in the validity of
reasons that people can use in the communicative sphere of thought and action. To strive
for understanding in the sphere of the "Lifeworld" means that people in interaction set out
to convince one another in a framework of reasoning whereby their interaction is
coordinated on the basis of motivation through "reason".
It is important to emphasise here that Habermas does not state that people in
communicative action have no personal ends; rather, that if these are pursued under the
condition of a communicatively produced consensus regarding the given situation, people
have to make use of language in a manner oriented towards reaching understanding. When
coordination has been reached, in whatever fashion, people perform on the basis of this,
and their activities are thus informed by communicative reason. Habermas (1982) sees
"speech" as providing the mechanism for the coordination of communicative action;
"speech" is important because it allows people to coordinate their action more
communicatively. This makes "speech" quite different from strategic action, which is
oriented merely to egocentric calculations of success, such as managers can find in a
bureaucratically structured arrangement. When employees, even in a bureaucracy, are
126
motivated merely by strategic calculation, then motivation becomes a matter of applying
mechanisms of power or of money as motivators. As an example, this is when Taylor's
scientific management approach (which induces through money rewards) or
reinforcement theory (inducing through promise of reward) to motivation may become
applicable. But employees become motivated partly because the "ideology" functioning
has come to penetrate their consciousness.
-
Habermas (1982) believes that evolutionary gains have been achieved by the development
of capitalism and other forms of modernity. Therefore, he does not reject the mentality of
bureaucratic functioning. What he rejects is people's failure to see that these forms of
functioning are coming to penetrate more and more into their consciousness and their
experience, so that they cannot imagine any other way of doing things. People's
ideology-critique faculties then become inoperable, because their ideological legitimation
is characterised by structured inequality, the fact that coordination takes place through an
apparent complementarity of interests (for example, of management and workers), does
not imply that motivation is really based on "reason". The fact that people direct
themselves ego-centrically, means that some others still get a better deal in the process.
Habermas sees this as an injustice, because it can not be in somebody's interest to accept
an offer of unequal exchange. He recognises that in strategic action, people influence the
choice situation of others not through criticisable claims of language, but through other
mechanisms, namely power or money. The motivation for action is empirical, rather than
normative.
Habermas (1984) suggests that people in society can make, intuitively and implicitly, the
distinction between strategic and communicative action which the theorist makes
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explicitly. This is why Habermas believes that the critical theorist can share ideas with
others about the importance of fostering communicative reason. The competence involved
here, is what he calls "communicative competence". He recognises that such competence
is what makes the subject capable of communicative speech and action, that is, "able to
participate in processes in which shared understanding is reached, maintaining at the same
time his or her own identity" (p.594). For Habermas's view, managers can see that
motivation can become empirically rather than normatively directed, when they interact
strategically. But Habermas does not state that this is always wrong, because it may be
necessary at times in order to sustain the technical performance of systems. What
Habermas believes is that people must also use their other faculties, that is, their faculty to
reason communicatively. Then, employees can also become motivated through
communicative reason. However, this process might include the need for an ideology-
critique process, to break the colonisation of thought which makes employees become
directed in terms of the performance principles of power (for those who can induce
reward) and money (as a way of exacting good performance). An ideology-critique
process at the same time breaks patterns of legitimation where unequal exchanges
between people (on the basis of money and power) are perpetuated. Therefore, ideology-
critique is not merely a thought process; it is also a practical process, because
communicative reason is linked to communicative action. Habermas's view of ideology-
critique will be discussed further later, when examining how Oliga (1990) compares it
with Foucault's (1979) argument. Now I proceed to show some aspects of Foucault's
argument, although he does not use the term 'ideology-critique' as such.
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5. 7 Foucault on disciplined motivation as creation of subjects
Foucault (1979) considers the linkage between rigid, fixed rules for knowledge
production, and the implementation of knowledge products in social institutions. He notes
that knowledge production is linked with creating people through disciplining their bodies
towards experiencing certain ways of life. For example, as he explains, the classical age
discovered the body as an object and target of power -- as something that could be
manipulated, shaped and trained. Since then, there have been many manifestations of this
phenomenon of disciplining the body. He calls these "projects of docility" whereby
individuals are trained to be docile, the disciplines. He states that many disciplines have
been created and have long been in existence -- in armies, monasteries and workshops. It
can be seen that Foucault shows by analogy with other types of disciplining, how
discipline in organisations becomes inculcated through the body and through people's
physical experience. Using this analogy, it can be suggested that people become used to
working in the same disciplined way.
However, Mingers (1992) suggests that the institutions are an exaggerated expression of
the practice of discipline which also seeps into other areas of society. On Foucault, as
Mingers notes, "power can best be observed in institutions which magnify its operations,
but the practices involved spread throughout society" (p.107). Just as power can express
force by creating subjects, it is also able to operate through disciplining their bodies, so
that they habitually comply. In this way, possibilities for action can become constrained
within a network of social practices which define how people must act. This is not the only
way that power operates and, as shown elsewhere, Foucault's view is not always or solely
the pessimistic view of power as domination. For example, Townley (1994) shows that
Foucault's view of the ethical subject acts as a balance against the extreme view of the
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body as only subject to others' disciplining dictates. Nevertheless, Foucault's discussion
of discipline draws out the fact that people can be disciplined through the inculcation of
compliance.
Applied to the organisation, discipline suggests that people become used to working in a
way which, in the workshop, is linked to extracting utility. Foucault (1979) does not use
the term 'ideology' to point to this disciplining (because he is worried that the term
-
'ideology' merely implies a process in thought, and also that 'ideology' implies there is
something true as its opposite). But his analysis does show how dominant groups may
seek to substantiate and legitimise their dominant position through a kind of ideology of
control (understood in a broad sense as an ideology built into control). This ideology, and
the power that goes with it, has its basis in the increasing rationalisation of social conduct,
a rationalisation that objectifies the subjective self.
Foucault (1979) recognises that people at all levels of social institutions are objectified as
a result of this increasing rationalisation. This perception is manifested in the view of
people as maximum performers; all means are tried to cause people to act at maximum
capacity. But for the subject people -- regardless of people's role within the social
structure, whether one designs the tools of subjugation or is subject to their use, he
believes that people are objectified. Consequently there does not have to be a constant
supervisor to check whether people are performing according to the rationalised plan and
are performing optimally. People at work become their own surveyors and act according
to demands for required behaviour. In this way, people become no longer subjects; they
are transformed into objects, almost without being aware of the learning processes which
have led to this orientation. These processes have seeped into people's bodies as an
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experience of docility. Foucault does not provide much advice as to how to break out of
this constraint except by implication.
The problem with Foucault's (1979) conception, according to Poster (1984), is that it
tends to reduce all forms of psychic inner life and the diversity of human experience and
creativity to the effects of a unifying bodily discipline. Moreover, subjects are understood
as manipulable docile bodies, rather than as people with the capacity for autonomous
-
experience and action. This is also the critique offered by Midgley (1995b), who states
that this is linked to Foucault's view of knowledge-formations. Foucault does not show
how people are able to break out of the grip of societal and institutional knowledge-power
formations. Critics of his view of discipline have argued that the construction of the
subject cannot be explained simply through reference to bodily experiences. Poster states
that too great an emphasis is placed on the effects of a corporeally centred disciplinary
power, at the expense of an analysis of how other forms of power contribute to the
construction of modern people. Furthermore, Foucault provides no way of going beyond
the notion of the subject as a purely determined category (that is, in fact an object) to a
fuller understanding of the subject as a thinking, willing responsible agent. As Norris
(1993) notes, the subject is little more than a
place-filler, a recipient of moral directives which issue from some other
heteronomous source of authority, and which cannot be conceived as in any
way belonging to a project of autonomous self-creation. (Norris, 1993, p.33)
Norris aims to create a theory of ideology linked to recognising people's capacities for
such "self-reflection", because Foucault's accounts falls short of this. Furthermore,
Habermas (1984) also criticises Foucault's argument on the grounds that a concept of
ideology (or any similar symbolic definition of power) becomes reduced to a technical
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notion of control, or what he calls the "uncircumspect levelling of culture and politics to
immediate substrates of the application of violence" (p.291).
Foucault (1972) criticises theories of ideology mainly because people's psyches imply a
pre-existent truth situated elsewhere which is finally revealed with the demystification of
ideological fictions. He plays down the idea that there are discernible, objective truths. In
Foucault's view, all knowledge has an ideological function. The production of knowledge
-
is bound up with regimes of power. Therefore, truths have a normalising and regulatory
function as people become accepted in society. Knowledge makes people accept as
normal a specific way of operating. As Foucault states,
all knowledge is the effect of a specific regime of power ... there is no power
relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power
relation. (Foucault, 1972, p.33)
Therefore it is impossible to distinguish between truth and ideology, as if ideology is
somehow wrong as opposed to a definite truth. He considers that the normalising force of
power can be understood, as the imposition of 'regimes of truth' through the operation of
power upon the body. So in Foucault's view, McNay (1994) argues that 'norm' does not
refer to culturally accepted patterns of behaviour, but to "routinised modes of behaviour
that are so deeply inscribed on the body by disciplinary modes of power that they seem
natural or normal" (p.112). To break out of this pattern is a project that Foucault explores
only by implication, and he does not say how people can ever decide that they have a better
way of doing things, so that whatever they think can be criticised as just a product of some
"power-knowledge" formation. It is for this reason that Oliga (1990) prefers Habermas's
theory (of ideology) to Foucault's. Foucault's "power-knowledge" does not seem to
provide any criteria for rejecting ideology in the name of something better. In the next
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section, it will be shown how through a critical systemic view, Oliga offers criteria for
rejecting ideology.
5. 8 Oliga's views on ideology
Oliga (1990) creates a (critical) systemic view by examining the work of various critical
-
systems thinkers and relating this to a discussion of ideology and power. He notes that
Jackson (1982, 1983, 1985a, b, 1987) and Jackson and Keys (1984) have classified certain
systems methodologies within the Habermasian three-interests framework. He shows that
the analyses provided by Jackson (1987), and Jackson and Keys (1984) point to the
continuing dominance of the functionalist paradigm. This, as we saw in Chapter 3, is one
way of seeing also certain motivation theories, which have a tendency to regard employees
as motivated towards maximum performance in accordance with given objectives.
Oliga (1990) also notes that the interpretive systems methodologies have not completely
replaced the well-entrenched functionalist methodologies. Both kinds of these
methodologies are still very much in operation. For example, managers can think of
interpretive systems methodologies which concentrate on employees' need to debate in
order to become committed to plans of action. Oliga notes that "distinctive radical/critical
systems methodologies have yet to emerge" (p.270). He sees that these are "in dire need of
critical inquiry", especially because people are "generally characterised by power
asymmetry and contradictions" (p.270). He recognises that an ideology-critique process is
one way of highlighting this dire need, and it can be levelled from the viewpoint of CST,
using some of the underpinnings explored in Chapter 4. However, Oliga notes that to gain
acceptance of such a type of thinking might be difficult, especially because it might be
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going against the tide of what is already accepted. The unmasking of ideological bias
might be "dreaded by the patient" (p.271). By "the patient" he means people in society, but
especially those who benefit more from the perpetuation of the ideology.
Oliga (1990) states that mainstream systems theories of stability and instability in society
often embrace functionalist or interpretive paradigmatic interests. He recognises that both
share a common perspective on their view of social control. , These approaches are
concerned with the dissolution of tension and contradiction. Oliga notes that the statement
of a problem of social order is already a way of seeing reality. He argues that "conflict is
an actual or potential problem and so arises only within a theory that defines the problem
of conflict", and adds that "the imposition of order must resolve that conflict on terms
favourable to one or the other party" (p.272). Therefore, maintaining order through
finding suitable ways of motivating employees may involve terms that are not equally
favourable to all concerned. This is why I argue the need for a critical systemic approach
to motivation that can uncover these contradictions and also look for some ways of
dealing with them, even if it is not necessarily a way that simply emphasises order.
The question is, whether there is a form of organisation that need not rely on domination
for its continued successful performance, and in which performance criteria themselves
can be altered. This is what Oliga (1990) hints at with his view of the possibility of
"transforming such domination" as linked to an analysis of "the roles of power and
ideology (ideology-critique)" (p.272). He organises his discussion by considering certain
conceptions of power, showing where his ideology-critique view fits in terms of these
views. As he notes,
in Foucault's concept of `pouvoir-savoir' (power-knowledge), power
(pouvoir) is assumed to be diffused throughout society, at all levels, just as
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practical, everyday life knowledge, savoir (as opposed to `connaissance', the
formal knowledge of science), is. (Oliga, 1990, p.2'74)
In Foucault's view, power is always linked to the way that knowledge is created and
utilised for social purposes, penetrating social institutions and people's experience of
them. In relation to ideology, Oliga notes that Foucault's power-knowledge "challenges
the idea of truth or pure knowledge since actual knowledge in society is political activity,
the product of power and its disciplinary techniques" (p.2'74). He raises a point, namely,
that Foucault concentrates hard on the way social life is played out in terms of power-
knowledge formations, but gives little attention to "the possibility that such parameters of
struggle may be ideologically structured" (p.275). He recognises that there is a danger of
over concentrating on the tactics without looking at the "biases of potential outcomes"
(p.275). By looking at these biases, the road is opened to giving a critique of these
outcomes, which for Oliga is part of the purpose of ideology-critique. Oliga utilises some
ideas of Habermas (1984) to make the point about the need for ideology-critique,
understood as operating in terms of some standards by which to distinguish truth from
falsity (biases). As he notes, "for Habermas critique presupposes criteria for
distinguishing truth from falsity, without which the very notion of ideology becomes
meaningless" (p.275). He states that two types of consequences flow from failure to make
this distinction: first, people lose the ability to distinguish between mere preferences and a
critical understanding of what their interests might be. Second, in the absence of such
distinctions, "prevailing power relations become the ultimate arbiters of interests"
(p.276).
Oliga (1990) also points out that Foucault's conception of "power-knowledge" is coupled
with a rejection of the concept of ideology. He notes that Foucault does not try to provide
standards to which the critique of ideology can refer in order to justify its procedure and
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claims to deny "the grounds on which to assert a priori criteria of its own truth" (p.277).
He shows that the condition of non-imposition can still accompany ideology-critique, so
that a communication between analysts and individuals in their everyday lives becomes a
way of carrying out ideology-critique. He recognises that critical theory is not merely a
"relative rationality", and must not simply give its own rational criteria of validity,
imputing ideological meanings to other texts. He also emphasises that perhaps there are
other ways of effecting critique (e.g., through a critical systemic view of learning such as
the one this thesis tries to develop). Before proceeding to discuss this, I continue to discuss
Oliga's analysis of views on ideology. The question is whether a possible better
alternative regime (social system) is conceivable. Oliga gives three possible answers: the
first possibility is a negative answer, that the present regime's dominant ideologies and
attendant power are not doubted or challenged; the second possibility is a qualified
positive answer that there is some doubt regarding both the strength of the power effect
and the dominant ideologies; and the third possibility is an unqualified positive answer.
Here, both power and dominant ideologies are doubted. Here, counterclaims to the
legitimacy of the rulers' domination can emerge strongly, together with resistance and
struggle by the ruled. In this case, there is disdain for the regime's right and capacity to
rule. Oliga recognises that the articulation between power and ideology creates a new
relation. However, whether better regimes are then created is still unclear. This brings us
to more detailed discussion of the question of power, for it is only in this way that further
answers can be found.
136
5. 9 Some views on the exercise of power which help enhance critical
appreciation
As has been shown in the previous sections, ideology theories include ideas about power.
For example, the social reproduction theory of ideology states that power configurations
in society (based on class formations) are reproduced, in part due to the legitimating force
of ideology. The Frankfurt school saw that the media reduced activity in society so that
people became consumers of culture. In this sense, people did not develop their critical
skills to challenge lifestyles in the "Lifeworld". Ideology is thus reductive reasoning,
supported by reductivist ways of portraying issues.
Thompson (1990) tries to show that power and dominance configurations in society can
change, as people see themselves as self-reflecting agents rather than pawns of
unchallengeable systems. Gregory (1992) draws attention to the power of challenge, as
people begin to co-ordinate their efforts to transform themselves and society. Mingers
(1992) suggests that what is important when looking at power in society, is
not a theoretical analysis of power per se, nor even the correct treatment of
power in critical theory, but a conception of power from which may be derived
useful operationalisations as part of action-oriented methodologies. (Mingers,
1992, p.106)
He states that the results of analysing power should be relevant for people "in everyday
situations of power by, and on behalf of, ordinary citizens" (p.106). He recognises that in
order to create action, people should not wait until all the different theorists have agreed
on what power is, and how to look at it. He thus argues that people should "not wait for
some consensus on the current approaches, many of which have important if limited
insights" (p.106). He believes that all approaches have some insights and also some
limitations.
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Mingers (1992) also notes that some of the debates concern whether, for example, "power
is seen as either coercive or else enabling; as only intentional and explicit or also as
unintentional and implicit" (p.106). He states that when power is seen as coercive then it is
assumed that power is always to be challenged, while when power is seen as enabling,
then some power is seen as necessary for people to act. He argues that power is most
adequately conceptualised as "elusive" , and is also multifaceted. He believes that the
-
explanations of how power operates in society are thus not simple. Here, some of its
effects are visible, in that we can see how power is used to manipulate, or alternatively to
empower. And sometimes power is conscious and intentional; at other times unconscious
and unintentional. This is similar to Oliga's (1990) view of the difficulty in seeing power
in any one way. Mingers suggests that people can draw together different conceptions of
power by analysing it, both from their perspectives and from the perspective of structure
(conditions that allow individuals to exercise power). He recognises that this drawing
together implies a form of "relational perspective" (p.107). He notes that approaches to
power can generally be categorised as "subjectivist", "objectivist", or "relational"
depending on where they locate the main focus of power. He states that
subjectivist approaches concentrate on individuals and groups of people
exercising power in a relatively conscious way. Objectivist approaches
concentrate on power as a structural phenomenon either constraining and
oppressing. Relational approaches emphasise that power must be seen as a
relational concept, concerned either with the interaction of groups or interests,
or of subject and structure. (Mingers, 1992, p.106)
Flood and Romm (1996a) offer a similar discussion in their typology of power. They see
that there are a number of ways of seeing power. But they do not try to integrate them
because, they suggest, it is better to keep distinctiveness, so that people can deal with
different aspects of issues of power when they intervene. For example, applying Flood and
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Romm's analysis and relating it to motivation, managers could consider how structures
can create conditions that allow some people to enforce their will on others. These others
in turn have to respond to the powerful forces, either by obeying or by trying to resist, but
as they resist they might come up against structural constraints. Consideration could be
given to how managers consciously exercise power, and also how this may be enabling,
especially if they are involved in the exercise of power in an inter-subjective way. For
example, managers can create teams which are then seen as using the power of teamwork
as a way of motivating employees, along with other ways of involving themselves in
decision-making. This ties in with motivation theories which see that employees'
motivation can be drawn upon as a powerful force that consciously leads them to work
towards co-operative achievement of goals. There is also another view of power which
questions such co-operative achievement (which Mingers links to a more critical view of
power). As Mingers (1992) states, "a critical approach sets out to challenge the status quo
in a more radical way, aiming to change it in favour of the disadvantaged" (p.105). This
view of power is always on the lookout for ways of trying to transform situations by
criticising the status quo in a radical way. Flood and Romm (1996a) suggest that the
efforts of both Habermas (1984) and Foucault (1982) can be seen in this way, as
essentially transformative. However, some critics of Foucault (including Oliga, 1996)
state that Foucault's argument does not show up sufficiently how people can transform
social relations, because he provides no standard by which to assess this. From my
personal view, this means that there are no criteria to judge when motivation is most
helpful. Now, I will consider in more detail a variety of views on power.
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Mingers (1992) considers that in reviews of the literature on power, very little attention
has been paid to Habermas's (1984) view on this. Flood and Romm (1996a) observe that
Habermas is concerned with activating new knowledge-power relations by appealing to
people's capacity to use argument rather than power as force, and they want to pit 'right'
(through good argument) against the dominant power of 'might' (p.73). They note, when
discussing ideology issues, that Habermas believes that ideology exists because people do
not use sufficient "communicative rationality" to challenge ideas in terms of 'validity'
claims. Flood and Romm also observe that for Habermas, ideas and whole ways of life
linked to the ideas are accepted, without there really being a true consensus arising of
genuine rational discourse; the power of ideology thus acts to suppress communication
oriented towards better argument. During interventions, power operates illegitimately,
because employees do not see how they can challenge it in terms of activating good
arguments. Employees then do not become motivated to achieve goals which have been
reached through public argument. Employees become motivated merely strategically to
try and fulfil whatever ends they can, while 'ego' and 'alter ego' become directed through
strategy rather than argument.
However, Foucault (1982) questions whether people can rely on rational argument to
make a better society. He describes power in terms of its operation -- what actually
happens in the exercise of power. He suggests that power is intentional, in that its exercise
has intended results, but it has no overall coherent structure or strategy. Its effects escape
intentions: "people know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do;
but what they don't know is what they do does" (cited from Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983;
p.187). Foucault recognises that power is intimately connected with knowledge, and refers
to "power-knowledge". He argues that power relations lead to the development of
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knowledge, and knowledge enables the exercise of power. However, Midgley (1995a)
notes that power can reinforce a view of subjects who cannot see how people can
transform either themselves or entrenched power-knowledge formations.
Foucault (1982) becomes specific about the analysis of power relations in society, and
suggests that it is necessary to establish a number of elements, for example, the way that
power is used to set up distinctions as it categorises things and names them; and the means
-
that can be used to create power relations. He sees that these factors operate in definite
ways. For example, managers can think of language rules that dictate that employees must
"work productively" to earn their wage; or that "time is money". Foucault also notes that
there is also secrecy, for example, the way that documents are kept confidential so that
people do not have access to information that would allow them to challenge a situation.
He believes that if people knew about this, they then might be demotivated to work for the
firm. Therefore these means and rules of language and secrecy apply to motivation
through strategy. Foucault argues that analyses of the way that power is used are helpful in
the continual struggle in and against power. He recognises that people should not aim to
-
remove power:
To say there cannot be a society without power relations is not to say either
that those which are established are necessary, or ... that power constitutes a
fatality at the heart of societies. (Foucault, 1982, p.223)
In Foucault's view, knowledge is a way of constructing the world, of differentiating it into
various elements and through this process taking control over the elements and
disciplining the self and social institutions. So, he believes that knowledge becomes
related to discipline of self. For example, we should focus on what the knowledge does --
on its "power effect". This can become a way of identifying how the power effect can be
challenged. Clegg (1989) uses Foucault's conception of disciplinary power to suggest that
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power can be facilitative. He states that power can be considered as creative rather than
necessarily limiting, and the conception of discipline allows a more sensitive description
of the workings of power than ideology critique alone. So, he sees Foucault's use of the
term 'power' as potentially facilitative of new ways of acting. He suggests that this is
perhaps a better way of seeing power and knowledge, than merely seeing power-
knowledge as ideology. The concern will then be with the workings of power, rather than
with examining false interests or distorted expressions, as if these can be identified by
individuals. However, Foucault does not offer sufficient material on how knowledge-
power formations can be transformed (see Midgley, 1995a).
Rahman (1993) in his book People's Self-development, also uses some of the work of
Foucault to examine the workings of power, with a view to creating more empowerment
and mobilisation of power. He suggests that an analysis of power-knowledge formations
creates possibilities for people to mobilise and self-develop. He recognises that
mobilisation should rest on the intrinsic urges of people and not be extrinsically imposed;
if it is externally imposed it is domination. To avoid this, he recognises that people need to
have "(i) a sense of owning the means of production, and (ii) a sense of being the subject
of decision-making" (p.19). He wants to see ownership as a category in society that must
be examined, so that "the complex combinations of the distribution of formal ownership
and decision-making power that obtain in reality can be assessed" (p.19). He recognises
that once this is done, new ways of seeing ownership which challenge existing power-
knowledge formations can develop. This implies transformation of society as well as
self-development, and that a sense of (positive) purpose in the exercise of ownership and
decision-making can emerge. He links this to the creation and sustenance of "self-
reliance". He defines self-reliance as "reliance on one's own resources, including those
objectively external but subjectively internalised, that an inner urge for creative work may
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be generated" (p.19). He also notes that "the concept of self-reliance is used in a variety of
senses, so that a discussion of its meaning in the context of mobilisation is necessary"
(p.19). Furthermore, he suggests that the self-reliance must be coupled with a
state of mind that regards one's own mental and material resources as the
primary stock to draw on in the pursuit of one's objectives, and finds
emotional fulfilment not only in achieving the objectives as such but also in
the very fact of having achieved them primarily by using one's own resources.
(Rahman, 1993, p.19)
For Rahman, motivation with self-reliance means becoming motivated not by pressure
from without, but by relying on people's resources to mobilise themselves. This also
implies achieving emotional fulfilment from striving for objectives. He is critical of the
way motivation is often derived from external resources, which creates the loss of "self-
respect". He recognises that to foster self-respect means that external help should not be
relied on
except when it is either mutual or in times of extreme and abnormal calamity
immediately threatening survival (for example, danger of drowning, being hit
by a cyclone) when, by accepting external help, one may also help preserve
self-respect of the helper. Furthermore, co-operative relations should be
striven for in the sense that if one appropriates others' resources, this should
occur within some mutually honourable quid pro quo. (Rahman, 1993, p.19)
He attaches great importance to autonomy of choice and action, current and future, which
people consider significant. In this sense, managers must be able to judge what they think
is significant and must be able to exercise choices when they commit themselves to action.
It is also important, in the process, not to endanger their self-reliance in the future. So
managers should be given the opportunity to act autonomously, both now and in the
future. Rahman recognises that overdependence or being vulnerable statistically,
politically, etc. are thus ruled out in this concept of self-reliance; and people should not be
at the mercy of others' whims or of political pressures or unable to act in ways that can
better their lifestyles.
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Following Mingers's (1992) claim about the need for a theory of power which can be
operationalised, Rahman (1993) suggests that "self-reliance conceived in these terms has
operational implications that are both creatively positive as well as resistance-oriented and
hence defensive" (p.19). He notes that the "creatively positive aspect" ties in with Clegg's
(1989) view of the facilitative strength of Foucault's analysis of power, and the idea of
resistance is an indication that in the process of mobilising power for self-reliance,
-
people's efforts may meet with obstructions, which have to be resisted. He observes that
people in society have become unable, through lack of "material staying power" as well as
of "mental staying power" to persevere in the face of top down control. He argues that
throwing off exploitative dominance-dependence relations requires persistence. To
strengthen this, he recognises that people require cultural education as well as some
experience of self-reliance as they become "exposed to examples of self-reliance under
difficult conditions by other groups, communities and so on"; and power also requires "an
impulse of self-reliance through inspiring leadership, for example, invocations and,
perhaps most effectively, through liberation struggles" (p.20). He has a liberation struggle
argument that ties freedom to these features, which seeks to be aware of how to improve
self-reliance. Furthermore, he notes that self-reliance embraces an energy towards creative
activity and that this energy is motored by
an awareness of one's creative assets, arising again out of a combination of
material resources under one's control, and such mental resources as
confidence in one's ability to solve original problems of life, the courage to
take on challenging tasks and the stamina to make sustained efforts to
accomplish them, and so on. (Rahman, 1993, p.21)
Thus, we can see that Rahman relates self-reliance to a new way of seeing employees'
involvement in organisations (or society) -- ideally not being motivated merely through
external rewards, or by some idea of objectives to be reached as externally given, but
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through developing employees' confidence for sustaining efforts towards their own
accomplishments, which will be emotionally fulfilling. However, this is not simply the
same as Maslow's hierarchy where "self-realisation" becomes a way of motivating
employees in organisations. Rather, it develops self-realisation further by looking at the
way in which collective purpose must be critically handled. In Ralunan's view,
mobilisation does imply moving towards a collective purpose, but a collectivity is not
simply a collectivity geared towards productivity goals or goals of-good performance as a
technical accomplishment. A collectivity, according to Rahman, is
an association of individuals who possess a sense of identity with the
association, so that the collective interest (as defined collectively by an agreed
procedure) registers emotionally in the consciousness of its members as part
of their 'individual' interest, that is, realisation of the collective objective gives
direct fulfilment to the individual members. (Rahman, 1993, p.21)
He thus recognises a balance between people's needs and their association with others, so
that they can gain some identity with others, but also can realise something of their own
interests. Motivation has to arise from an intrinsic wish to achieve something, and this
must not be a matter of being manipulated to want this because people's identity has been
totally moulded by the collective. So, as Rahman argues, though self-reliance should be a
collective state of mind, it must not "replace individual self-reliance, as the sense of the
individual itself is extended to embrace the collective" (p.22). He cautions that for the idea
of collective mobilisation (and individuals' fulfilment) to become potent,
the chosen level of mobilisation may be too low, in the sense that the desired
mobilisation could have been achieved at a higher level, gaining at the same
time a wider choice of resource allocation, as a higher-level mobilisation
could allow resources to be put under the control of a correspondingly higher
(larger) collective, permitting more efficient resource use to the extent that
such possibilities (economies of scale) exist. (Rahman, 1993, p.25)
Here, Rahman' s analysis is that if mobilisation is too locally defined, with too small a
scale of operation, then it will not have power to transform patterns in society. He
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recognises that participation requires a consideration of how to balance the distribution of
society's resources between its different collectives and an examination of whether
emotional resources are evenly distributed in the sense that fulfilment is being satisfied.
However, he states that intervention must not become so abstractly focused that its centre
of gravity becomes unmanageable. For purposes of action, he recognises that people thus
might have to be chosen for mobilised development, to initiate the process of social
transformation towards greater self-reliance as a general principle. The basis of self-
reliance, as Rahman has conceptualised it, needs to be linked to larger social goals of
generating a new style of life (p.29). He develops his argument in relation to what he calls
"the concept of satisfaction of basic needs of the population", and notes that this idea
(need fulfilment) has emerged as part of liberal development thinking. Furthermore, he
takes the argument about needs further by suggesting that the process of satisfying needs is
what is all-important, and not the fact of reaching a satisfaction of the said need. People
thus have to create the means of satisfying other needs, according to their own priorities.
He recognises that
through such creation we evolve - develop - as creative beings. This is the
basic human need - to fulfil our creative potential in ever newer ways -
although it may not be expressed or asserted by all because of the conditioning
resulting from structural social and cultural domination. (Rahman, 1993,
p.187)
Here, he views humankind as being primarily creative beings, a view which links up with
the idea of people's self-development through self-reliance and what kind of society is
thereby created. He states that such a society "rejects dogmatism about collectivism as the
ultimate emancipation of labour and leaves the question to the organic evolution of
people's collective search for life", and society also rejects the notion of macro structural
change as a prerequiste for people's self-development which can start immediately as a
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process of collective inquiry and action for solving problems along with "self-
determination" (p.179).
Rahman' s view of self-development is related to the issue of who creates knowledge in
society, and how knowledge is used. He recognises that power is built when top-down
control is linked to expert rather than organically derived knowledge. He argues that part
of the task of social transformation is to
-
restore popular knowledge to a status of equality with professional knowledge
and advancing 'organic knowledge' as a part of the very evolution of life and
not distanced from it. This offers a new role for intellectuals, in initiating
'animation' work with the people to promote their collective self-inquiry and
action. (Rahman, 1993, p.179)
So although he sees a 'role' for professionals (for example, professionals concerned with
developing theories of motivation), he also sees that all knowledge must be related
organically to popular ideas and needs. He emphasises that people's self-development
must start "with self-understanding to guide their own action, and is a process in which
self-understanding develops as action is taken and reviewed" (p.195). He recognises that
people must have a sense of how they wish to address their own needs, and knowledge
cannot be held by elites who develop constructions of their needs and try to motivate them
on this basis.
Therefore Rahman (1993) refers to a kind of need-based theory of motivation, but not
quite in any of the ways that were discussed in Chapter 2. He recognises that his approach
must grow organically from a personal definition of needs and by coupling this with new
forms of social existence. To organise this transformation, he states that people's foremost
need is for a liberated mind; that is, where transformation is linked to ideology-critique,
because ideology can imprison our minds. He summarises his argument:
147
Only with a liberated mind (of the people), which is free to inquire and then
conceive and plan what is to be created, can structural change release the
creative potentials of the people. In this sense liberation of the mind is the
primary task, both before and after structural change. (Rahman, 1993, p.195)
Therefore, he tries to break monopolies of knowledge, and in this way pave the road for
people to assert their right to advance their 'self-knowledge' through 'self-inquiry' as the
basis of their action. His suggestion to change power relations is thus aimed towards
altering the knowledge, and to produce and advance "organic knowledge" as a part of the
very evolution of life. This is opposed to elite-generated knowledge produced in academic
laboratories, which is then disseminated as knowledge in society. Rahman recognises that
a more liberating role can be taken by the intelligentsia, if they act as facilitators that
"stimulate and assist the others to collectively inquire and act for themselves" (p.196). He
believes that bringing about basic changes in society is possible by giving a new role to
people trying to develop their own knowledge. Relating this to knowledge of needs, he
recognises that it should not come from the intelligentsia with the purpose of retaining the
basic institutions of society. As he notes, we use knowledge merely to gear employees to
maximum performance, or to fulfil objectives and purposes that have not been widely
discussed. For example, MBO in the hands of managers can become an ideology that
helps to entrench power.
Rahman (1993) offers a new view of motivation, which ties it to organic development of
knowledge (through a kind of needs approach). His views are thus very significant for this
thesis. I believe that his view of needs also agrees with kinds of learning which allow us to
learn between radically alien perspectives as long as we do not let those others impose our
knowledge to develop our own self-knowledge. Furthermore, when it is used in a more
liberating way, it becomes a view of motivation which leads us to inspire and facilitate,
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rather than to merely define objectives. It is also tied to new ways of organising lifestyles
in organisations. So, Rahman's view of needs and self-development, offers a new way of
seeing employees. He gives a vision of a better motivation where employees can develop
their own knowledge and self-knowledge without the imposition of others. In this way he
goes beyond Foucault, who does not apparently offer any visions like this. Foucault
(1982) concentrates more on showing up 'knowledge-power' configurations and their
unfolding in a myriad of circumstances. Oliga (1996) takes a line similar to Rahman's
(1993) view, when he speaks about the basic needs approach in which people's needs
could be met, and states that these needs must be catered for in society. However, he notes
that the needs approach often only becomes a policy, without seeking the involvement of
people in deciding how to achieve it or letting them develop their own view of their needs.
Like Rahman' s view, Oliga (1996) sees that a needs approach can have some radical
importance in helping people to become involved in defining their motivations, without
being induced by external power, threat, subtle forms of coercion, etc. He recognises that
intrinsic self-knowledge can become a basis both for need satisfaction and for people's
self-development. Learning can occur in various ways, as I discuss when I propose a
critical systemic view of learning in the following chapter. As referred to the discussion
presented in Chapter 2, Oliga's ideas have implications for motivation approaches. For
example, need-based theories which do not question views on maximum performance as
the criteria for action, and process-based theories which do not allow for radical critique
practices, can lead to a neglect of the ideological dimension in social control. And
learning-based theories, like need-based theories, can become trapped in a situation
leading to employees' self-misunderstanding where they do not employ their critical
faculties to redefine their needs. Those approaches suffer from the problem of uncritically
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using our ideological self-understandings as resources to reproduce a form of society that
in fact cannot meet collective needs.
By reflecting on all of this, we should communicate and learn to become more active in
making ideological changes. However, this requires not only our acts of self-knowledge,
but also development of a critical systemic view of learning that encourages our self-
development. This is the purpose of critical systemic view of learning, as developed in this
-
thesis. It also ties up with Gregory's (1992) "discordant pluralism" (as I mentioned in
Chapter 3). Gregory (1994) notes that "an ideology-critique must incorporate structural
changes as well as changes which address the processes of interaction between human
beings" (p.1565). This is because the "Lifeworld" processes must take account of people
relations, as well as organising new interactions between people which are more
communicative. As Gregory believes, our actions should be accommodated in a theory of
social transformation; and transformation requires our action, which have been activated
through critical self-reflection and ideology-critique. She recognises that our actions can
reproduce given orders (especially when ideology is not criticised), conversely, our
actions can also have impacts which will be transformative (p.1565). She sums up her
argument as follows:
Through a critique of ideology an individual may choose to act in certain ways
that will impact on the values and beliefs of the society which, in the normal
day-to-day activities of individuals and collectives is produced and
reproduced. (Gregory, 1994, p.1566)
She recognises that values and beliefs of society can be reproduced and can also be
transformed, and that society can be (re)created in a different configuration of interactions
and with new values coming to the fore. In this sense, we in turn can be subjected to
critical self-reflection and perhaps ideology-critique as soon as they become undesirably
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all-powerful as guiding forces to motivation. She uses Habermas's view of emancipation
to show that we can emancipate in the sense of looking forward to new futures. She quotes
Giddens (1991) who states,
it is this 'openness' of the future to other possibilities that causes other writers
to argue for the potentiality of change in the make-up of society: The
'openness' of things to come expresses the malleability of social world and
the capability of (individual) human beings to shape the physical settings of
our existence. (Giddens, 1991, p.111 cited from Gregory, 1994, P.1563)
Gregory (1992) utilises ideas from Habermas and Giddens, and advocates processes
involving the development of self and society (re)creation,
to reveal the complex interactions between self and society which enable each
to be co-(re)productive of the other. It is also possible to show the features of
reflexive inquiry aimed at providing understanding which involves both
processes of critical self-reflection and of ideology-critique. (Gregory, 1992,
p.188)
Here, Gregory's exploration of self-society dynamics is another way of looking at
ideology-critique, and shows why ideology-critique is necessary to change social
configurations that otherwise become reproduced (without critical reflection on why they
should be reproduced). Critical reflexivity leads us to develop our own new knowledge
(like Rahman's idea of self-knowledge), and shows us how to criticise ideologies which
hamper our own development and where we have not reflected on values. Gregory also
notes that self-society dynamics aims at encouraging us to reflect on the values that are
being reproduced in society as a matter of course. This can be done by means of the critical
appreciation process. In the critical appreciation process, all participants' ideologies must
be subjected to debate as well as offering opportunities for new reflections. Therefore, as I
noted in Section 5. 3 of this chapter discussing ideology, Gregory does not want to see that
only certain powerful individuals have ideologies that they disseminate to others. Others
(so-called subordinate ones) can also develop their ideologies through the critical
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appreciation process. In this way, we should develop organisations built on more critical
reflexivity which involves normative thinking, and allows employees to question and
challenge norms and ideologies which do not seem right. Gregory also refers to
Habermas's theory of moral communication to show that moral reasoning cannot be
ignored in the critically reflexive processes. Here, we should be able to communicate and
learn from one another, and part of this learning allows us to see how immoral contexts
(reasoned to be immoral) need changing.
Thus, a critical systemic view of learning is needed to be able to see when, for example, a
certain motivation approach has the consequence of enforcing certain types of behaviour,
which could be challenged as being wrong. So a critical systemic view of learning is not a
values-neutral process, it involves judging different values in alien paradigmatic
assumptions which are produced in society, hoping to create better society. Some of these
ideas are taken up in Chapter 6, which deals far more with a critical systemic view of
learning in the context of looking at self-society dynamics.
5. 10 Conclusion
In this chapter, I highlighted briefly the implications of some theories of ideology and
views of power. I showed that sometimes views of ideology imply that people are passive
in the face of ruling ideologies and power. An ideology-critique process can be coupled
with the idea that we need to engage in critical self-reflection of the way in which
ideologies structure lifestyle choices. As Rahman' s view states, self-reliance in relation to
collective involvement presents a view of motivation which is creativist, but which does
not see the employee as isolated from the collectivity. In fact, this creates a way for
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managers to understand how self and society can become interlinked so as to develop both
self and society (the collectivity). They should recognise that the different approaches are
embedded in specific ideologies, and should be aware of the underpinning ideology in
order to appreciate properly the approach. We should always have critical awareness
about the suitability of the available approaches. Motivation also continually raises
questions concerning the appropriateness of both the status quo and ideological
differences. Using and developing ideas from these views, I moved towards showing the
need for a critical systemic view of learning which is tied up with some understanding of
self-society dynamics during motivation interventions.
In the next chapter I develop these ideas further, examining organisational learning and
linking this to a critical systemic view of learning during motivation interventions, which
are seen as in a discordant pluralist relationship to each other, allowing them to learn from
one another.
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Chapter 6
Issues in Motivation Interventions (3):
The Need for Learning during Interventions
6. 1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I showed that sometimes views of ideology imply that people are
passive in the face of ruling ideologies. However, ideology-critique can be coupled with
the idea that people need to have critical awareness of the way in which ideologies are
structuring lifeworld choices. That is, when matched with a critical self-reflection which
allows people to question assumptions that they might have taken-for-granted, or to
question dogmatic ways of seeing the world, may form the basis of new ways of being
motivated. Instead of motivation being seen as something that has to be inculcated, or as
something coupled with an external reward, it can be seen as linked to self-determination,
while also accepting people's need to form part of a collectivity. In fact, this creates a way
for us to understand how self and organisation can become interlinked so as to develop
both self and organisation (the collectivity).
This self-development and collective development can be linked through the process of
learning. Selves can learn to appreciate other ways of seeing themselves by considering
other people's views of themselves and also other participants' views of theories and
ideas. When this occurs, organisation also develops as it does not simply reproduce itself
along habitual lines, and in terms of entrenched ideologies. Organisations can develop to
the point of creating organisations which reward ethical behaviour (while leaving scope
for continued discussion about questions of ethics). And they can develop to the point
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where organisational functioning also shows sensitivity to careful thought about
sustainability.
In this chapter, I develop these ideas further, discussing views of organisational learning
and linking this to a critical systemic view of learning. I show how such a critical systemic
view of learning means that people can learn from one another and also from theories that
have been offered by others to explain motivation. I also show why a critical systemic
-
view of learning is necessary to understand more about motivation and to help change our
conceptions of motivation so that these are not ruled by ideology. The way that learning is
ideally in a discordant pluralist position which lets people question what they receive from
others, while also adding to their own appreciation of the issues. Therefore, people exist in
parallel (and theories exist in parallel) without them all becoming all the same. That is, it
means that people can continually learn from one another because they can continue to
engage in dialogue about their differences, including a dialogue about the relevance of the
available motivation approaches.
6. 2 Self-society dynamics
As noted in Chapter 5, self-society relationships cannot be avoided as part of a discussion
about motivation. The question arises whether people should retain a sense of their own
identity which is not just ruled by others' expectations of them and others' judgments
about their performances. For example, Rahman' s (1993) view of self-development offers
a new way of seeing society and individuals, and it gives a vision of a better society where
people can develop their knowledge and self-knowledge without the imposition of
traditional ideology. Thompson (1990) and Gregory (1992) are also arguments which
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concentrate on the relation between self and society as being a dynamic one. For example,
Gregory believes that action of individuals must be accommodated in a theory of social
transformation, and transformation requires the action of individuals, coupled with their
critical reflective faculties, which have been activated through critical self-reflection and
ideology-critique processes. In these arguments, it is shown how people can be critical of
ideologies which otherwise would pattern their performances, and how they can be self-
critical about ideas and experiences that they have absorbed. 	 -
Nurius (1991) discusses self and society relationships by noting that we not only have
selves (definitions of who we are) but also possible selves (definitions of what we might
be). He describes the conceptions of possible selves as follows:
Possible selves are the future-oriented components of the self-concept; people
personalise and give enduring cognitive form to other's goals, motives, and
hopes and fears for the future... .Positive possible selves carry both means-end
information about who to be like (what social identity to emulate) and what to
do (how to go about manifesting or enacting that identity), as well as positive
mood associated with the anticipated goal and regard of others. In contrast,
negative possible selves are more likely to reflect what not to become, who
not to be like, and, in some cases, what not to do. (Nurius, 1991, p. 248)
Nurius's discussion of possible selves shows that people need to have some form of social
support to think about creating new ways of being (and thereby perhaps breaking with old
ideologies). So although society can restrict people in the sense of perpetuating norms and
expectations which reproduce existing lifestyles, collective engagement through
significant other people is a way of creating new lifestyles and ways of being. This links
up with Gregory's (1992) self-society dynamics, in which people act to change or
maintain society, yet social processes transform or constrain the knowledge that people
may have, and thereby the actions they may take. She points out that transforming the self
requires self-reflection, whilst social transformation needs to begin with ideology-
critique. She also emphasises that emancipation cannot result from the application of
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self-reflection or ideology-critique independently, but only from a process in which both
are used and thereby act to create something new.
In a similar view to Nurius, and when considering the way selves relate to society, Stryker
(1991) notes the importance of the 'ought-self, that is, the "person's representations of
attributes that someone (self or other) believes they should or ought to possess -- their
responsibility, obligation, or duty" (p.25). He suggests that motivation is created by
-
linking between 'self-guides' (which guide their responses) and people's 'self-concepts',
which are their sense of their actual own and actual other self-representations, that is,
people's feelings about attributes that they possess and about how others are seeing them.
This may prompt them either to retreat into negative emotional responses or perhaps to
consider altering their self-guides and self-concepts, thus providing some impetus for
transformation.
Stryker (1991) also notes that people's ways of responding to their ought-self (how they
and others consider their obligation-related self) is not merely a matter of taking in some
prescribed conception of normative expectations. People also have their own ideal
ought-self as an image which can guide them. Stryker states that "ethical conduct is not
reducible to performance in accordance with societal order" (p.26). This is what opens the
way for people to challenge norms or ideologies. Similarly, Gregory's (1992) view is that
through "critical self-reflection, the participants can alter who they are; they can present a
different identity which 'fits' more closely with what is required by the organisation", or
which challenges what is required by the organisation (p.363). People can confront social
norms because they have their own sense of an ought-self, which may not correspond
entirely with the ought-self that they see others proposing for them. This is the ground for
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a self-society dynamic relationship, in which people can learn from others but do not have
to conform with all of their expectations. People's development of self-concepts
(including their development of an ought-self) is not simply a matter of accepting others'
ideas for their performance. This can be linked to the aspect of Habermas's (1976)
"Lifeworld" where reasoned motivation can occur as people think together about ought-
selves (to use Stryker's terminology). This generates mutual learning guided by the
intention of becoming better selves, and the ability to act in acCordance with 'reason'
(communicative co-ordination of action). Foucault (1982) also sees that it is important to
concentrate on freedom to rebel, so that even normative directed selves will not simply be
selves shaped by others' view of what is right. Townley (1994) highlights this and other
aspects of Foucault's argument, as will be discussed in the next section.
6. 2. 1 Rebellion and re-creation in the workplace
Townley (1994) notes that Foucault's (1982) proposal of a 'freedom to rebel' implies a
freedom to reject performance appraisals done only by managers, and the general
possibility of developing subordinate appraisals of those defined as higher. She recognises
that Foucault's analysis of an ethical meaning of subject is not simply reduced to societal
dictates, and that the ethical meaning of subject
requires the recognition of various subject positions and the recognition of the
plurality and difference which arise due to social, economic and cultural
origin, differences in situations and needs. (Townley, 1994, p.156)
Townley notes that currently, potential employees are not given an adequate idea of what
their job might entail, which is required if they are not to fall short of any expectations that
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employers might have, and regret taking appointments which turn out not to be what they
themselves had expected of the job.
Burrell (1992) also suggests that to create new styles of relationship in the workplace
requires concentrating on the possibility of creating an organisation for pleasure, so as to
enhance motivation. He proposes the 're-eroticisation' of relations in the workplace, and
states that the path of re-eroticisation must not be controlled only by managers who mete
out pleasures in accordance with their view of what is pleasurable and what behaviour
requires rewarding. Burrell emphasises that re-eroticised human interaction implies new
lifestyles of a kind which break with ideologies fostering disciplined performance in the
workplace in accordance with goals to be achieved. Motivation is attained not by external
reward systems (e.g., money and status), but by being part of a pleasurable process of
doing. He introduces the terms 'pleasure', 'playfulness' etc. as contestatory language to
challenge current organisation theory and practice. He knows that this language can be
"swallowed up" and used by organisation theory. Then pleasure comes to be seen merely
as "a commodity to be exploited". In Burrell's alternative vision, it is necessary to be
aware that pleasure has two faces: "passive resistance" and "radical transformation"
(p.87). He notes that passive resistance as a form of creating pleasure does not necessarily
have broader social impact. Yet he wants new notions of pleasure to make such an impact
in the battleground between organisation and anti-organisation theory. He is concerned
that this impact can be lost in passive, introverted efforts of the self. This ties in with
Shamir (1991) who considers meaning, self and motivation in organisations, and also
with McNay's (1994) suggestion that the ethics of the self as described by Foucault
(1982), can retreat into a form of "unregulated introversion" (p.8):
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To avoid introversion becoming the response of those who exercise the freedom to rebel,
it is necessary to understand how transformation of the self also can be linked to social
transformation. That is why Burrell (1992) shows how collective movements have made
impacts on a societal level. He hopes that somehow organisational life need not merely be
penetrated and reproduced in terms of old style organisational theory, but that new ways of
thinking (and experiencing) can penetrate the world of organisation. Other thinkers who
have tried to highlight new forms of interaction occurring in the workplace are the
proponents of various forms of organisational learning, to which I now turn.
6. 3 Some views on organisational learning
To begin with, Mullins (1993) offers some ideas regarding attitudes which are relevant to
organisational learning. He begins by describing attitude, belief and value, all of which
can be seen as being developed during socialisation processes. He notes that an attitude is
concerned with "what is known about the reality" as it is understood, that belief involves a
"specific understanding of reality", and that value is concerned with "what should be and
what is desirable" (p.111). Furthermore, he suggests that "to convert a belief into an
attitude, a 'value' ingredient is needed which, by definition, is to do with an individual's
sense of what is desirable, good, valuable, worthwhile and so on" (p.112). However, as
noted in Chapter 5, it is not to do with an individual's sense alone, because that sense is
linked to his/her involvement in society as other ought-selves (individuals develop their
sense of the ought partly by referring to others' expectations). Therefore, attitude, as belief
with added value elements, forms an important component in motivation. As Katz (1960)
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suggests, attitude and motive are interlinked and attitude can serve four main functions, as
follows:
1. Knowledge-related: attitudes provide a knowledge base and framework
within which new information can be placed.
2. Expressive: attitudes become a means of expression. They enable
individuals to indicate to others the values that they hold and are thus able
to express their self-concept and adopt or internalise the values of the
group.
3. Instrumental: held attitudes maximise rewards and minimise sanctions.
Behaviour or knowledge which has resulted in the satisfaction of needs are
thus more likely to result in a favourable attitude.
4. Ego-Defensive: attitudes may be held in order to protect the ego from an
undesirable truth or reality. (Katz, 1960, cited from Mullins, 1993, p.112)
Revealed here (by expansion) are a number of important issues for the development of a
critical systemic view of learning. First, attitude is both a means of people's expression
and a statement about values that are adopted. People's attitude can also be influenced by
others, which is why I can speak of learning. Learning, in fact, means that people's
attitudes could change. Second, people may have an instrumental orientation towards the
organisation, which means that their attitudes are linked to what they have found
rewarding. These will normally be associated with a favourable attitude. But rewards do
not have to come only in the form of need-satisfaction in the narrow sense of the term.
They can also refer to the kinds of needs discussed when explaining Rahman' s (1993)
views of needs in Chapter 5. This means that the instrumentality of people's responses can
be seen in a broader framework, accounting for their gaining pleasure from doing rather
than necessarily having (see Burrell, 1992). People can also become very defensive in
order to protect themselves. In one sense, this is a good thing, because it shows that people
do not allow themselves unresistingly to be exploited by, or simply shaped by, others'
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values. In another way, it may hamper learning, whereby people could learn to take in new
information and then to use it for the development of themselves.
Organisational learning see people as a matter of course consistently influencing and
affecting the perceptions and attitudes of their subordinates. For example, Mullins (1993)
recognises that this can be formalised when organisations "initiate rituals and ceremonies
to encourage and maintain certain attitudes and beliefs. Many attitudes and ideas then
-
become permanent and unchallengeable making them highly resistant to change" (p.114).
He notes that this can become a hindrance both to personal development (self-
transformation) and to collective development (either within an organisation or affecting
whole lifestyles in society). He suggests that the process of attitude change is dependent
on key factors revealed by asking the following questions:
1. Why is an attitude held in the first place and why should the attitude
change?
2. What are the benefits?
3. What are the outcomes if it does not change? (Mullins, 1993, p.115)
He suggests that learning should start out by considering these three questions, and that
learning is a
continuous, automatic and often a social process. Although there are times
when individuals will deliberately and consciously 'learn' and 'study', for the
most part learning takes place without any necessary deliberations, nor any
assessments to find out how much has been learned. Learning is an all-
embracing term which covers changes of an enduring and persistent nature. It
includes not only knowledge and skills but also attitudes and social behaviour.
(Mullins, 1993, p.115)
He notes that learning is not simply passive acceptance of what is being taught (or of
information received). Due to the active and dynamic nature of the learning process, there
will be different values among people in terms of their responses to the learning situation.
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He recognises that differences may sometimes be attributable to the fact of people's
differing capability to learn and potential to understand the world around them, but, it is
also "influenced by how motivated an individual is and by the attitudes held" (p.116).
Motivation is thus part of the development of one's own self-concept, as indicated in the
last section, and this is one reason why different employees are motivated to learn
different things. Employees do not all respond to situations in the same way. As Mullins
goes on to note, people can refer to value as another component of thinking. He indicates
that "learning links the individual to the social world and is both a personal and social
experience". The ideas that people have learned (ways of responding to the world) is
partly a configuration of their own values, while aspects may also be shared with others.
He also indicates that there are external factors to be considered, such as constraints that
occur via the environment (for example, the issues of cultural differences, which I will
discuss in Chapter 7). He links internal and external factors in learning. Part of the process
of learning is through our receiving information in the form of experience. This view is
further justified by Simon (1991), who claims that experiential learning is an integration
and alteration of thinking and doing. Kolb (1985) also suggests that learning focuses on
experience, but that people have to evaluate their experiences. He maintains that learning
is a cyclic process: "doing, reflecting, thinking, deciding and (re)doing", and that people
gain experience through doing; reflecting is the meditating on this experience; thinking is
the attempt to understand that experience by means of analysis and conceptualisation;
finally, people then make choices, deciding on the next steps, and then the cycle repeats
itself. In this sense, Kolb believes that learning is a never ending and constantly repeated
process by means of action and reflection. Mullins (1993) emphasises
the importance of the synthesis between the individual's behaviour and
actions, and the evaluation of their experiences. The individual's goals and
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aims are focused as being crucial. Reflection of what has been learnt in order
for understanding to be achieved is also important. (Mullins, 1993, p.121)
He observes that the evaluation experience is what allows people to retain some critical
distance, so that they do not just receive all information and take it in without questioning
its meaning. As Flood (1995) notes, it is necessary to improve people's potential not only
to ensure that their role performances can be satisfactory, but also to ensure that life is
made meaningful for their own involvement. He observes that, however, making life
,
meaningful should not be simply a process of control led from the top of an organisation.
Furthermore, he emphasises that provision must be made for 'freedom of rebellion', but
that the freedom of rebellion needs to be linked with a view of learning that ensures that
rebels do not cling irrationally to their own ideology, but are able to learn from others.
This is emphasised by the critical systemic view of learning advanced in this thesis.
Learning from experience need not be a solitary activity. Senge (1990) believes that
people need to be able to think and reflect, both "individually and collaboratively". That is
why, he notes, it is important that we "identify partners with whom we can act". Having
said this, he nevertheless seems to place more importance on the idea that people must
have time to reflect on their own. So people will go about their work attuned to what
everybody else is thinking and doing. After collective thought, people are then able to go
away and think privately about how they should act. Given that these authors all argue for
the integration of experience into learning, one may dare to ask over what periods of time
should experiences be allowed to build up before being converted into crucial learning?
There are many issues associated with the time dimension to learning, and these will be
discussed in the next section.
165
6. 3. 1 The time dimension and organisational learning
March (1991) adds another dimension to organisational learning by introducing the 'time'
dimension and by linking this to broader aspects in society. He suggests that when
organisations are involved with exploration of new possibilities, feedback is not as clear
as when it is relating to its environment by exploiting old certainties. When considering an
exploratory relationship with the environment, he argues that it is- important to consider
the mutual learning of an organisation and individuals in it. Within organisations, he
points out that mutual learning has consequences both for people involved and for an
organisation as a whole. In particular, he argues that the trade-off between "exploration (of
new possibilities) and exploitation (of old certainties)" in mutual learning involves
conflicts between short-run and long-run concerns and between gains to people's
knowledge and gains to collective knowledge (p.105). He notes that because these
'trade-offs' have to be accomplished, people can expect conflict to exist within
organisations. This links up with Swieringa and Wierdsma's (1992) view of a learning
organisation (see Chapter 2), where an indication was given of the need to recognise
conflict in learning.
March (1991) discusses how over 'time', organisational norms that have been developed
begin to "affect the beliefs of people even while they are being affected by those beliefs"
(p.106). He recognises that there are various ways in which people's beliefs draw from
one another over time, and there are also advantages to be gained from breaking ties with
the 'folk wisdom' of the past, when this is used merely to socialise others into accepting
received wisdom. He notes that
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the returns to fast learning are not all positive, ... rapid socialisation may hurt
the socialisees even as it helps the socialised, ... the development of
knowledge may depend on maintaining an influx of the naive and ignorant,
and competitive victory does not reliably go to the properly educated. (March,
1991, p.121)
So he lays some more of the groundwork for a critical systemic view of learning, in that he
suggests that people need to maintain a balance between believing that knowledge is
attained and being prepared to admit new information from the seemingly naive and
ignorant. He notes that ideology makes those proposing somethidg new or a new way of
experiencing reality appear ignorant in the face of the technical and specialist knowledge
that is at hand. Confronting this, he makes the point that people should not rely on the
learning of the educated.
I claim that learning is a mutual process in which people can gain from appreciating the
viewpoints of others, and in this learning process new ways of seeing sustainable cultural
contexts can also emerge, as organisations adopt an exploratory role, rather than relying
on past habits and old certainties. There is another way of working with other emerging
research methodologies: this is by story-telling. I will explore this in the next section.
6. 3. 2 Story-telling and organisational learning
Brown and Duguid (1991) explore the processes of organisational learning by considering
story-telling as a way of generating shared experiences in relation to some perceived
problem situations. They suggest that through story-telling, separate experiences can
converge, "leading to a shared diagnosis of certain previously encountered but unresolved
symptoms" (p.64). Before a story is told, people may face a problem but be unable to
express their responses in a way that is meaningful to different situations. Brown and
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Duguid note that people are, through story-telling, able to "construct a communal
interpretation of hitherto uninterpretable data and individual experience" and are also
enabled to "modify previous stories and build a more insightful one" (p.64). They note
that, through story-telling, people can increase their own understanding and their
organisation's collective knowledge. Reason and Hawkins (1988) also observe that
through a collaborative reflective exercise, story-telling juxtaposes explanation and
expression as alternative methods of working with qualitative information in sense-
making. So the story-telling proves to be a self-enriching process in which people are able
to develop their own ideas, and to be a collectively advantageous one in that the collective
increases its stock of knowledge. Moreover, story-telling can be interpreted anew, as
people decide whether the story-telling helps them to appreciate a particular problem
situation.
Brown and Duguid (1991) note that story-telling yields other stories than the ones
"furnished by the corporation" (p.65). So learning, in the sense of not simply absorbing
information from 'the corporation', can be achieved through this informal mechanism. A
characteristic of story-telling, according to Brown and Duguid, is that "the stories act as
repositories of accumulated wisdom, in particular, community narratives can allow
workers to protect their skills in the face of downskilling practices" (p.66). They argue that
story-telling creates wisdom, which refers to the realities that are created and recreated in
the process of appreciation. Furthermore, they consider that participation in this process
can grow over time, and people's ability to participate in constructions can be supported
consciously, by others respecting their voices. This leads Brown and Duguid to suggest
that proactive organisations have to reconcile and reinterpret their environment. They
recognise that it is not simply a matter of adapting to current conditions, but of
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reinterpreting these conditions in a way which allows new relationships to form. As they
note, "an enacting organisation must also be capable of reconceiving not only its
environment but also its own identity, for in a significant sense the two are mutually
constitutive" (p.75). They see it as part of the process of learning, that people learn to
innovate in creative "response" to their own environment. They thus try to offer a "unified
understanding of working, learning, and innovating", and point out that working, learning,
and innovating are processes that can "thrive collectively" (p.79). They add 'reflection' as
a new point and emphasise that reflection involves learning how to unite working,
learning, and, in particular, how to encourage innovation. In the following section, I will
elaborate further on the issue of innovation in relation to organisational learning.
6. 3. 3 Innovation and organisational learning
Simon (1991) notes that 'roles' in organisations can become a way of telling people how
to reason about problems facing them, and how to engage in decision-making. He
recognises that "roles tell people where to look for appropriate and legitimate
informational premises and goal (evaluative) premises, and what techniques to use in
processing these premises" (p.177). And he emphasises that people are thus highly
effective at learning, are self-critical, and are committed to continuous improvement.
However, the fact that behaviour is linked to people's roles does not in itself indicate what
degree of flexibility they have in their performances. As Simon states, "the fact that
behaviour is structured in roles says nothing, one way or the other, about how flexible or
inflexible it is" (p.177). He suggests that some degree of flexibility is required in order to
encourage people to accept innovation. He argues that the problem is how to make
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provision for "assimilating innovations that originate outside the organisation, or that
have to be transmitted from a point of origin in the organisation to points of
implementation" (p.181). He recognises that there is much to learn from the outside, and
that people should not try simply to re-invent the wheel in every situation. He points out
that innovation actually involves to a large degree an intelligence function, and that
learning requires much knowledge which is being produced elsewhere that people can
utilise as appropriate for their circumstances. At the same time, he-emphasises that people
must recognise the boundaries of their rationality, which refers to
the limits upon the ability of human beings to adapt optimally, or even
satisfactorily, to complex environments. Attention to the limits of human
rationality helps us to understand why representation is important, and how
policy statements imply representations. (Simon, 1991, p.186)
Here, Simon observes, people must be prepared to change their representations if need be,
and that the different representations are required to enhance further the innovativeness of
the corporation. What we have learnt so far, is that people can learn from outside sources
and need to be responsive to innovation possibilities.
The motivation to move in a different direction, that is, towards innovation, often comes
from a particular representation of the corporate purpose. Therefore, in order to proceed
along new paths, employees might link their motivation to this. Part of this process
requires making new representations. The idea of creating corporate representations is
related to the idea of developing organisational learning. That is, the organisation is able
to respond in innovative ways. This is not necessarily the same as individual learning
processes. Cook and Yanow (1993) pursue this argument much further by making a
distinction between organisational and individual learning, a distinction recognised in the
literature (e.g., Garvin, 1993; Wick and Leon, 1995; Dovey, 1997; McBain and Kusy,
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1997; Edmondson and Moingeon, 1998). Here there are two domains of study:
Management (individual) learning and Organisational learning.
6. 3. 4 Management learning and organisational learning
As Burgoyne and Reynolds (1997) note, management learning was concerned initially
with an attempt to create a rational framework for understanding ihe purposes, processes
and effects in the interpersonal behaviour and skills of training; and later research took
"more of an interest in the context of these processes" and engaged "more fully with the
worlds of both theory and practice" (p.8). Willmott (1997) applies critical thinking to
explore the process of learning about theories and practice. He criticises Revans's (1982)
action learning which "abstracts processes of individual self-development from the
institutional media of personal and social transformation" (p.171). He proposes instead a
"critical action learning" which views social development and self-development as
mutually constitutive. He considers that critical action learning is the understanding that
embodies
reflection upon problems experienced in everyday practice, which in principle
is facilitated by action learning, is of crucial importance if the possibilities of
personal and social transformation, anticipated by critical theory, are to be
fulfilled. (Willmott, 1997, p.174)
As Cook and Yanow (1993) note, "organisational change is governed by an experiential
learning process within which entrepreneurship (individual action) is seen as a search
activity" that can bring about "change to the core dimensions of organisational activity"
(p.434). They argue that people can learn in the context of organisations, that this context
influences the character of that learning, and, in turn, that such learning has repercussions
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for the organisation. They recognise organisational learning as having special qualities,
referring to
the capacity of an organisation to learn how to do what it does, where what it
learns is possessed not by individual members of the organisation but by the
aggregate itself. That is, when a group acquires the know-how associated with
its ability to carry out its collective activities, that constitutes organisational
learning. (Cook and Yanow, 1993, p.438)
In this sense, organisational learning builds on the idea that learning can include the ability
to learn in groups. Moreover, Cook and Yanow state that in the course of time and during
joint action, people create a set of inter-subjective meanings. They note that an inter-
subjective process cannot be reduced to individual learning activity that allows people to
recognise that learning acts collectively. They suggest that organisational learning has a
special quality which is not merely a matter of individual cognitive processes. They
believe that the ontological problem of the existence of an organisation as a cognitive
entity is not an issue when one adopts a cultural perspective. They recognise that the issue
of concern is, "what is the nature of learning when it is done by organisations?" (p.440)
This is also linked with the question, seen from different perspectives, of "what might
meaningfully and usefully be understood as learning" (p.440). Their concept aims at
understanding people's behaviour in groups and seeing what kind of learning may be
achieved as group activity, and which can also explain why ideology becomes so habitual
that people cannot begin to see other ways of thinking. Furthermore, they recognise that
different perspectives allow people to view organisational learning as both an innovative
and a preservative activity, and allow for an appreciation of the efforts that "organisations,
like all human groups, put into maintaining the patterns of activity that are unique to each
organisation" (p.448). In this sense, organisational knowledge is not seen as deposited in
the minds of people, nor as merely the aggregated knowledge of them, but as something
more that is achieved through the mutual interaction and its emergent knowledge.
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Organisational learning, according to Cook and Yanow (1993), is "the acquiring,
sustaining, or changing of intersubjective meaning" (p.449). They note that the main
concerns of organisational learning from different perspectives are, how does an
organisation constitute and reconstitute itself? How does an organisation retain or change
its identity as people interrelate (including in a proactive way) with their environment?
How do people manage to reconstitute themselves in different shapes in order to act
-
innovatively? Cook and Yanow suggest that answers to these questions cannot be
reducible to personal cognition, especially, in terms of organisational learning. They
recognise that organisational learning is not merely for people, but is part of wider social
networks, which together create 'knowledge'. So organisational learning is not something
deposited or located in people; it is located in processes of social existence.
Nevertheless, even accepting that intersubjective processes are not reducible to personal
cognition, the question still remains about how learning can be enhanced. I suggest one
way to tackle this question is to see how people's capacities for self-reflection, coupled
with ideology-critique can be encouraged. If a critical reflexivity process can be
encouraged, then people do not merely become part of collectives which create knowledge
which is then retained in stock for them to draw upon. A critical reflexivity process shows
how people can contribute to the process of forming a collective which, though more than
the sum of its parts, does not become merely an ideology-producing machine which slots
them into itself. This is the significance of the discussion of ideology introduced in
Chapter 5. There is, furthermore, a need for a fuller understanding of how people may
'agree to disagree', which will be discussed in the following section.
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6. 3. 5 Other contributions to organisational learning
Hassard (1993) offers an outlook on how managers may 'agree to disagree' by referring to
the conception of a language-game, where "knowledge is based on nothing more than a
number of diverse discourses, each with its own rules and structures" (p.124). He notes
that "each language-game is defined by its own particular knowledge criteria" (p.124).
More importantly, he believes that no one discourse is privileged; there must be an
"acceptance of a plurality of diverse language forms" (p.124). He suggests that the idea of
a language-game, furthermore, is not to pit one discourse against another, but to "maintain
a stage of continuous difference". This offers a new way of seeing learning in social
contexts. Learning can be achieved by allowing people to form part of an environment of
difference, where language-games are played in an effort to sustain these differences.
These language-games can motivate employees, and motivation in this way prompts
employees to accept the plurality of different views about the world and about themselves.
This ties in with Gregory's (1992) discordant pluralist view, which shows how people can
develop their critical appreciation as part of a language-game of continuing to sustain both
discordance and pluralism. It may be seen as a language-game of learning, but not learning
defined in the sense of accepting some stock of knowledge, or even drawing on some
stock of knowledge. There are so many knowledges that people have to learn to
appreciate, as part of their involvement in language-games.
But language-games might be penetrated by power dynamics, which is why Foucault
(1982) concentrates on what happens in the exercise of power. He states that power may
have no coherent structure or strategy, but power effects may lead to certain knowledge
becoming the norm or accepted way of thinking. Following up Foucault's concerns with
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knowledge-power effects, Dachler and Hosking (1995) argue for the necessity of
developing a view of learning in terms of provision made for what is called
`multiloguing'. They define multiloguing as offering multiple voices through language
(multiple language-games). They state:
Multiloguing need not only refer to explicit live, face-to-face social processes
as the term conversation usually connotes. It takes place implicitly, in the
sense that by working on a text we are speaking with reference to a complex
set of contexts made up of many interrelated texts ... there is always an
increasingly complex network of contexts to which reference Could be made.
Thus while the meaning of a text is context-bound, the contexts are, in
principle, unlimited. (Dachler and Hosking, 1995, p.'7)
Dachler and Hosking propose a 'relational epistemology' in order to accept truth as
socially certified, while not privileging any particular knowledge claim as more true than
others. They recognise the emergence of "multiple realities, in the sense of multiple
meanings, descriptions or knowledge claims, which are all part of the local ontology in the
process of being narrated" (p.8). They argue that local ontology merely forms contexts of
interpretations of reality (knowledge claims), while a relational epistemology broadens
the possibilities for meaning because it is defined by the fact that it disallows one meaning
from being seen as the only possible context for interpretation.
However, Dachler and Hosking (1995) point out that there are socio-cultural limits to
what will be allowed as real or true, right or wrong, desirable or undesirable. They note
that "in narrating a particular text reference is made, usually implicitly, to a cultural
context whose meaning is taken for granted" (p.8). They recognise that this is one way of
stopping a scenario of endless challenge and disagreement which can prevent a narration
from proceeding; but it also can become a way of avoiding any questioning of the status
quo. They consider that the denial of opportunity for questioning the assumed context is
what serves to preserve the status quo, and that this suppression of genuinely differing
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possible meanings could be seen as an avoidance of novelty. This agrees with Gregory's
(1992) point that efforts have to be made to be appreciative of another standpoint;
otherwise its meaning will merely become absorbed into old meaning patterns, without
properly being appreciated. This is what the process of critical reflexivity can entail (see
Chapter 5). A critical reflexivity process allows assumptions that are assumed to become
explicated, so that people's ideas (or thoughts) can then be thoroughly discussed. In this
domain a full appreciation of other ways of seeing has to be deveroped (see Gregory,
1992). In this way, as Dachler and Hosking suggest, "the limits that previously maintained
the status quo can be (re)constructed" (p.9). They state that discussion about the way that
language can be used to bolster assumed contexts of meaning is one pathway towards
reconstruction (transformation). However, as I noted when discussing critical systemic
views in interventions in Chapter 4, it is also important to consider ways of acting anew;
for example, via group co-ordination and by enlisting group support to supply an antidote
to status quo `knowledge-power' formations. Dachler and Hosking believe that a
relational perspective allows the relationship between self and society to be continually
re-addressed. They note that the narratives which explain how it is that people's selves
become part of a social dynamic (and may as actors alter this dynamic), are only
narratives, none of which are true per se; but at least they act as a starting point to construct
some narrative that allows people to question the limitations of monologuing (as opposed
to multiloguing).
Dachler and Hosking (1995) recognise that a relational perspective "opens the possibility
for radical change as contrasted with what otherwise would turn out to be more of the
same" (p.13). They suggest that part of the process of deconstruction leading to
possibilities for radical change, also aims to provide different contexts which point to
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these possibilities. This can open the way towards radically different views, which at least
provides one alternative to bear in mind. It may be preferable, as Dachler and Hosking
suggest, using a different context of meaning, to refer to people as "responsible for the
kind of relationships they construct together" (p.15). But they note a problem is that
language is also tied in an assumed way to a particular context of meaning, and that it is
assumed "that the networker can better understand how things really are (knowledge) and
can act, based on better known facts, to structure objects in the world (achieve power)"
(p.17). They suggest that knowledge about the world is one aspect which is linked to a
nonrelational epistemology in most discourse concerning networking. They recognise that
knowledge is produced in social relationships because it is assumed that networking
people can learn to know better what and whom they must influence, informing
themselves about, among other factors, as well as the perspectives of their subordinates,
about organisational practices, structures and policies.
Furthermore, Dachler and Hosking (1995) suggest that negotiation is in fact a process of
allowing people to respect and appreciate their differences (as would be the case in, i.e.
individual's need). They believe that people need to be able to ask questions about the
processes by which such meanings are made, so that they can begin to think about other
contexts to apply to the text of, for example, networking, in order that the term can take on
new meanings. This is linked to the idea of critical reflexivity explained in Chapter 5,
which means that people can simply become aware of areas in society where language is
restrictive of new possibilities and can be allowed to think more critically about the
language they are using and its implications. The language of influence and manipulation
may be useful in certain contexts. But it must be recognised that the language leads to
certain relationships, and that if people want different relationships they may need to use a
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different language. For example, if it is felt that motivation for better performance means
that some influence on the part of employees is necessary, and that employees can be
motivated to perform by being offered some rewards (including the social reward of
working in a team), then this is one possibility for motivation. But there are also other
possibilities, as have been explored in this thesis. For example, the equity theory of
motivation introduces new terminology to explain that employees may be motivated by a
sense of equitable processes as another motivating force. 	 ,
In the next section the conception of language-games in terms of `multiloguing' provides
the background to the argument for a critical systemic view of learning.
6. 4 Organisational learning in terms of multiloguing
As Gregory (1992) notes, no language structure should be exempt from critical reflexivity
and therefore none of the different ways of seeing learning should simply be accepted. The
important requirement for critical reflexivity is to allow all possibilities to be appreciated,
while at the same time being open to challenge. Further development of ways of seeing
things takes place by a constant discordant relationship between the different choices.
This can take place through multiloguing, that is, by accepting and enshrining a variety of
languages as part of the process of learning between them. Dachler and Hosking's (1995)
view of multiloguing is similar in many respects to the idea of discordant pluralism. They
note that if negotiation is viewed as multiloguing, then,
instead of trading away differences, so to speak, negotiation is a process in
which manager and others may come to know each other's perspectives and
construct shared understandings in and about their relations: (Dachler and
Hosking, 1995, p.21)
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Here they show that differences should not be 'traded away' (denied) but rather that
people should come to know better (appreciate) other's perspectives. They apply this idea
of multiloguing to consider different points of view which can exist in practice between,
for example, management and people's representatives. They suggest that processes of
negotiating in which multiloguing creates shared understandings, are emergent in
organisations.
-
It is often considered that appraisal of people is a way of motivating them to perform better
because they know that they are being checked. It will be recalled that Townley (1994)
suggests that one way of diverting this gaze is for employees also to appraise their
managers. This idea is taken up by Dachler and Hosking (1995), who here show the
negotiations that may be involved in shifting narratives of control and manipulation. The
new narrative of 'self-directness' (similar to Rahman' s (1993) view of self-determination)
has to be introduced in complex patterns of negotiation. Dachler and Hosking apply a
relational perspective which concentrates on ways in which negotiations occur, to
consider the differing projects of people involved in networking. Here again, they use
language to point to some other possibilities for creating partnerships. They are optimistic
because they believe people can participate in constructing local realities in which "there
is always the possibility socially to construct partnership rather than dominance" (p.23).
Their relational epistemology is adopted to some extent by Gergen (1995) who develops a
discussion towards a relational theory of power. Gergen's approach to power offers a good
supplement to the foregoing discussion. It helps us to consider how some of the ideas
about multiloguing can be achieved in terms of features of power in society.
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Gergen (1995) begins with the question: "How may we articulate a theory of power
congruent with a constructionist metatheory?" (p.34 .). He notes, having asked the
question, that one has to move carefully because there are no clear answers, since there are
different kinds of arguments. As he states:
One moves with trepidation at this point. For example, on the one hand, there
is no univocal agreement concerning the nature of the constructivist
standpoint. No one can properly claim to speak for the range of interlocutors
more generally. Rather, we must envision a range of constructivist accounts
with no single entry privileged in its position. (Gergen, 1995, 0.34)
He suggests that even when we adopt a constructivist standpoint, there is still much to
discuss about how power should be seen, and that one author whose work can be utilised
to offer one entry point into the discussion is that of Foucault. He uses some of the ideas of
Foucault concerning disciplinary power. He notes how such power for Foucault is tied to
ways of constructing realities, in such a way that discourses and associated practices are
developed to rationalise their own existence. In this way, Gergen argues that what is taken
to be "truth or knowledge by its advocates, becomes the argot of everyday activity, seeping
into the capillaries of the normal or taken for granted, so does the aggregate become
complicit in its own subjugation" (p.35). He proposes that this idea (of how subjugation is
achieved through the "capillaries" of assumed realities), is a useful entry point into
analyses of power. But he finds that there is no fully developed perspective in Foucault's
work. Furthermore, he says, there are many ambiguities in regard to "the character of
power and oppression" (p.36). In stating that further elaboration is needed, he refers to
processes of language and discussions about the "fragmented character of cultural
languages" (p.36). He notes that the languages we commonly use do not have an inclusive
set of rules; instead, written into language usage are a multitude of possibilities for using
it, including "a legacy of long and complex relations among various cultural and sub-
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cultural groups" (p.36). So Gergen concludes that language is not static, and that it is "in a
continuous state of multiple transformations" (p.36). He recognises that "no society is
bound to a singular discursive regime", and that there is no one regime of truth that is
all-pervasive and all-encompassing, and that there are rather fragmentary and partial
regimes of power relations. Furthermore, he believes that these relations are not cohesive
and they are ever-changing. He emphasises that there exist "a multiplicity of groups, each
of which may define power and its attainment according to different Ontologies and value
systems" (p.40). He recognises that these ontologies and value systems all operate to
create multiple configurations of power; and that within the configurations, people can
negotiate the terms of what is real and what is good, and so "configurations undergo
continuous transformation" (p.40). He does not align himself with theoretical tendencies
to "define power in terms of a singular dimension, commodity, or criterion" which implies
that only certain people are seen as occupying places of power (p.40). He states:
If we decide to attribute power to those in executive positions, with high
income levels, occupying political office, reaching championships and the
like, then we are joining the interpretive viewpoint of the people seeing
themselves this way. (Gergen, 1995, p.40)
He notes that people see as ontological reality the realities that some groups have created
for themselves, and other ways of valuing realities become forgotten; and that the valued-
by-themselves position of some groups may in fact be devalued by others. He believes that
criticising the valuations attached to positions of power, is an important part of the process
of revealing new ways of life, and allows for a critique of positions which presume a
standpoint in an unwarranted presumptuous way. The problem is, as Gergen says, those
who presume such a standpoint try to "generalise their ontology across all sectors of
society" (p.40). He recognises that it is important to be able to criticise views of the value
of power and the value of things which are assumed to be valuable.
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Further ideas on the cultural contextualisation of views on power will be explored in
Chapter 7 where Hofstede's (1980a) account of power distance as a cultural variable is
explored. What can be shown here is that ways of working may take on different forms
when different views of power are utilised. This points to the importance of being able to
think about power in new ways if managers want to think about employees becoming
motivated within new ways of working. For example, the power of status gained from
competition could be regarded as tedious and slave-like from a certain point of view, and
likewise the power of occupying an executive position in a large conglomerate could be
regarded as pitiful by those who place more value on the simple life.
Whatever the case, there should be opportunity in social life for those who value different
things. There is a need for executives and a place also for performance-based systems, but
there should also be room for different experiments with other styles of working and other
styles of life, as has been expressed by Dachler and Hosking (1995) and Gergen (1995).
People can learn about alternatives by being able to talk about them. As Gergen states,
people do have available negative ontologies which can be used to criticise the position
and strength of visions which are too all-encompassing. But he is uneasy about a situation
where "a posture of defence and counter-critique on the part of others is set up" (p.43). He
finds that the rhetorical process of argument leads to isolationism, where different people
fail to communicate (or appreciate one another, in Gregory's term). People fail to learn
from one another; thus, learning is prohibited. In this thesis, I try to envisage situations
where managers will not act in terms of defence and counter-critique such that they fail to
appreciate the views of others. Gergen also states that it does not enhance the cause of
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learning when people cling to the assumption that some people are powerful and others
are exploited. He asks:
By what particular authority does the concept of power necessarily apply to
armies, wealth and tyrants? Are there not other and different means of
describing these same conditions, ways for example that might be used by the
actors themselves? (Gergen, 1995, p.45)
Gergen even believes that when one wants to go beyond a particular perspective it is
important to remember that power is essentially a very ambiguous concept and that there
,
is no agreement on what it is. He is worried that when opinions such as this become a
"single reality system" mutual "annihilation" seems the only way to organise
relationships. He thus argues that
mutually annihilating competitions come about largely through the broad
dissemination of a single reality system. It is the unquestioned assumption that
wealth, victory, high office and so on are valuable and important that move
people to competitive action. As the present analysis suggests, such
assumptions of the effective and the good should always be placed in
question. (Gergen, 1995, p.47)
Gergen holds that ideas linked to narrow assumptions about what is good and worth
getting, should be broadened, so that motivation will not always be oriented towards
competition. He believes that it is essential to pursue a learning process where people
"expand the range of relevant perspectives to explore the realities of the dominating
groups, as well as those of still other groups whose realities may differ" (p.47). He
recognises that in exploring different perspectives, people can come to learn more about
what is involved in occupying different positions, and they are thus able to think about
issues in new ways. For example, managers need not accept passively the ideology of
subordinate groups (see Gregory, 1992) nor that of dominant groups. The idea of
dominant and subordinate also can be changed because in such discussion people will
learn about how they want to (re)organise their relationships. This learning is not
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enhanced when it is assumed that people occupying executive and managerial functions
are always wrong and exploitative. Rather, it is useful to explore to what extent their ways
of leading might be controlled by an ideology of influence and manipulation. If there is a
dominating ideological conception leading to specific practices, then more space needs to
be made for multiloguing.
There may also be a place in organisational learning for re-examining the way that
'grievances' are dealt with in specific circumstances, as Salipante and Binouwen (1995)
suggest, a re-examination which concentrates on an important aspect of organisational life
from a conflict point of view. It was shown in Chapter 2 that some learning-based
approaches fall short of looking at conflict, while others speak about it but do not align it
with full discussion of the way that power-knowledge formations are perpetuated through
ideology. Salipante and Bouwen's analysis closes this gap by concentrating on the way
that grievances become processed in organisations. They are concerned about grievances
which often "classify each grievance into a single, objective category", and they find this
view "highly misleading, as is any research that then relies on such records and
categories" (p.77). Their research has led them to the conclusion that a crucial feature of
grievances in organisations is that there is such a wide variation from one individual to
another, as each offers different perspectives on the situation. This variation adds to the
complexity, multiplicities, and dynamism, of the way that grievances arise. Salipante and
Bouwen state that
variation in perspectives is the very essence of grievance that needs to be
captured in conceptual representations, leading to new explanations for
previously identified effective actions and to new ideas about conflict
management. (Salipante and Bouwen, 1995, p.77)
They suggest some new explanations and new ideas on the way in which conflict becomes
linked to negotiations about reality, and by noting how grievances change constructions of •
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reality. They note that as with motivation, there are always a wide range of interpretations
that can be applied to a set of experiences which can be influenced by co-workers as well
as friends and others whom the people concerned are in contact with. They recognise that
"interpretations are dynamic and socially influenced, yet ultimately individualistic"
(p.80).
Salipante and Bouwen indicate that although people can take up ideas from others,
-
interpretation is ultimately an individual event. They believe that people's acceptance or
not of this is also partly influenced by the way that they have been brought up. They
observe with regard to interpretations of grievance experiences that
grievances are significant to organisations, not because they can temporarily
disrupt smooth functioning, but because their effect on interpretations such as
motives, integrity and one's value to the organisation can strongly influence
individuals' entire constructions of their organisational reality. These
constructions affect members continuing commitment to the organisation and
associated decisions of participation and production. (Salipante and Bouwen,
1995, p.80)
We can see why some exploration of grievances cannot be left out of a discussion about
learning. How well employees with a grievance or their colleagues feel that grievances are
dealt with, might affect their commitment to learning. This links up with the equity theory
of motivation, where it is suggested that employees' feelings about fair process affects
their motivation. What is added here is the idea that feelings about fair practices can be
created as employees discourse with one another. This discourse can be riddled by
conflicting perspectives. Applying Gergen's (1995) argument to this, it can be stated that
if the conflict becomes a clash of ideologies, no (or very little) learning will take place. An
orientation towards mutual annihilation can set in, and the prospect of learning across
differences will then not be realised.
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Salipante and Bouwen (1995) note that even when people do not label their relationships
as conflictual, there is a kind of conflict in that they have differing perspectives and
interpretations. It is important to explore these as a way of exploiting the fruitfulness of
the differences. This can also be done through grievances and interpretations of them.
Again this ties in with Gergen's (1995) view about productive opposition. Salipante and
Bouwen note that over a succession of grievance episodes, different interpretations can be
brought to bear and can add new social experiences to modify any personal perspective
(p.83). They suggest that this modification process (learning) is important so that people
can think together about organisational actions and decisions. Sometimes different
viewpoints are such that they threaten the continuation of a personal relationship with the
organisation. S/he may feel that s/he cannot continue to work there. But even continuing
to work there does not imply that shared perspectives are reached. Salipante and Bouwen
note that "the person never needs to reach a shared interpretation with others, the key
behavioural action for the individual is simply remaining a member of the organisation"
(p.83). They state that an individual may lower his evaluation of others and interpret
events in a way consistent with these lowered evaluations, "yet choose to remain and do
the job according to his own standards" (p.83). However, commitment might also be
lowered if evaluations of others is consistently negative.
The concepts developed by Salipante and Bouwen (1995) can be applied to conflict and
non- conflict situations alike. They suggest that conflict can be defined as emerging from
situations of negotiation where people "fail to achieve the minimally shared meaning
required for an action to be accepted" (p.83). Less conflictual relationships (less
annihilating of others) is when people have opposing perspectives but can still accept in
some sense one another's actions. They recognise that because people are either not
186
committed or less committed to work with others if their evaluation of others is
consistently negative, forms of conflict resolution are important to introduce when
considering commitment. They suggest that questions should be asked:
When parties interact, what structuring or intervention leads to a questioning
of one's own formulation? What metaphors lead to appreciation of others'
perspectives? What types of discourse lead to reformation and the social
acceptance of a common meaning? What does resolution mean and how do
we define desirable outcomes? (Salipante and Bouwen, 1995, p.93)
As has been shown above, these kinds of questions can contribute to-learning (learning to
appreciate others' views and learning to question one's own formulations) and also to
allowing people to interact so that they can reach more understanding (if not to share
realities, at least to understand others better). A desirable outcome cannot be decided
beforehand, as it depends on the people involved and their views, including their views
about what learning factors are important to them. The most important practical
implication of the multi-perspective view that has been discussed with reference to
authors (e.g., Dachler and Hosking, 1995; Salipante and Bouwen, 1995; and Gergen,
1995), is that, as Salipante and Bouwen suggest that
individuals and groups in organisations should engage in conflict with a full
realisation that they are negotiating meanings. The interplay of differing
perspectives will be ongoing [dynamic] and will continue in future conflicts.
Organisations that accept pluralism will have a tolerance for this interplay of
divergent perspectives, for different values, that will make conflict processes
and the renegotiating of meaning more open than in organisations where one
party devalues another's perspective. (Salipante and Bouwen, 1995, p.93)
The views expressed by Salipante and Bouwen are consistent with a discordant pluralist
way applied to people's learning experiences. In the interplay of differences, people are
negotiating meaning, and what is important is that they try to appreciate others'
constructions. They can then also learn from these other constructions, instead of trying to
annihilate them or assimilate them into a single viewpoint.
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6. 5 The dynamics of organisational learning
The dynamics of organisational learning analysis can be applied to motivation
intervention. It can be stated that when motivation criteria spring from a singular
perspective, then employees' motivations are ruled by ideology (the ideology of this
perspective). To introduce a learning perspective into motivation is to allow managers to
think about differing motivating factors, by considering different approaches, and also by
relying on their own experiences of working with others and how employees can be
motivated in different problem contexts. However, because different interpretations of
experience will exist in divergent positions, there will remain a variety of interpretations
of experience that motivation approaches can also see as complementary in some way, as
was shown in Chapter 4. Discordant pluralism means that managers do not all need to be
brought under the banner of a single perspective. However, it is also important that
managers thinking about the issues are open to learning from one another. This is what
allows approaches to develop and also what allows managers to re-engage and in new
ways with their experiences. So, for example, managers might learn to motivate
employees in new ways, and not simply in terms of a fixed ideology that motivation often
springs from -- motivation to compete for scarce commodities (such as money and status).
Employees might decide that they want to experiment with other styles of living. This can
take place at organisational level as organisations develop the opportunities for members
to try new ways of co-relating, as for example through the kinds of ways discussed with
reference to Dachler and Hosking (1995), Townley (1994) and others.
There are a wide range of approaches to think about and all of these in turn can learn and
develop through communication with alternatives. But it is not the theories themselves
that learn, rather people who would use them. As Salipante and Bouwen (1995) note,
learning is part of the process of negotiating meaning, but these negotiations should not
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become ruled by ideologies. This includes ideologies of so-called dominant groups and
ideologies that may be constructed to reveal forms of dominance (for example, the
dominance of influence and manipulation). When new ideas are developed, this should
ideally be done in a spirit of mutual learning, where learning is seen as occurring through
the negotiation of differing realities. This is a dynamic process. If this can be done, then it
can be said that 'improvements' (Midgley's term) are taking place in people's
-
perspectives and therefore in their way of understanding and applying their values.
From the above discussion it is clear that some kinds of organisational learning
encompass a range of phenomena which advocate a cognitive approach to improve
organisational adaptability and effectiveness. As Argyris and SchOn (1996) state,
"organisational learning occurs when individuals within an organisation experience a
problematic situation and inquire into it on the organisation's behalf" (p.16). They
recognise that individuals should "reflect on and inquire into their organisational learning
system and its effect on organisational inquiry" (p.72). They argue that "organisational
learning is not a value-neutral activity but proceeds from values, has implications for
values, and is subject to critique in terms of a conception of what is good or right, and for
whom" (p.194). Indeed, more insight can be gained by accepting different perspectives,
but that it is possible to self-reflect on this. In the following, I argue the need for a critical
systemic view of learning during motivation interventions.
189
6. 6 Needing critical systemic learning during motivation interventions
As shown in the previous sections even a brief review of the organisational learning
literature reveals considerable fragmentation and diversity, I hope to draw attention to the
benefits of this diversity in learning approaches. Traditionally, organisational learning
focuses on the acquisition of mental processes and cognitive interactions with the external
or internal environment, and is concerned with using knowledge in order to exercise that
-
learning which can best lead to the achievement of goals or to solutions of specific
problems, or to identifying the values and assumptions underlying learning and
developing shared norms and values alignment (e.g., Huber, 1991; Swieringa and
Wierdsma, 1992; Isaacs, 1993; Coopey, 1996; Flood and Romm, 1996a; Weil, 1998).
Learning processes are thus directly connected to personal experiences which are shaped
by socially transmitted beliefs and value judgements. However, I claim learning should
also have the capacity for ideology-critique, and should not submit to purely passive
models of learning.
Although it may be accurate to say that we learn values, norms and (empirical)
knowledge, it is also the case, as Thompson (1990) suggests, that people can interpret all
of these. Midgley (1995b) claims that the 'improvement' of knowledge and understanding
relies on people reflecting on their assumptions and examining and judging the
surrounding ideologies which provide the context for their own values and beliefs.
'Improvement' is here defined as related to people's learning abilities based on critical
reflexivity. Now I proceed with my argument to explore the field of my proposed critical
systemic view of learning (which can be called critical systemic learning) in terms of
'improvement' (Midgley's usage).
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I accept Midgley's (1995b) suggestion that 'improvement' is always both 'temporary' and
'local' (p.58). As Midgley notes, the local can also extend to include whole ways of life in
a society. For example, 'improvements' can occur across organisations, and also between
organisations and the environment as people deconstruct ideologies which have become
fixed. A critical reflexivity process at the general level of society (and even across national
boundaries) is something that may involve vast numbers of people. For example, we can
refer to Dachler and Hosking's (1995) suggestion that possessive -individualism or the
ideology of influence and control penetrate whole ways of thinking across sectors of
society. To improve situations like this, it is necessary to engage in a critical reflexivity
process.
Part of the process of developing a critical systemic view of learning involves learning
about how improvements in areas of society can come about and considering how changes
can be effected. This involves a process of constant learning by means of ideology-critique
processes as one thinks about what kinds of changes are possible. As Midgley (1995b)
notes, it is always a limited set of people who define what 'improvement' is. He says that
this is one reason why he sees it as temporary and local. However, managers can learn
about how others are defining improvement. It is thus important to have a concept of
ideology-critique as part of a critical systemic view of learning. Midgley (1995b) also
observes that "even if there is widespread agreement between all those directly affected by
an intervention [such] that it constitutes an improvement, this agreement may not stretch
to future generations" (p.59). He concludes that this is why it is so important to have some
notion of "sustainabilty" built into a view of improvement. I have tried to show that part of
a critical systemic view of learning is to extend the learning parameters so that the process
of learning does not stop merely at the purpose of any organisation, but extends to
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consider social contexts in the future. Here I am following Midgley (1995b) who states
that future generations must be given importance. This idea can be linked to the ideas
about ought-selves as discussed earlier (e.g., Stryker, 1991): that is, to the part of the self
that defines its own obligations in relation to what it believes is responsible action. Our
ought-selves can develop in the process of learning. Thus, self-direction does not exclude
consideration of others, including future generations. Furthermore, self-determination can
be in its own terms directed also to a desire to create a sustainable -environment, for the
reason that this is a good thing in itself (and not necessarily because some people will
benefit from this, now or in the future).
Midgley (1995b) goes on to suggest that it is important that our understandings about
improvement are geared in such a way that we minimise the possibility of "terrible,
unanticipated side-effects" (p.59). He makes the point that power can be manifest when
decisions are made concerning who is to be included in the process of developing
knowledge (learning). One way of improving this is through enhancing our learning
processes, understood in the critical sense of the term, as developed in this chapter.
Ideally, as Gregory (1992) notes, all ideologies that have become formulated in a society
need to be subjected to critical reflection. This -- as we saw in the previous chapter -- is
one way of breaking through power-knowledge formations that have become
unrecognised and is also a way of ensuring that any learning is genuinely transformative.
However, as Gregory (1992) points out, this does not mean replacing these formulations
with another ideological formation, but rather allowing all patterns of thought to learn
from one another. Then, both the complexity in theory and the multiplicity in practice can
be retained.
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In this section, I argued the need for critical systemic learning which stresses both the
critical and systemic components in the learning process. The process is never-ending
because of (or as long as there exists) ideology conflicts among the plurality of ideas and
experiences. Nevertheless, it has also been shown through the process of ideology-critique
and the discussion about the need to develop a learning capacity that responsible social
awareness may be blocked by certain ideologies, for example, , ideologies stressing
maximum performance at all costs.
What is this critical systemic learning and how does it differ from the existing
organisational learning? I suggest that critical systemic learning sees self-society
dynamics as the focal point that connects people and society without them reducing each
other. That is why I propose to link individual learning and organisational learning
together in relation to critical systemic learning. When society is reduced to its constituent
individuals, learning is seen as a process in which people have to be rewarded on the basis
of their personal needs. This means that learning is tied to finding out what people require
and then allowing them to compete so that they can learn properly to perform (in
competition) to meet their own needs. This is not necessarily a Wrong way of treating
people, but learning then tends to reduce people's potential somewhat and forgets that
they may be able to learn on other bases. Learning could also create a society where people
cannot imagine other ways of functioning. There may be times when it is feasible to treat
people in this way and this is why critical systemic learning which concentrates on this
aspect of learning suggests it is not per se to be rejected outright.
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There are some differences between critical action learning (Willmott, 1997) and critical
systemic learning, as summarised in Table 6.1.
Therefore, we should be aware of some learning theories which define learning merely as
accepting something and that this learning process reduces people to 'things' which
merely register information or merely take in guidelines for acceptable conduct in the
.	 form of norms, without allowing for people to challenge and question these norms. Norms
can be accepted uncritically but can also be subjected to discussion, where people discuss
things from a normative viewpoint.
As Habermas (1984) believes, normative discussion is essential so that norms can be
challenged in speech acts oriented towards mutual understanding. Habermas's argument
is essentially based on the idea that people can learn to discuss and can also learn to the
point where they come (ideally) to a consensus understanding. However, as noted in
Chapter 5, Foucault sees that people have potentially to resist certain power-knowledge
formations that have been created in specific historical settings. What can be said is that at
least he shows us that specific formations might be challenged (because they do not rest on
any absolute foundation). It can be extrapolated that Foucault prefers people to learn from
their involvement with others and from their own responses to others, rather than merely
to be shaped by the constitution of knowledge in society. This way opens the path to
critical systemic learning which reflects on knowledge that is being disseminated through
certain patterns of thinking (ideologies).
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Critical action learnin Critical systemic learnin
World
view
The world is a contiguous
psychopolitical field of action and
change.
The world is a contiguous social
field of action and reflection.
Content and/or delivery of learning
is guided by critical social theory and
reflection upon experiences derived
from its practical application.
Content and/or delivery of learning
is guided by critical systems thinking
and	 critical	 reflection
	 upon
experiences and others'
understandings derived from its
practical application.
Modus
operandi
Learners are potentially receptive to,
and can be facilitated by, the
concerns of other groups, in addition
to individual tutors, when
identifying and addressing problems
Learning can be facilitated by
ideology-critique, in addition to,
communication between different
perspectives, when learners are
identifying and addressing problems.
Received wisdom, including that of
experts, is subject to critical scrutiny
through a fusion of reflection and
insights drawn from critical social
theory.
Models, concepts, and ideas are
developed through an interplay of
reflection upon practice and an
application of ideas drawn from
critical traditions.
In critical systemic learning
knowledge is subject to critical
reflexivity through self-reflection
and ideology-critique and insights
based on critical systems thinking.
Models, concepts, and ideas are
developed through interplay of
critical reflexivity, critical
awareness, and discordant pluralist
views upon practice and an
application of ideas drawn from
local contexts.
Table 6.1. An alternative approach to learning using a framework
adapted from McLaughin and Thorpe (1993)
I showed in Section 6.2 that learning is related to some understanding of self-society
dynamics which can be seen as both playing a part in transforming each other. Here, I try
to develop these ideas further, by linking this to a more critical perspective than has been
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supplied by learning theories so far. Critical systemic learning sees the way that learning
occurs as ideally being through an ideology-critique process, which allows managers to
reflect on what they receive from others, while also adding to their own appreciation.
Managers therefore exist side by side (and theories exist side by side) without their
becoming all the same. This means that managers can continually learn from one another
because they can engage in an ideology-critique process across different perspectives
-
(even learn from divergent learning approaches). Put in the terms that Gregory's (1992)
critical appreciation model suggests, managers can see why empirical-analytic knowledge
should not simply be accepted without showing them how they can interpret this
knowledge.
In this section, I have tried to offer critical systemic learning as a process which involves
the understanding and exploring of organisational context, to reflect on the social
phenomena, and to improve the purpose and processes of learning by an ideology-critique
process to reflect on the status quo in radical ways. Furthermore, critical systemic learning
is also a step toward experimenting with the possibility of finding new ways to
supplement a critical systemic approach to motivation. In this sense, critical systemic
learning is not only a kind of learning according to a particular rationality, but also an
expression of a wider awareness and reflection in organisations (or society).
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6. 7 Conclusion
In this chapter I explored a variety of organisational learning ideas and I showed how they
could become interlinked to enrich our understanding of learning processes, seen from a
critical systemic point of view. I also showed how they allow us to expand our vision of
learning from the learning-based motivation theories (discussed in Chapter 2), and to
develop critical systemic learning which tied as it is to the capacity for ideology-critique
linked with critical self-reflection processes, cannot confirm purely passive models of
learning. Although it may be true that people may learn values, norms, and empirical
information. It is also true that people can interpret all of these. Put in the terms of
Gregory's critical appreciation model, we can see why empirical-analytic knowledge
cannot just be accepted without showing how people can interpret the knowledge. People
can also through critical self-reflection and ideology-critique processes develop their own
understanding of the empirical events. But their own understanding can be enriched by
others' understanding, and this is what the process of critical appreciation (systemic
learning) is all about. It also applies to norms. Norms can be accepted uncritically but they
can also be things that are subjected to discussion, where people discuss things from a
normative viewpoint. I also showed the importance of multiloguing was discussed to
show how different languages (on the level of theory and experience) can exist in a
discordant pluralist relationship. That is, learning possibilities are never ending. I
concluded by indicating how critical systemic learning needs to be related to social
awareness so that new lifestyles can be thought about and experimented with. I tied
discussion about critical self-reflection and ideology-critique processes as part of the
development of a critical systemic approach to motivation in organisations.
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In the next chapter, I take up issues related to cross-cultural influences on motivation. I
discuss this mainly by referring to cultural variables of Hofstede's (1980a, b) argument
about culture's consequences in motivating people to perform in different ways.
,
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Chapter 7
Issues in Motivation Interventions (4):
Harnessing Cross-Cultural Influences
7. 1 Introduction
This chapter follows up arguments developed about the need for critical systemic learning
during motivation interventions. Expanding this line of thought, in this chapter work by
several authors (Hofstede, 1980a, b, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993; Cox and Blake, 1991;
Sowell, 1991; Rivera, 1991; Schein, 1992; Huo and Steers, 1993; Mendonca and
Kanungo, 1994; Harvey and Allard, 1995; Brocklesby, 1994, 1995; Brocklesby and
Cummings, 1995, 1996) which notes that culture links self and society and is the
environment in which people develop ideas about themselves and their relationship with
society is discussed. I also take up Hofstede's (1980a) suggestion that there are certain
cultural variables which affect the way that people work in organisations. So the aim of
this chapter is to explore different ways diverse cultures may cope with the issue of
motivation intervention, and the possibilities for cross-cultural (or alien paradigms)
learning. To start out, let us consider the cultural variables.
7. 2 Understanding cultural variables
Hofstede (1980a) draws out a number of variables which he argues may differ from
culture to culture. As Sowell (1991) notes, a world view of cultural diversity has
progressed by sharing different unique features and advances with one another. Rivera
(1991) also states: "cultural values play a key role in how you view the world and how you
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learn to succeed in it" (p.32). Hofstede suggests that there are four cultural variables:
power distance (high or low); masculinity versus femininity (as cultural features);
individualism versus collective orientation; and uncertainty avoidance (as a variable this
can vary between wanting to take risks and trying to avoid them). He recognises that
variations between cultures mean that people's motivation and ways of becoming
motivated can vary. For example, motivation that is sometimes seen as coming from
collaborative teamwork may not be as much of a motivator in a society where people feel
uncomfortable with low power distance (as I will explain later). Or again, the idea of being
motivated through competition as a challenge, may be less of a motivator in a culture
where employees feel more comfortable with collective orientations. Hofstede (1984)
focuses on the culture dimension in management and planning, and shows that people
with different cultural backgrounds may have very different beliefs, as indicated in Table
7.1.
From the following table, we can see different beliefs embedded in each cultural
background. For example, in Taiwanese culture employees are motivated by group
interest because of low individualism; the domain of owner interest cannot be ignored
because of high power distance; and the relationship between the employee and owner
has a moral component because of high uncertainty avoidance. Huo and Steers (1993)
also note, Taiwanese enterprises respect for old age is one of the key factors which
keeps these enterprises stable, and traditional power relationships still determine
organisational direction because employees cannot radically challenge authority.
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Country Individualism Power distance Uncertainty
avoidance Masculinity
Taiwan 17 58 69 45
Japan 46 54 92 95
Korea 18 60 85 39
Singapore 20 74 8 48
Hong Kong 25 68 29 57
Germany 67 35 65 - 66
Great Britain 89 35 35 66
U.S.A. 91 40 46 62
Table 7.1. Value of Four Cultural Indices for Eight Countries
Individualism: stands for a preference for a loosely knit social framework in society wherein
individuals are supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate
families only.
Power Distance: is the extent to which the members of a society accept that power in institutions
and organizations is distributed unequally.
Uncertainty Avoidance: is the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with
uncertainty and ambiguity.
Masculinity: stands for a preference in society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and
material success.
(Source: Cultural Dimensions in Management and Planning, Hofstede, 1984, p.25.)
In this section, I point to some implications for understanding and learning among cultural
diversities. The same principle applies as has been developed in the previous chapter
regarding the nature of learning from a critical systemic view. We should be able to
question what is a part of other traditions, so that we do not merely accept that some other
tradition is better. As Cox and Blake (1991) suggest concerning improving organisational
capability to manage cultural diversity, people should be aware that in a particular
tradition ideological forces may be operating to limit their learning capacities. So before
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we can learn from one another, we need to be aware of problems of ideology potentially
restricting our learning.
Nevertheless, Hofstede (1991) states that although there are wide cultural differences,
people from very dissimilar cultures can learn fruitfully. Cox and Blake (1991) also
observe that cultural diversity promotes creativity and innovation. They note, specific
steps (e.g., people making themselves aware of the attitudinal differences of others) must
be taken to realise this benefit. Hofstede also points to limitations; for example, one
limitation is related to the variable of power distance. He suggests that when people seek
co-operation from nationals who score high on power distance, this becomes difficult
because the co-operation itself depends on the "whims of powerful individuals" (p.237).
Also significant from the critical systemic view of learning, is that cultures where
uncertainty avoidance is strong find it difficult to learn from with something which seems
so different. So there are various limitations to the possibility of learning when we are
speaking on the level of learning between cultural boundaries.
I believe that critical systemic learning developed in previous chapters has some
applicability here too (there are also restrictions on learning when applied within some
cultural or national contexts, so the problems are not qualitatively different). Just as
applying need-based motivation theories in an emancipatory way may be more difficult
when dealing with differences between 'advanced' and 'less advanced' countries, so it
seems that the same applies to possibilities of co-operation among those at the same
'level'. But, this should not lead to pessimism. It only means that the challenge is greater.
Hofstede (1991) points out that when addressing the question of learning across national
boundaries, that there are certain value-laden issues that cannot be ignored. This ties in
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with the fact that CST cannot avoid value-laden issues when considering how to approach
a commitment to cross-cultural learning. This is what Hofstede is referring to when he
states that we cannot simply continue to introduce more and more technology, and apply it
as if this can go on forever without reflection.
There are issues, as Hofstede (1991) notes, that cannot be dealt with by any specific set of
people -- decisions that have to be made on a world-wide scale. Cox and Blake (1991) also
,
assert that managing cultural diversity should enhance organisational flexibilty. Thus,
cross-cultural learning is necessary. People need to be motivated for this, and according to
Hofstede, there is the possibility for such motivation, subject to the limitations that he has
pointed to (which he hopes can be overcome). The limitations actually relate to people's
ability to learn, because those who score high on power distance and therefore rely on the
judgement of those who seem powerful, may find that they need to learn more about co-
operation if they want to create sustainable policies. Also those who normally like to avoid
uncertainty may find that they cannot continue to do so, because they will still be faced
with the uncertainty of not knowing if the future is sustainable. And again, those who
might want to believe that the culture of competitive individualism works well, may find
that in certain contexts they cannot any longer hold onto this. Moreover, those who wish to
adopt a kind of masculine orientation of influence and control, may also find that in certain
contexts this is not sustainable. So on all counts cross-cultural learning to address the
kinds of issues that Hofstede has raised and that have been explored in this thesis, may
require critical systemic learning between different aspects.
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7. 3 Hofstede's four dimensions about cultural variables
Now I will discuss in more detail Hofstede's (1980a) arguments, and issues surrounding
his arguments. Hofstede defines culture as "the collective mental programming of the
people in an environment", and notes that culture "encompasses a number of people who
were conditioned by the same education and life experience" (p.43). His work on the
effects of culture is used to point to possible different orientations of managers in different
societies. He labels four dimensions about cultural variables as follows.
7. 3. 1 Power distance
Power distance refers to the way that people rely on managers to make top decisions and to
take responsibility for them. Hofstede (1980a) notes that power distance indicates "the
extent to which a society accepts the fact that power in institutions and organisations is
distributed unequally", and is "reflected in the values of the less powerful members of
society as well as in those of the more powerful ones" (p. 46). Mendonca and Kanungo
(1994) also observe that when there is a high power distance then there is a high value
placed on obedience to superiors and dutiful compliance with their directives. Such
obedience and compliance is not based on the expertise or competence of those to be
obeyed but rather on the fact that they occupy a position of authority. People are unwilling
to disagree with their superiors. Mendonca and Kanungo feel that people who operate in
such cultures can learn from other cultures where value is placed on self-determination;
otherwise subordinates may experience a feeling of powerlessness. However, Hofstede
(1980b) points out that when a manager tries to force this kind of viewpoint onto cultures
with high power distance values, this can also be counterproductive. He cites the case of
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France, where management by objectives (as organised in the American way) was not
successful because it relied too much on managers coming to define objectives
collectively, a process which was shunned in France (also in the Taiwan cultural context).
So although it seems that learning is achievable, the principle of non-imposition must
apply. So must not imposing a value of low power distance onto a situation where people
feel uncomfortable with it. Of course, attention must be given to the fact that ideological
forces could restrict discussion about possibilities for new ways of working together. This
is a factor which must be considered by those who are trying to present new ideas (for
example, ideas about lower power distance as a value) within some cultural contexts.
Hofstede (1991) notes that there are no absolute values for judging whether certain
cultural values are less powerful factors than others in some way (for example, the value of
accepting power distance as a strong gap between people in a hierarchy). So, it is very
difficult to say how people will operate. But, Hofstede also points out, this does not mean
that people are value-free.
So in the light of the discussion about critical reflection in the previous chapter, I suggest
that anybody wishing to offer new values, or who believes that there is some imperative to
introduce something new (for example, about the way power can operate), that theorist or
practitioner must also be willing to listen to what those in the context state about the
matter.
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7. 3. 2 Uncertainty avoidance
Uncertainty avoidance is manifested in people's desires not to take risks. Hofstede
(1980a) recognises that uncertainty avoidance indicates
the extent to which a society feels threatened by uncertain and ambiguous
situations and tries to avoid these situations by providing greater career stability,
establishing more formal rules, not tolerating deviant ideas and behaviours, and
believing in absolute truths and the attainment of expertise. ( Hofstede, 1980a,
p.46)
Nevertheless, he notes that "societies in which uncertainty avoidance is strong are also
characterised by a higher level of anxiety and aggressiveness that creates, among other
things, a strong inner urge in people to work hard" (p.47). Mendonca and Kanungo (1994)
refer to India, and state that:
The early socialisation practices in India, ... expect that individuals perform tasks
as a matter of duty, and in terms of their prescribed role in society. .... In the
organisational context, the effects of high uncertainty avoidance are manifested
in terms of high aversion to risk taking, dependence on superiors, reluctance to
take personal initiatives, and high external locus of control. (Mendoca and
Kanungo, 1994, p.195)
They also note that often the degree of uncertainty avoidance is related to people's dislike
of the risks involved in facing their managers. People are worried that their managers will
not sanction any exercise of autonomy and decision-making unless it goes exactly
according to the rules. They feel more secure in following rules. Managers are not
confident that the work that has been delegated will be done if it is left to subordinates to
take personal initiative. Mendonca and Kanungo also note that this uncertainty from the
managers' side "will make them exercise greater control and provide more detailed
directions than are actually required" (p.196).
Mendonca and Kanungo suggest that it is possible for us who are trying to avoid risks in
this way to learn new ways of acting. We can learn, for example, that through access to
participative management, we can become involved with less anxiety on all our parts if we
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personally try less to avoid risks. But the way that principles of participative management
are applied must be consistent with the predominant cultural characteristics of the country
of application, otherwise, Mendonca and Kanungo suggest, the application will not be
successful. So applying participative management cannot simply be applied in the same
way in all cultural contexts. People can learn to take some personal initiative and to find
fulfilment from this, while they can learn to relinquish some control. People may find that
in any case they cannot continue any longer with always trying to avoid risks, because
organisations are too complex for everything to be directed with certainty. These are
things that can be learnt, but in the process of suggesting new ways of behaving,
consultants must be careful not to adopt an impositionary role.
7. 3. 3 Individualism and collectivism
Individualism is manifested in the sense that work and other fulfilments are based on
personal needs. The self is experienced apart from the rest of society, with whom the
individual is often seen in competition (see the discussion on possessive individualism in
the previous chapter). Hofstede (1980a) suggests that:
Individualism implies a loosely knit social framework in which people are
supposed to take care of themselves and of their immediate families only,
while collectivism is characterised by a tight social framework in which
people distinguish between in-groups and out-groups; they expect their in-
group (relative, clan, organisations) to look after them, and in exchange for
that they feel they owe absolute loyalty to it. (Hofstede, 1980a, p.47)
Mendonca and Kanungo (1994) note that in highly collectivistic cultures, by contrast,
"family concerns and group attainments take precedence over the individual's work
concerns and achievements" (p.196). They note that when people perform their jobs well,
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the motivation for this is not a sense of "delight of achieving job objectives"; rather, the
motivation is associated with efforts to "please their superiors or peers, who may be
friends, relatives, or people from the same village" (p.197).
This shows that people do not always in all cultures become motivated by the same things.
In highly collectivistic cultures motivation differs from highly individualistic ones. This is
why in the previous chapter possessive individualism was defined as an ideology if it
-
stops people from looking at new ways of being, feeling and working. Collectivism can
also operate as ideology if it makes people feel that they have to operate always in terms of
what Stryker (1991) calls an 'ought self which is defined by others' feelings about one's
duties. This limits us from thinking about norms -- we simply accept whatever society
seems to demand. This is not compatible with critical systemic learning, which sees that
we can question ideas and norms through ideology-critique and can transform ourselves.
7. 3. 4 Masculinity and femininity
Hofstede (1980a) observes, measurements in terms of a masculinity-feminity dimension
express "the extent to which the dominant values in society are 'masculine' -- that is,
assertiveness, the acquistion of money and things" (p.48). For example, not masculinity
simply as being necessarily male but rather as pointing to an attitude to life, femininity
may be associated with being motivated by quality of life and care for others and the
environment. Thus, we see that masculine features (or what are defined as masculine)
penetrate workplace culture where the orientation is towards influence and control, and
sometimes this is linked to orientations towards possessive, individualism, where
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competition between individuals is seen as the order of the day. These ways of working
and relating can become an unquestioned part of a culture.
7. 4 Realising cross-cultural influences on motivation
Based on Hofstede's (1980a) findings, and coupled with discussion from previous
-
chapters, we see that different cultures may cope with motivation issues in different ways.
For example, the idea of rewarding people on the basis of personal needs may not be
applicable in more collective-based cultures. Hofstede (1980b) points out that Maslow's
needs theory does not reflect universal needs. For example, self actualisation may be
applicable to American society but not to all other societies; even management by
objectives -- which became popular in America (after Drucker) -- is based on the idea of
the impersonal pursuing of goals which may be inapplicable in all cultural contexts. The
low power distance that exists in America suggests that people do not look to a manager to
take all responsibility but can consider individually how to pursue goals.
Therefore, Hofstede (1980b) emphasises that managers need to examine the processes of
developing motivation by looking at the social and cultural contexts. This gives an
indication of how people can cope suitably with the question of motivation in their
society. We should be careful about simply adopting approaches to motivation that have
been created by other cultures. However, Hofstede states that learning between cultures in
multicultural contexts is possible. He believes that there is much scope for problem-
solving argument in various settings. It can be in the setting of organisations which are
multicultural, and it can also be in the sphere of decision-making about how to sustain the
environment. In hoping to encourage multicultural creative contexts, cultures (and hence
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managers) need to learn from one another through exchanges which let managers question
what they receive from others, while also adding to their own appreciation of the issues;
but also ensuring that one cultural way of seeing does not come to impose on the others. A
cultural system can be seen as part of a system of intercultural influences, and the way in
which this affects views of motivation must be acknowledged.
When considering the motivating of people in a given context, Mendonca and Kanungo
,
(1994) show how managers can work with organisational culture while still extending the
boundaries of what seems possible within that culture. They believe that this is necessary
when there are cultural constraints of some sort which can be identified. They show why
they believe that sometimes it is necessary to extend the boundaries of what is taken as
given in a particular cultural setting -- especially if one is aware of tensions that are being
caused by the restrictions of the culture (for example, the anxieties linked with risk
avoidance as described above, or the anxieties linked to feelings of powerlessness which
some employees possess). Mendonca and Kanungo speak of the dysfunctional effects of,
in Hofstede's terms, high uncertainty avoidance and high power distance. But, they agree
with Hofstede that views of it and ways of dealing with motivation in various contexts
cannot all be the same. As Harvey and Allard (1995) argue,
To deal with diversity we need to understand ourselves, and our cultural
blinkers in order to go beyond thinking of our way as the only way and to
develop appreciation for other viewpoints. We need, too, to be able to put
ourselves in the shoes of others to understand how they view us and interpret
our actions. (Harvey and Allard, 1995, p.9)
Mendonca and Kanungo's (as well as Hofstede's) ideas raise the idea of intervention to
improve learning among cultures. Intervention as shown in this thesis should contribute to
enabling people (motivating them) to pursue better ways of working and better ways of
being. But cultural constraints (ideology) have to be examined. Also situations where high
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power distance is prohibitive of all innovation will also have to be considered as
potentially problematic. Hofstede (1980b) suggests that every society has to cope
somehow with certain "basic problems" (p.212). In this sense, some issues are common to
all societies, such as the fact that power will operate in some way, and that managers have
to consider what level of risk they want to take and how they can organise this.
So it is necessary to adopt critical systemic learning if the manager wants to harness the
utility that a plurality of approaches to motivation can offer. This allows differing ways of
motivating people to be taken seriously, and it also allows cultures to learn from one
another. That is, it allows the ideas from one culture to be seen as a counterpoint for
criticising ideas that have become fixed in other cultures. There are many intervention
possibilities for us who desire to instill learning, so that within cultural boundaries people
can reconsider their lifestyles and ways of working.
In developing cross-cultural learning, motivation theories discussed by Moorhead and
Griffin (1995) (need-based, process-based, and learning-based), could be examined by
considering their possible relevance in different cultures, and also their possibilities for
criticising traditions that have become ideological in those cultures. Critical systemic
learning looks at problems of ideology in society and tries to see how new styles of
working can be explored, in a way which is not aimed at serving the interests of only
certain individuals or groups, and is both culturally sensitive and able to extend the
boundaries of culture through an ideology-critique process. It is linked with an exploration
of the possibilities for legitimate intervention with the purpose of enabling us to deal with
the problems of motivation in our own cultures. In the process of developing cross-
cultural learning, power relations in society have to be considered again, partly with a
view to respecting patterns that have been established (for example, with regard to power
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distance) but partly with the aim of criticising ideological formations. As Brocklesby and
Cummings (1995) claim, different cultures can impact on our ideology with effects on:
where one looks for problems and how these problems are perceived; what
one chooses to include within, or omit from, research; how one interacts with
clients; what one believes 'works well' and what does not; whose interests one
supports; and how findings are presented. (Brocklesby and Cummings, 1995,
p.241)
Therefore, anybody who wants to foster cross-cultural learning cannot simply accept
without question assumed patterns that have been established in society as a way of
working and a way of defining people's motivations. But also anybody who claims to be
self-reflective also has to pay attention to the condition of non-imposition, so, they do not
impose their own values on others as if these are necessarily better.
The question to be raised here is, how can we transcend cultural boundaries? Gregory
(1994) suggests that "ideology-critiques have a role to play in bringing about such
changes", and notes that "the individual is responsible for gaining new cognition, new
understanding of a particular situation" (p.1562). She argues that
through a critique of ideology, an individual may choose to act in certain ways
that will impact on the values and beliefs of society which, in the normal
day-to-day activities of individuals and collectives, is produced and
reproduced. (Gregory, 1994, p.1566)
She argues that we should not only be capable of adopting subjective and objective
positions in discourse, but also must be able to consider whether a proposed norm is fair.
Thus, the challenge is how to capture the benefits of cultural diversities rather than their
meaning. Midgley (1995b) also notes possibilities for cross-cultural learning and
integration in terms of a critical systems perspective. This thesis argues that critical
systemic learning can help us by providing opportunities to reflect on in given
organisational cultures. Hence, the value of cross-cultural interactions lies in providing us
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with an increased critical awareness of our own culture to guide the way in which we look
at motivation, and the way we deal with others' responses. Managing cultural diversities
also provides insights into alien cultural contexts by learning new ways of thinking and
new ways of behaving to change our own deep-seated assumptions, which can help us to
become aware of our own assumptions and how we might deal with motivation.
-
7. 5 Conclusion
In this chapter I showed how culture affects the way in which people become motivated
and the possibilities for cross-cultural (or alien paradigms) learning. An approach cannot
be adequately understood by means of one culture alone. Cultural differences can also be
regarded as complementary in some ways, in that we do not all have to be subsumed into
one dominant pattern that encompasses the world. This allows different cultural patterns
for motivating people to co-exist, while at the same time we can learn from the dynamics
of cultural differences. Once the cultural variables have been surfaced, we need critical
systemic learning through an ideology-critique process so that we can improve mutual
understanding and enhance our learning among the available approaches and their
potential effects.
Having examined the issues in motivation interventions in Chapters 4 through to 7, in the
next chapter, I argue the need for a critical systemic approach to motivation, and present
the main commitments of this approach in action.
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Chapter 8
The Need for A Critical Systemic Approach
to Motivation
8. 1 Introduction	 -
This chapter follows up arguments developed in previous chapters and argues the need for
a critical systemic approach to motivation. A critical systemic approach to motivation is a
step both towards discovering the limits of the current approaches, and towards
experimenting with the possibility of finding new thinking in interventions. Especially, it
emphasises critical systemic learning which encourage participants, particularly
managers, to communicate with and learn from other perspectives (even cross-cultures)
by means of self-reflection and ideology-critique. This approach is based on critical
systems thinking (CST), and highlights that the following four themes should be
embodied in interventions: critical awareness, pluralism, critical reflexivity, critical
systemic learning. This chapter first presents the key requirements to motivation which
provide criteria in determining whether the intervention is appropriate in a given
organisational circumstance, and then offers a critical systemic approach to motivation in
action which hopes to resolve the issues identified or arising during interventions, and can
lead to improvement in tackling the problems of motivation..
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8. 2 The key requirements for successful motivation
It is false to assume that there is a ready-made approach to improving motivation where it
is hoped that intervention will be immediate and produce quick results. As Shamir (1991)
states, the shortcomings of current models (or approaches) stem from their overreliance on
hedonistic assumptions and an instrumental model of the human being: namely, "their
bias toward individualistic behaviours in individualistic cultures, their inapplicability to
-
weak situations, their emphasis on predicting discrete acts and their oversight of the role
of values and moral obligations in work motivation" (p.405). In order to correct these
biases, we need theories that can explain individual sacrifices for organisational concerns
and can account for the role of values and moral obligations in energising and directing
work behaviour. The following six key requirements point out that continuous
improvement will be characteristics of successful motivation in organisations:
1 The processes of intervention should address the systemic nature of motivation. The
interventions components form a system, with changes in one element affecting the
others. Because the components need to mutually reinforce high motivation, they must
be examined as a system of interacting parts. The intervention of each element should
be consistent with the intervention of the others.
2. The processes of intervention should be dynamic and iterative. It should reflect the fact
that motivation is the order of the times and that intervention is an ongoing process of
adjusting to change and improving motivation in organisations. Intervention is never
finished, but it continually seeks to expand the effectiveness of motivation.
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3. The processes of intervention need critical systemic learning --a process where people
should learn by doing, trying out new perspectives, appreciating their effectiveness,
and modifying them if necessary. Moreover, people often start intervening with only
limited knowledge of interventions alternatives and vague ideas about what they want
their interventions to look like. They can gain clarity about interventions by trying to
implement them in favoured directions and learning from the experience. Such critical
systemic learning helps people to better understand what they really want their
interventions to be. It also provides a deeper and more realistic understanding of the
perspectives needed to implement motivation interventions.
4. The processes of intervention need to look at conflicting perspectives, needs, and
interests. Organisations typically include a diversity of perspectives. Motivation
intervention should take into account the different viewpoints and should seek to
reconcile the conflicts among them. The intervention process ideally helps managers
with different ideologies and assumptions learn together to create a new reality. It
should facilitate uncovering and clarifying conflicts among different perspectives and
searching for innovative resolutions.
5. The processes of intervention should allow the diversity of available motivation
approaches in a way which respects all their qualities. It also should consider that
problems or situations need to be reflected on from wider points of view than other
approaches have done, and it is not the case that there is one best or right approach
which should always predominate. Motivation intervention should hold that, in
principle, no approach should be ignored, but should be respected and adopted where
appropriate. It seems reasonable that different approaches should be used, depending
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on the problem situation being faced. However, while pluralist systemic approaches
are part of the answer, they should (in the view of critical systems thinkers) be
operated critically.
6. The processes of intervention need to facilitate critical awareness, in Jackson's (1991a)
terms, that means examining systems design proposals in terms of their "underpinning
values and assumptions" and also means understanding the strengths and weaknesses
,
of different approaches (p.185). The aim is to elucidate the relations between social
circumstances and the theoretical assumptions underlying various approaches. As
Midgley (1995a) argues, critical awareness is to "examine and re-examine taken-for-
granted assumptions, along with the conditions which give rise to them" (p.2). This is
to say, social circumstances (e.g., cultural influence, political power, social ideology,
etc.) will affect the success with which motivation approaches can be applied, while
conversely, systems intervention will also affect social circumstances.
Traditional approaches to motivation tend to score low on these requirements for
successful intervention motivation in organisations. Their approaches often ignore the
systemic nature of organisations and focus on limited interventions in isolation from the
others; they tend to view motivation intervention as a one-shot event rather than as a
dynamic and iterative process; they are frequently implemented by external experts who
leave the organisation with little instruction about how to improve motivation; they tend
to focus on limited perspectives and needs, typically catering to the interests of owners;
they often involve limited motivation approaches in organisations; they tend to be
concerned with improving existing understandings of the problems of motivation, often
neglecting the need to radically transform the organisation.
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In order to correct these biases, current thinking of motivation should be expanded by
adding a self-society dynamic based model of work motivation. A self-society dynamic
based model of work motivation rests on the following assumptions:
1. Humans are not only goal-oriented but also value self-reflection. This means that, in
contrast to the current cognitive emphasis in motivation approaches, behaviour is not
always goal-oriented and instrumental but is also expressive of values, attitudes, and
beliefs.
2. Individual's behaviour is motivated and regulated by internal standards and self-
appreciative reactions to their own actions. Thus self-appreciation is an important
form of intrinsic motivation. To the extent that self-appreciation reflects the ought self
and hence an anticipated sense of self-worth, it is closely linked to social values as
cultural conceptions of the desirable.
3. People are motivated to maintain and increase their sense of ideology-critique. The
self-society dynamic is thought of as pertaining to a multiplicity of meanings. We can
assume that ideology-critique is not only a corrective mechanism activated in case of
discrepancy but also a positive motivation. In a sense, the self-society dynamic is an
ideology that people attempt to express and validate in their behaviour.
4. Self-society dynamics involves critical systemic learning --a process where people try
out new behaviours, processes, and structures; and make necessary modifications.
Self-society based behaviour is not always related to clear expectations or to
immediate and specific goals. Rather, it is often guided by imagined possibilities and
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faith. It is important to note that as representations of the self in future states, possible
selves are views of the self that often have not been confirmed by social experience.
Furthermore, this type of self-knowledge does not always exert its influence on the
individual in direct proportion to the ease with which it can be formulated or to the
likelihood of being realised.
Having examined some key assumptions concerning: the need for a self-society dynamic
-
based model of work motivation, the requirement of appreciating the suitability of
available approaches to deal with the problems of motivation more appropriately and
effectively, the importance of considering the diversity of available approaches in a way
which respects all their qualities, reflection on the legitimacy of power relations and
question ideology conflicts in given social contexts, the need for critical systemic learning
to foster cross-cultural (alien paradigms) learning. It is now possible to draw these
assumptions to create a new thinking to motivation. I call thia a critical systemic approach
to motivation (which henceforth I refer to as 'my' approach). The following section aims
to introduce the main ideas in my approach.
8. 3 The main ideas of a critical systemic approach to motivation
My approach is based on CST. As we saw in Chapter 4, CST is concerned with the
promotion of pluralism, critical awareness, and human emancipation. Pluralism suggests
that various approaches should be used according to their perceived strengths and
weaknesses; critical awareness requires that the suitability of an approach be evaluated
222
through local ideological studies; human emancipation needs to be encouraged through
meaningful participation. My approach argues, following Flood and Romm (1995b), that
"each choice (methodology, theory) can be made only using locally generated criteria
informed by wider considerations" (p.473). Thus, there can be no universal standard for
reviewing, appreciating, and choosing an approach to motivation. It is therefore vital that
we do not seek to judge an approach from only one single perspective and assume that this
perspective is the truth. The need is to explore multiple perspectives by means of critical
self-reflection and ideology-critique. As Gregory (1992) states, critical self-reflection is
about encouraging managers to reveal their understanding and assumptions and consider
their legitimacy in the light of possible alternatives; and through ideology-critique,
managers' ideology are brought into dialectical debate and are challenged by others. This
is to prevent motivation interventions from automatic domination by a single ideology.
Flood (1990) suggests that absolutes should be resisted. Instead, contextualised
understanding and the integration of approaches can be more appropriate in a local context
which refers to both space and time (Flood, 1996; Flood and Romm, 1996b). The
following principles need to be embodied when applying my approach to intervene in the
problems of motivation.
1. Meaningful participation and communication among different perspectives is necessary.
2. Knowledge is never perfect and sufficient, appreciation is a never-ending learning
process.
3. People should be willing to critically reflect on the coercive use of power and question
ideology conflicts during interventions.
223
4. People should consider intervention in terms of a pluralist systemic position (informed
by discordant pluralism). .
5. People should perceive the importance of cultural contexts.
My approach argues that the current understanding and knowledge about motivation
needs to be critically assessed, and different perspectives should be taken into account in
order for all participants to gain an improved awareness of their circumstances and the
likely effects of implementing available approaches. It essentially emphasises a critical
and systemic process of developing something new out of existing perspectives. Because
organisations are artefacts created by people, they are the manifestation of different values
and beliefs about how motivation should be intervened in. In laying the foundation, we
learned that motivation interventions are variable and dynamic; they are malleable, not
deterministic. Although motivation interventions must be responsive to people and
environments, intervening is not an exact process with one correct outcome. Rather, there
is considerable choice in interventions to achieve motivation. Moreover, as managers
learn more about intervening, their ability to alter existing approaches or generate entirely
new ones increases. It is a potentially continuous process. My approach highlights four
themes in motivation interventions: critical awareness, pluralism, critical reflexivity, and
critical systemic learning (see Figure 8. 1 -- Model of critical systemic approach to
motivation in action). It is undirectional, but is a potentially continuous process because
the new understanding of the available approach and/or the context may lead the
organisation and manager to start a new cycle of investigation.
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Critical Theory
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critically on power 	 ideology conflicts
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Intervention
paradigm incommunsurability?
Motivation
Critical systemic learning
1
Critical Reflexivity
How can we appreciate the
suitability of available motivation
approaches for each local context?
How can we manage
the diversity of available
motivation approaches in a
way which respects all their
qualities?
Figure 8. I Model of Critical Systemic Approach to Motivation in Action
The model of my critical systemic approach to motivation in action is explained in more
detail below:
• Urges critical awareness to appreciate the available approaches in terms of
underlying assumptions
An approach is created according to particular meta-theoretical assumptions about
motivation. By investigating the philosophy, principles, and process of the available
approaches, we can critically assess these meta-theoretical assumptions. This enhances
our understanding of the available approaches. My approach emphasises that different
approaches should be appreciated critically in terms of meta-theoretical assumptions
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(or reflect on manager's assumptions) and a given organisational context. Managers
cannot simply accept without appreciation assumed patterns that have been established
in organisations, because no one best approach can be used universally and be used
concretely to motivation. My approach provides a new critical process for managers to
encourage them to evaluate a given approach pior to (possible) intervention. As I
argued in Chapter 3 that an evaluation approach needs to take into account the views of
stakeholders who will be directly or indirectly influened by the application of a
candidate approach(es). This is because the proposed intervention will directly or
indirectly affect them, and they may in turn affect the course of the intervention.
Managers should continually appreciate the radically distinct assumptions behind the
available approaches, and should capture the complexities of dynamic environments.
• Stresses pluralism to utilise the diversity of available approaches in a way which
respects all their qualities
My approach is a form of pluralism which involves appreciating and recognising the
differences and similarities between available approaches, which is preferable to
reducing them to only one perspective; and allows for dynamics and development to
move beyond alien paradigmatic boundaries. As I argued in Chapter 4, CST considers
that problems or situations need to be considered from wider points of view than other
approaches have done, and that there is no one best or right approach which should
always predominate. My approach holds that no approach should be ignored, but
should be respected and adopted where appropriate. It seems reasonable that different .
approaches should be used, depending on the problem situation of motivation being
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faced. Especially, my approach stresses discordant pluralism which enhances the
abilities of managers to understand the available approaches by encouraging self-
reflection and ideology-critique. As Gregory (1996) argues, pluralism seeks to
"facilitate a transformation process through understanding self and others"
(p.622).This is to say, the available approaches should be interpreted critically and used
in a way which respects all their qualities at a given point in time.
'
• Promotes critical reflexivity to question ideology conflicts and to reflect on power
relations during interventions
In examining the assumptions that an approach to motivation should embrace, we should
consider that paradigms are not ideologically neutral. We also need to have an idea of
what ideology actually is, and how it can be critiqued. Most importantly, we should
prevent uncritical ideological domination. From a critical point of view, ideology needs
to be criticised. In Chapter 5, I argued that personal and social ideology affect both our
view of reality and choice of approach to motivation interventions. I suggested that
ideology-critique is possible, but strictly objective ideology-critique cannot be
achieved. As Gregory (1992) proposes a theory of ideology-critique, according to
which ideologies should be critised by observation, communication, and self-
reflection. Ideology-critique is a dynamic process because the participants can change
their ideological positions through the critical process itself, necessitating renewed
analysis. Furthermore, I also indicated that it is problematic to tackle motivation
interventions in which managers are aware of issues of the coercive of power. I argued
that coercion can only be tackled through the promotion of mutual understanding
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among participants. Each needs to understand different perspectives. Importantly, the
moral responsibility for improving the organisational situations lies with all
participants. Finally, my approach argues that professional knowledge needs to be
opened up to challenge by sweeping in wider perspectives from relevant participants.
In addition, the forms of communication proposed within my approach may support
participants in arguing against the possible imposition of undesired ideologies.
• Encourages critical systemic learning to foster communication and learning
between cross-cultures (or alien paradigms)
In motivation intervention, the manager plays a key role. It is therefore important that
managers reflect on what they believe; their assumptions, knowledge, and
understanding of both the current organisational circumstances and the available
approaches. In Chapter 6, I explained the importance of critical systemic learning
which provides opportunities for individuals to see motivation through other patterns
of thought, either leading to an elaboration of the original paradigm. As Gregory (1992)
indicates that "improved self-awareness would enable us to come to see the repression
and subjugation that have helped to shape our social reality and its accepted
interpretations" (p.207). She argues that "one cannot predict that a particular norm or
value will 'win out' in the end, but the possibility of getting people to talk and think
critically" is valuable (p.370). It is thus necessary to encourage people to enter into a
dialectical process of debate that will be capable of promoting self-reflection and
ideology-critique amongst participants. Nevertheless, it will be difficult for each
individual to carry out self-reflection and ideology-critique alone. The presence of a
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facilitator is usually necessary to promote questioning. Therefore, in order to improve
mutual understanding and communication, I suggest that, wherever possible, critical
systemic learning is necessary. Furthermore, in chapter 7, I step toward experimenting
with the possibility of learning new ways of thinking and new ways of behaving to
change people's taken-for-granted ideologies, which can help them to become aware of
their assumptions and how they might learn from different cultures (or alien
paradigms).	 '
In this section, I have shown the main ideas in my approach, which provides critical and
systemic interventions because no single approach can be used universally. My approach
views humans as being motivated by a complex set of interrelated factors (such as external
rewards, need for affiliation, need for achievement, and desire for meaningful work) which
vary in importance according to the context (including the cultural context). It is assumed
that different employees often seek quite different goals in a workplace and have a
diversity of talents to offer. Under this conceptualisation, employees are regarded as
reservoirs of potential talent, and manager's responsibility is to learn how best to bind such
resources. My approach argues that professional knowledge needs to be opened up to
critically challenge by sweeping in wider perspectives from relevant perspectives. In
addition, the forms of self-reflection and ideology-critique proposed within my approach
may support managers in arguing against the possible imposition of ideological conflicts.
In effect, critical systemic learning allows one to dispense with the unlikely assumption
that a single approach will be equally effective under any and all circumstances, and rather
substitutes an emphasis on appreciation of the situation to determine which approach will
be more appropriate in a given circumstance.
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8. 4 The need for a critical systemic approach to motivation
Organisations exist today in an environment that is changing in fundamental ways and is
demanding changes in organisations that go well beyond the status quo. As I detailed in
Chapter 2, different motivation approaches are categorised as need-based, process-based,
and learning-based. There appears to be no single best way which can deal with the
problem of motivation. In this section, I will look at the strengths and weaknesses (as they
have been discussed in the literature) of 'hard systematic approaches' and 'soft systemic
approaches', and finally argue the need for my approach to motivation.
Hard systematic approaches (e.g., need-based motivation approaches) are designed as
means to achieve pre-determined ends. These authors assume that natural science-based
systems concepts can equally be employed to intervene in human beings' affairs, such as
dealing with the problems of motivation. They also believe that quantitative models can
be used to pursue optimal solutions. Hard systematic approaches are thus characterised by
the pursuit of pre-defined goals in well-structured problem solving procedures.
Obviously, the key assumption underpinning the approach to motivation adopted by hard
systematic approaches is the ability to construct and manipulate a model of a situation
under study. However, organisational situations can be problematic, especially if we
focus on organisations within society, where different ideologies, interests and
presumptions exist. Hard systematic approaches are criticised for simplifying objectives
and ignoring value issues in some circumstances. Therefore, the question arises: when do
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we need different approaches, which are based on distinct perspectives, to assist us to
solve more complex motivational problems?
Soft systemic approaches (e.g., process-based motivation approaches) tend to respect
various individual perceptions and bring these into the problem solving procedure. As
Checkland (1978) states, the soft systemic approach is based on inter-subjectivism: it
deals with people and their perceptions, values, and interests. It is argued that we should
,-
not avoid subjectivity, but should include it in any definition of objectivity. Soft systemic
approaches emphasise individuals' perspectives, but they also seek to build
accommodation among individuals. However, soft systemic approaches encounter major
difficulties: the power relations implicit in consensus creation and neglect of cross-
cultural (or alien paradigms) learning. The fundamental basis of soft systemic approaches
is inter-subjectivism; they seem to lack sufficient methods to deal with the effects of
unequal status and influence to motivation in organisations, or within the wider society.
As Jackson (1991a) argues, "the exercise of power in the social process can prevent the
open and free discussion necessary for the success of work and interaction" (p.12).
Therefore, how my approach to motivation addresses these issues, is brought into the
discussion.
My approach to motivation is a holistic concept, which seeks to enhance critical
awareness, pluralism, critical reflexivity, and critical systemic learning in dealing with the
problems of motivation. It argues that traditional understandings to motivation need to be
critically examined, and different perspectives should be taken into account in order for
managers to gain an improved awareness of their own organisational circumstances and
the likely effects of implementing the available approaches. The question arises, is it really
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wise for managers to take professional knowledge for granted? My answer is "no", for
three reasons. First, the available approaches could develop as their creators revise their
perspectives, making a one-off classification restrictive. Second, there might be more than
one interpretation of an approach to motivation in which interventions are a considerably
complex, uncertain, and multi-faceted processes. Finally, taking professional assumptions
for granted might mean importing an alien ideology into an organisation without any
awareness. I argue that an approach to motivation should be appropriately understood
according to different perspectives. When managers take an approach to motivation, they
presume that they understand the available approaches. However, it can be argued that this
is only their own perspectives, and should be opened up to communicate and learn from
others. Part of my approach to motivation emphasises that managers should learn to think
systemically, not to reduce the whole into separable part(s), isolated from contact with
other ways of doing things. Therefore, no single approach, no matter how 'systemic' it may
be, is sufficient to deal with the problems of motivation. My approach to motivation
provides a forum in which each of different perspectives can be communicated and learnt,
and the consequences of conflicting views realised.
To summarise, an approach is created according to particular assumptions about
motivation. By investing the philosophy, principles, and process of the available
approaches, we can critically examine their assumptions. Each of the three types of
systems approach might have different perspectives to motivation. It is by comparing and
contrasting the different perspectives that a more critical appreciation of the available
approaches and their suitability for a given organisational circumstance may be gained.
Figure 8. 2 represents the strengths and weaknesses of different kinds of systems approach.
232
1. The inequalities of power
2. Ideology conflicts
3. Unstructured contexts
Weaknesses:
1. Be aware of the necessity of critical awareness
2. Allow pluralist systemic approaches in interventions
3. Question ideology conflicts and reflect on power relations in organisations
4. Realise cross-cultural (alien paradigms) influences
5. Emphasise critical systemic learning to foster inter-paradigm communication and cross-cultural learning
1. Uncritical exercise of power relations
2. Neglects cross-cultural (or alien paradigms) learning
Figure 8. 2 Strengths and weaknesses of different kinds of systems approaches
In the following section, I design a practical process for tackling the problems of
motivation by means of my approach.
8. 5 Designing a method for implementation
This practical process could employ many techniques which are needed to expose the
different assumptions underlying managers' perspectives during interventions. It must be
emphasised that in a real situation, adaptations will be necessary. I recognise that the
manager plays a key role in the whole process and should not only be committed to the
technical feasibility of the intervention, but also has a moral responsibility in relation to the
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organisation. This idea is central to the understanding of critical systems thinkers, most
notably Midgley (1990) and Flood and Romm (1996b). My approach highlights the four
commitments to critical awareness, pluralism, critical reflexivity, and critical systemic
learning (as discussed in Section 3). How these commitments are expressed in any
particular intervention should always be borne in mind when dealing with the problems of
motivation. Managers need to have the following characteristics.
-
1. To promote critical awareness, managers should be willing to consider the
consequences of intervention and the suitability of available approaches in a given
organisational context. Managers should reflect on their intellectual knowledge and
ideological understanding of motivation approaches and their own organisational
circumstances. This means that managers can become aware of the need to be critical
or reflective of their intellectual assumptions.
2. To appreciate the available approaches in a pluralist position. Managers have to be
willing to develop understanding of the ideological assumption and strengths and
weaknesses of the available approaches. They should hold that no approach should be
ignored, but should be respected and adopted where appropriate. They must also be
willing to consider that problems or situations need to be appreciated from wider
points of view than other approaches have done, and that there is no one best or right
approach which should always predominate.
3. To raise critical reflexivity, managers have to be willing to critically reflect on the
power relations and question the ideological differences. It is the managers'
responsibility to create a forum (or forums) for different perspectives to discuss the
available approaches so that their needs can be assessed prior to intervention, ensuring
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that the motivation intervention creates improvement. If the powerful resist the
different perspectives, at least the latter will be forewarned.
4. To cultivate critical systemic learning as a way to overcome different perspectives (or
cultural boundaries). Critical systemic learning involves an iterative cycle of self-
reflection and ideology-critique processes. This kind of learning continues until
managers have learned enough to tackle the problems of motivation effectively.
-
In the following sections, I will describe how my approach can be used in practice. To
begin with, I focus on critical awareness.
8. 5. 1 Critical awareness
As discussed in Chapter 4, people in different perspectives view motivation differently,
there is no a priori basis for deciding which approach has the better solution for
motivation. In this sense, managers should appreciate different assumptions on the
consequences of intervention and the suitability of available approaches in a given
organisational context. Each assumption managers make is derived from, and supported
by, a particular ideology, which will determine the way the motivation is perceived.
Several authors (e.g., Emery, 1969; Schän, 1983; Ulrich, 1983; Oliga, 1988, 1990, 1996;
Jackson, 1991a; Midgley, 1992, 1995a, b; Gregory, 1992, 1996a, b; Flood, 1995; Flood
and Romm, 1995a, b, 1996a, b; Brocklesby, 1994, 1995; Brocklesby and Cummings,
1995; Wilby, 1996; Mingers, 1997; Ho, 1998) consider that the implementation of the
available approaches should be appreciated critically. For example, Flood (1995)
recognises that any choice of approach has to be critically reviewed and examined. The
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main technique to appreciate the difference among assumptions could use Ulrich's (1983)
boundary questions to see what different perspectives exist between interventionists,
because they might view the same problems of motivation in different ways. As Ulrich
(1983) indicates, boundary questions help managers to appreciate assumptions about the
organisational circumstances and the available approaches. Midgley (1995b) also
indicates that boundary questions can be used by individuals to enhance critical self-
reflection.
As argued earlier, an approach to motivation is made according to creator's assumptions.
These assumptions are derived from their experiences, beliefs, and social ideology.
However, the creator of the approach might be not willing to be classified in a particular
paradigm framework (as discussed in Chapter 3). Likewise, I do not want to set up a
classification system for approaches and their associated paradigms. I argue that this way
limits flexibility. This kind of classification could also be interpreted as imperialism
because managers would inevitably apply their own values and ideological assumptions to
the process of classification. In contrast, my approach shows that inquiry into the
ideological nature of the assumptions of the available approaches enriches managers'
understanding without the need for a pre-formed paradigm framework. As I have shown,
to appreciate the available approaches is to examine their fundamental philosophy,
principles, and processes. The following issues should be taken into account.
1. Managers can look at how the available approaches pursue their goals. Are the goals
generated by a particular perspective or individual? On what kind of techniques and
methods is the processes of achieving the goals based?
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2. How do the available approaches tackle the problems of motivation; using what kind
of paradigm?
3. What do the available approaches want motivation to be?
4. Do the available approaches take value conflicts into account?
Through critical awareness, managers can gain explanations from the original creators.
Moreover, the available approaches can also be appreciated through boundary questions
that could help managers to gain a deeper understanding of the assumptions to motivation.
Here, critical awareness is concerned with the application of the available approaches and
the impact of intervention to motivation. The processes of motivation intervention should
develop managers' understandings in terms of social awareness and the strengths and
weaknesses of the available approaches, and in particular it should help managers clarify
the likely consequences of applying it. Therefore, questions arise such as, can the
problems of motivation be solved by means of a single approach? If not, how can
managers relate different approaches together? My approaches argue that different
approaches are most appropriately applied in different organisational circumstances. It
advocates pluralism that appreciates the diversity of available approaches in a way which
respects all their qualities.
8. 5. 2 Pluralism
As discussed in Chapter 4, an approach to motivation should not be interpreted only by its
creators and users. It is also necessary to take into the evaluation process the different
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perspectives. This is because the proposed intervention will directly or indirectly affect
them, and they may in turn affect the course of the intervention. Several critical systems
thinkers (e.g., Flood, 1989, 1995, 1996; Jackson, 1989, 1990, 1991a, b, 1997; Flood and
Jackson, 1991a, b; Midgley, 1992, 1995a, b, 1998; Gregory, 1992, 1996a, b; Flood and
Romm, 1995a, b, 1996a; Mingers, 1997) examine the benefits of using pluralist systemic
approaches to deal with issues during intervention. For example, Jackson (1997) notes
that
	 _
the explicit choice of a 'dominant' methodology to run an intervention with
'dependent' methodologies, reflecting alternative paradigms, in the
background. The relationship between dominant and dependent
methodologies must be allowed to change as the intervention proceeds to
maintain flexibility at the methodology level to set alongside the flexibility we
are looking for at the level of methods and tools. (Jackson, 1997, p.373)
Managers may hold different perspectives, based on their own knowledge and
assumptions, from which to see motivation. Likewise, managers may also have different
ideas about the available approaches to motivation. If managers are independent, without
strong power influence in the situation, strategic assumption surfacing and testing (SAST,
Mason and Mitroff, 1981) is recommended. Through SAST's dialectical debate,
managers can gain a clearer picture of different assumptions, and the issues which
underlie conflicts and disagreement. However, managers should not make any judgement
as to which position is superior. Rather, all issues should be taken into account and
consideration given as to how the available approaches might be applied so that as wide a
variety of perspectives as possible can be satisfied. Of course, there may be some interests
that remain irreconcilable. My approach does not try to force compromise. If compromise
is not possible, at least my approach raises awareness of the probable consequences of
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intervention using the available approaches in a way which respects all their qualities.
This goal is to examine and appreciate the three different assumptions about:
1. What the available approaches want motivation to be.
2. What motivation is and ought to be from the different viewpoints.
3. What managers think about the "is" and "ought" of motivation and the available
'
approaches.
My approach argues that the available approaches should be appreciated in terms of
different perspectives (reflect on user's assumptions and organisational circumstance); at
the same time, to see what can be learnt from one another and how each can be developed,
because there is no one best approach which should always predominate and can be used
universally for motivation. As Gregory's (1992) argues, managers should keep in touch
with the organisational context in which they are embedded, because the organisational
context will affect their appreciation of available approaches. Indeed, my approach
recognises that social pressures will affect whether a approach can be implemented
properly, and that certain approaches may be unsuitable when dealing with the problems
of motivation in certain power relations or ideological circumstances. Thus, the use of
available approaches should be considered in relation to the power relations and ideology
conflicts inside and surrounding the organisation. Once again the possibility of the critical
reflexivity becomes relevant here.
8. 5. 3 Critical reflexivity
239
As discussed in Chapter 5, sometimes managers are passive in the face of ideology
conflicts and the exercise of power in interventions. As several authors (e.g., Foucault,
1972, 1979, 1982, 1984; Habermas, 1976, 1982, 1984; Elster, 1982; SchOn, 1983; Poster,
1984; Jackson, 1985b, 1989, 1991a; Clegg, 1989; Meszaros, 1989; Flood, 1990; Brand,
1990; Thompson, 1990; Austin, 1990; Eagleton, 1990, 1994; Oliga, 1990, 1996; Mingers,
1992; Gregory, 1992; Rahman, 1993; Townley, 1994; Midgley, 1995a, b; Flood and
Romm, 1996a; Brown and Wilby, 1996; Reynolds, 1997; Mingers -, 1997) point out, it is
problematic to deal with a problem situation in which managers are aware of issues of the
ideology conflicts and power relations during interventions. It is therefore important that
managers should perceive social and organisational circumstances. Schiin (1983) shows
that managers have to consider at two levels: (i) his personal tacit norms and (ii) social
consciousness. Flood (1990) states that
Self-reflection develops an awareness of one's own mind and its operations
and reasoning about how and why the ideas of this mind and operation come
about. Using ideas of the mind to reflect on other ideas it already processes.
(Flood, 1990, p.216)
However, the question arises, how can managers gain an understanding of their
unconscious presuppositions which are based on their experiences and are affected by the
surrounding social contexts? Gregory (1992) indicates that "improved self-awareness
would enable us to come to see the repression and subjugation that have helped to shape
our social reality and its accepted interpretations" (p.207). Likewise, Brown and Wilby
(1996) state that the way to reflect on our tacit knowledge is to be open to different
perspectives, beliefs, and assumptions. As they state,
This process however assumes a willingness or ability to be open within a
group process of inquiry. This openness requires our understanding of
previous experiences or phenomena to come into contact with the unique
aspects of the current situation, and the conflicting views and tacit
,
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understandings which are brought by different participants to the change
process. (Brown and Wilby, 1996, p.19)
But, they do not clearly spell out how to challenge and to criticise the social constraints.
We may ask, how can managers reflect on (or challenge) the exercise of power relations?
How can managers question (or criticise) ideological differences (or ideology conflicts)?
In examining these questions, it is important not merely to surface a variety of positions,
but also to identify ideology conflicts and power relations. This will allow managers to
reflect on power relations and question whether the dominant ideology can or should be
changed, and what there might or might not be for managers involvement in the change
process. Ulrich's (1983) boundary questions can be used to understand the ideology
conflicts and power relations behind the current organisational situation. Managers could
ask the four types of question about
1. Sources of motivation in the organisation. These are concerned with the organisation's
purpose, direction, and value.
2. Sources of control in the organisation. These are concerned with the organisation's
power relations. Who actually takes decision(s)?
3. Sources of expertise in the organisation. These are concerned with the organisation's
know-how. How does the organisation set about achieving its ideal design and goals?
4. The nature of participation in the organisation. These are concerned with who is
affected, directly and indirectly, by the organisation's operation, and whether or not
they can become involved in decision making.
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The questions are asked in both the "is" and "ought" modes. By comparing the answers
using the two modes, managers can clarify the ideology conflicts and power relations in
the current organisational situation. As Gregory (1992) notes,
individual's self-awareness (through critical self-reflection) coupled with
sociological awareness (through ideology-critique) appears to be the most
appropriate means available to today's individual who wishes to deal morally
with the pluralistic environment confronting him or her. (Gregory, 1992,
p.355)
She recognises that it is necessary to apply an ideology-critique process to discuss ways of
transforming lived relations and also ways of developing critical self-reflection as part of
the whole process, as well as to prevent uncritical domination.
My approach does not seek to judge objectively the exercise of power or ideological
differences, but also tries to identify how the power effect can be reflected on and how the
ideology conflicts can be criticised by means of a critical reflexivity process. In order to be
critically reflexive, my approach argues the need for critical self-reflection to reveal our
own assumptions in order to appreciate (or question) the value of any social systems, and
an ideology-critique process to examine the social construction in order to break the
colonisation of thought which make us become manipulated by assumed ideologies and
power asymmetry. Moreover, can people based in different paradigms (even cross-
cultural influences) communicate with each other, and if so, how can managers overcome
paradigm communication (or cultural boundaries) by means of critical systemic learning?
8. 5. 4 Critical systemic learning
As discussed in Chapter 3, Burrell and Morgan's (1979) 'sociological paradigms'
framework shows that people in different paradigms view reality differently, according to
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assumptions they make about the world. Nevertheless, this is not to say that learning
between different cultures (or alien paradigms) is impossible. Several critical systems
thinkers (e.g., Flood, 1990, 1995; Midgley, 1992, 1995a, b, 1996, 1997; Flood and Romm,
1995a, b, 1996a) discuss the issues of paradigm incommensurability. In Chapter 7, other
authors (e.g., Hofstede, 1980a, b, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993; Austin, 1990; Cox and Blake,
1991; Sowell, 1991; Rivera, 1991; Huo and Steers, 1993; Gioia and Weaver, 1994;
Mendonca and Kanungo, 1994; Harvey and Allard, 1995; BrOcklesby, 1994, 1995;
Brocklesby and Cummings, 1995) consider the issues of cross-cultural learning.
However, the question arises, how can inter-paradigm communication be conducted?
From a critical systems point of view, Gregory's (1992) 'critical appreciation model'
provides a clear guide for inter-paradigm communication (or cross-cultural learning). She
argues that inter-paradigm communication (or cross-cultural learning) needs to involve
not only observation, interpretation of an alien paradigm, and the generation of
understanding of the cultural circumstances in which the translation happens, but also
some analysis of interventionists' inner understanding. She suggests the need for "an
alternative pluralist perspective which allows for communication between alien
paradigms which should allow their differences and conflicts to be considered" (p.146).
Moreover, she recognises that managers have to keep in touch with the situation in which
they are embedded, because the cultural circumstance will also affect their interpretation
and understanding of alien paradigms in interventions. She argues that four kinds of
approach are needed if inter-paradigms communication is to be conducted critically:
historical-hermeneutic inquiry (surfacing other views and communicating ones own),
empirical analytic inquiry (observations of the situation), ideology-critique (examining
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the social construction of the various viewpoints), and self-reflection (revealing the
interventionist's own assumptions).
In Chapter 6, my approach argues the need for a critical systemic learning which sees
self-society dynamics, and involves appreciation of alternatives by means of self-
reflection and ideology-critique processes to be aware of what we receive from alien
paradigms (or different cultures), while also adding to our own perspectives. Furthermore,
it proceeds towards exploring new ways of thinking and new ways of behaving to
challenge our taken-for-granted ideologies which can lead us to become aware of our own
assumptions and how we might learn from alien paradigms (or different cultures).
8. 6 Comments on my critical systemic approach to motivation
I have tried in this chapter to argue the need for my approach to motivation by highlighting
critical awareness, pluralism, critical reflexivity, and critical systemic learning. My
approach not just matches with specific problem situation, because it requires us to
examine the diversity of available approaches and to come to our own critical appreciation
of how to deal with the issues. So I believe that the problems of motivation cannot be dealt
with by having only one approach or by expecting all organisations and all cultures within
and between societies to adopt one approach. I also noted that this should be broadly
understood as including self-reflection and ideology-critique as part of the process of
intervention, so that the problems of motivation are not narrowly defined either by
prevailing ideologies or by prevailing rigid conceptions of what is needed for social
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transformation. However, other questions arise, for example, what should be the role of
interventionists when getting involved in the dynamics of social asymmetries in
organisations or in whole societies where some people's decision making is regarded as
more important than others. Flood and Romm (1995b) argue that in order to break this
dominant wisdom, the interventionist might need to be creative by using these dominant
methods, but altering the way issues are attended to.
,
My approach stresses appreciating knowledge and values and critical assessment of how
the organisation is doing living up to its values and accomplishing its valued outcomes. It
involves ongoing appreciation, innovation, and change in order to maintain and improve
the effectiveness of motivation. We have argued the need for critical systemic learning by
means of critical self-reflection and ideology-critique (in the way I explored it in Chapter
6) which accepts continued warning to avoid believing that there is only one narrow route
to the problems of motivation in organisations. Critical systemic learning asks us do not
stick with only one view of seeing problems of motivation. It (which is linked to an
understanding of discordance as part of learning) shows how the problems of motivation
can be addressed in a way which both enriches our understanding of the various
motivation theories, and of participants' varied experiences and different perspectives in
regard to motivating factors. This enrichment of understanding (which includes
development of both theory and development of personal experience) is a never-ending
process, because of continuing tension which gives rise to further critical learning. For
example, Gregory's (1992) critical appreciation model allows us to consider a range of
theories, to interpret them and to decide how to use them if we want to deal with any issue
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at any point in time (such as motivation). It also lets us consider self-society dynamics
(linked to critical self-reflection and ideology-critique) as part of the process of learning to
be critically appreciative.
So far, it should be noted that these argument veer in the direction of not so much aligning
methods to problem contexts, but rather developing people's critical capacities in various
ways. Then, this allows them to look at any topic, for example, _questions surrounding
motivation intervention, in a more critical way than might otherwise have been the case. It
allows people to draw, in an informed way, on a variety of approaches and models of
motivation; to compare them with one another in some way (though not completely
commensurable) and then to see how they feel when they need to address the situation at
hand. That is, the available approaches are compared by looking at how they each can
become informed through the existence of the others. Therefore, it is believed that
interventionists, by being thus informed, will not work solely with one way of seeing
people, one way of seeing how they can be motivated, one way of seeing organisation in
society, and one way of seeing prospects for improvement. This applies both to theorists
and interventionists. For example, in the domain of motivation, it applies to considering
and reflecting on the diversity of available approaches, so that one can be informed about
this; and in the domain of practice, it requires that people do not just apply one way at all
times.
On the problem of motivation, this chapter has shown why a critical systemic one to
intervention, surpasses other ways which concentrate on only one aspect of issues
connected with motivation. It has shown how concentration on one aspect is a result of not
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Examining cross-cultural (or alit
paradigms) influences on
motivation, and fostering
communication and learning
between different perspectives
n
Appreciating the diversity of
available approaches to consider
the consequences of intervention
and the suitability of approaches
in a given organisational context
Reflecting on power relations
and understanding ideology
conflicts in organisations,
ad learning new ways of thinking
to motivation
Applying the available approaches,
no approach should be ignored,
but should be adopted where
appropriate in a way which respect!
all their qualities
Critical systemic
learning Critical awareness
Critical renexivi
Figure 8.3 My approach for tackling the issues during motivation interventions
making use of a full range of approaches that have been developed to look at the problems
of motivation. As shown in Figure 8.3, my approach for tackling the issues during
motivation interventions.
8. 7 Conclusion
In this chapter, my approach to motivation argues critical awareness which is needed
because no single approach can be used universally and all approaches introduce
ideological assumptions into intervention. I also emphasise that managers should consider
the choice of the available approaches in a discordant pluralist position. The available
approaches to motivation should be critically appreciated in terms of different
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perspectives in a way which respects all their qualities. This implies that, although an
approach might have been created with a given purpose in mind, it might be interpreted
and used in different ways. My approach convinces that ideology conflicts and power
relations affect both our view of motivation and choice of the available approaches to
interventions. I argue that critical reflexivity is necessary which can act as a way to
actually increase insight by making managers examine their own ideological assumptions
and reflect on power relations as part of the critical process: Finally, I stress that
communicating with, or interpreting alien paradigms (or cross-cultural influences on
motivation) can be achieved through critical systemic learning. As paradigms and their
associated approaches are ideological, I conclude that it will be necessary for my approach
to incorporate these aspects of self-reflection and ideology-critique.
Having spelled out the commitments of my approach, in the next chapter I explain why
these same issues are a cause for concern for me, for managers in Taiwanese enterprises,
and consider how to apply my approach to deal with the problems of motivation that there
is a need to build a critical learning organisation (CLO).
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Chapter 9
Proposals for Using A Critical Systemic Approach
to Motivation for Building A Critical Learning Organisation
9. 1 Introduction
In the first eight chapters I have made a case demonstrating the need for a critical systemic
approach to motivation. I have shown that such an approach has to include a critical
appreciation of the way that available motivation approaches can learn from one another
through processes of communication and learning (Gregory, 1992, 1996a, b) and also that
different cultural contexts can learn from one another in the process (Hofstede, 1980a, b;
Mendonca and Kanungo, 1994; Brocklesby, 1994, 1995; Brocklesby and Cummings,
1995; Dachler and Hosking, 1995). This involves ideology-critique coupled with critical
self-reflection as a cognitive capacity (e.g., Thompson, 1990; Rahman, 1993; Gregory,
1992; Oliga, 1996).
In this chapter I integrate all the strands of thinking that have gone into Chapters 1 to 8,
and I argue the need to build a critical learning organisation (CLO). To do this, I draw on
some of the ideas that I have developed earlier in the thesis, but I also add some others
regarding learning organisations. In trying to integrate all the available motivation
approaches in a way consistent with a critical systemic approach as developed in Chapter
8, I now in this chapter reorganise the arguments that I laid out in Chapter 2's review of the
literature of motivation. I show how this review points up different approaches to the
study of humankind; about what people are and about what they can become. I do this by
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discerning the differences between the motivation approaches and re-categorising them in
terms of their view of people; and demonstrate that these alternative views all have some
credibility but that each must learn from the other, considering in the process the
consequences of adopting another view of people. I show why I prefer (as part of my
approach) to adopt a view of humankind as complex beings (following Schein's terms)
able to learn from human diversity, from different approaches (or ideologies), and from
-different experiences of the world as captured in different organisational contexts.
The need for a critical systemic approach to motivation is argued in this thesis because
there are many approaches but none that so far offers an approach to motivation that is
systemically able to appreciate radically different views of people and their motivation. As
shown in my review of the literature on motivation in Chapter 2, and my critical
commentary in Chapter 3, the need for a critical systemic learning in Chapter 6 so far
seems to work with a view of people as learning from others, but not as able to engage in
critical appreciation whereby they can criticise ideological conceptions that may be
prevalent. In order to allow for this, we need to extend learning theories by introducing
notions of critical self-reflection and ideology-critique (e.g., Gregory, 1992). To some
extent, authors (e.g., Argyris and Schän, 1978; Schein, 1987a, b; Swieringa and
Wierdsma, 1992) of learning organisations have tried to do this -- but the significance of
this for a critical systemic approach to motivation still needs to be further explored. In the
concluding section, I indicate why a critical systemic approach is necessary in order to
tackle the problems of motivation in Taiwanese enterprises.
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9. 2 Re-categorisation of motivation theories
In Chapter 2 we saw that it is convenient to categorise motivation theories in terms of
need-based, process-based and learning-based. This scheme (taken from Moorhead and
Griffin, 1995) is useful as a way of discussing the various theories, and what they can offer
towards our understanding of motivation. It is also useful because it aids a critical
commentary of the literature that has been developed about motivation. Now, however, I
wish to extract from this review, and from my critical commentary, five different views of
humankind. I wish to explore some implications of adopting these views. This is
consistent with a critical systemic approach which, as Flood and Jackson (1991a) and
Midgley (1995a, b) point out, requires us to have some awareness of the implications of
holding certain views. In order to aid such awareness, I therefore re-categorise those
motivation theories that I have already discussed so as to allow us to discern five different
perspectives, and their implications for our views of human nature.
The five perspectives about people which I isolate are: a view of economic beings, of
rational beings, of social beings, of psychological beings, and of complex beings
(following Schein's (1987a) models of human nature). I argue in this chapter that the view
of complex beings allows managers to think about what it means to build what I call a
CLO. This view of complex beings allows managers to appreciate the other four views
and leads to a dynamic idea of employees with regard to their motivation. Also, the four
other views do not lead to a vision which allows managers to learn from different theories,
and hence to develop their view of how human beings can act. The idea of complex beings
thus fits in better with a view of critical appreciation as described by Gregory (1992) --
where learning possibilities between viewpoints are strengthened, enabling managers to
think about themselves and about their situation as part of a dynamic process (where their
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consideration of new ideas in turn allows them to act in different ways). Schein (1987a)
observes, complex beings is built on the view that "human beings are different from each
other and that they change and grow in their motives as well as in knowledge and skills"
(p.86). Therefore, it is important for managers to appreciate what approaches are
available; it is even more important to recognise what can be done to bring about
motivation, and when and how motivation can be directed within existing structures. As
Schein emphasises, "the manager must be a good diagnostician in order to know what the
motivations and abilities of his subordinates actually are, and must be flexible enough to
use different influence attempts with different people" (p.86). To begin with, let us
consider a view of people as economic beings.
9. 2. 1 Economic beings
As shown in Chapter 2, there are some motivation theories, specifically Taylor's scientific
management approach, that view employees as motivated primarily through economic
reward. Taylor's ideas were aimed at creating an efficient workforce based on time-and-
motion studies. Taylor developed techniques such as a piece rate system which was seen
as a way of motivating employees to perform for maximum efficiency. This suggested that
employees could be rewarded for the amount of work done (as long as this was done well).
A fair day's pay for a fair day's work could be calculated and employees would be
motivated to work for bonus pay if they worked sufficiently hard. This implied that
employees were motivated by economic incentives. This view of people can be termed
Economic Beings.
,
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Morgan (1997) points out that Taylorism implies that managers and designers leave all the
"doing" to people (p.23). Managers can see how the job could best be done, and then
employees' work could be monitored to see if they are performing efficiently. This implies
the creation of "management observation checklists" to be used as performance indicators
(p.23). Employees would perform well, it was then argued, if managers judged their work
by performance and rewarded them on the basis of that performance. Employees were
seen as competitive -- they would compete with fellow workers - by trying to do the job
quickly if they knew that they would get a reward for it. The reward was an economic
incentive which was believed to motivate employees. Employees did not involve
themselves in their work other than for the economic reward that would follow, and were
not required to have a sense of responsibility for seeing a whole job done. Thus, job
specialisation has been associated with Taylorism. It was argued that breaking jobs down
into specialised parts would let employees work faster and better. This approach governed
management thinking at the turn of the century and still governs much thinking about
motivation. As we saw in Chapter 5, there is often an operating ideology of
competitiveness and individualism (which Hofstede (1980a) associates with
'masculinity') that enters our thinking about motivation. This may or may not accord with
how people feel about themselves. The point, though, is that it has become an ideology
which often functions to create people who then do not try to see themselves in any other
way.
It will be shown below that a critical systemic approach lets managers learn to see
employees in many different ways and also to be aware of what the implications are of
certain theories -- which Argyris (1993) calls 'theories-in-use' (following the model
developed by Argyris and Schän, 1978). Managers need to be aware that the view of
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economic beings is not the only possible way of seeing employees. Also, an outcome of
inference from this view is that employees tend to become more individualistic and
competitive because managers reward them for this. The reward system in the
organisation is geared to performance criteria set by managers. Managers do not treat
employees as able to become motivated through different factors.
It is possible that this type of motivation results from the view of
,
 economic beings which
Argyris and Schtin (1978) calls the theory-in-use of the managers. Also, it can become the
theory-in-use of most of us who do not challenge this theory. Salaman (1983) points out
that it is important not merely to accept ideologies without challenge. He notes that there
is evidence of resistance already in many of the organisations that seem to reward
employees as if they are simply economic beings. He argues that counter-cultures are part
of the substance that preserves organisational integrity by not allowing only managers to
set all agendas for the reward system. All this indicates that there may be a dynamic of
resistance that can arise when people are viewed as economic beings by managers.
Nevertheless, there may still be times when the view of people as economic beings points
to something that managers are willing to adopt. This could be, for example, as I see in the
case of Taiwan, when managers feel that their economic success and also that of their
country depends on giving employees economic rewards for hard work done well. But
there should always be space for resistance to assumed ideologies -- as explained in
Chapter 5. It is therefore possible to question the ideology of economic beings by showing
that it is not always the case that employees are (or should be) motivated simply by an
economic incentive.
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The view of humankind as economic beings is closely associated with the view identified
as rational beings. However, because the view of rational beings includes some extra
components, I isolate this as a second category.
9. 2. 2 Rational beings
,
Morgan (1997) notes that alongside Taylor's arguments for increasing efficiency through
piece-rate systems and increased specialisation of tasks, and that "during the 19th century,
a number of attempts were made to codify and promote ideas that could lead to the
efficient organisation and management of work" (p.16). The approach of mass production
through organising the division of labour was a key theme. This way of thinking was
recorded by Weber (1947), who "observed the parallels between the mechanisation of
industry and the proliferation of bureaucratic forms of organisation" (quoted by Morgan,
1997, p.17). Weber suggests that the bureaucratic form of organisation aided the processes
of mechanisation and specialisation that were being undertaken at the turn of the
nineteenth century. Bureaucracy as a form of organisation relies on the idea that there can
be "precision, speed, clarity, regularity, reliability and efficiency achieved through the
creation of a fixed division of tasks, hierarchical supervision and detailed rules and
regulations" (quoted by Morgan, 1997, p.17).
Morgan (1997) states that Weber was critical of the potential for the bureaucratic
approach to pervade all aspects of human life, "eroding the capacity for spontaneous
action" (p.17). The idea of using a bureaucratic way of organising was to increase the
rationality of production, eliminating the variation that occurs when employees try to act
outside of definite rules and regulations which fix their tasks. Weber called this approach
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to living a "goal-rational approach", and he noted that it implied rational action in
accordance with meeting definite goals that had been set. It was action that employed the
most efficient means to achieve these goals.
The ideas of the bureaucratic approach can be summarised as follows: there is a chain of
command where employees can receive orders from a superior (who would be an expert in
their field). There are some others (not too many) reporting to one superior. Employees are
-
employed also in terms of their specific competencies. There is a division of work much
like that described by Taylorism (see above). Management would in this way establish the
specialisation required to achieve the goal of the organisation in an efficient way. There
would also be discipline demanding obedience to rules which would require supervision.
However, there is also a recognition that kindness and justice to encourage personnel in
their duties, is important too. As Morgan (1997) observes, management by objectives
(MBO), or goal-setting theory fits in well with this kind of bureaucratic approach. As
noted in my discussion of this in Chapter 3, when MBO links up with a view of employees
as motivated to perform tasks in accordance with goals set by the organisation, it begins to
agree with a regulatory approach as described by Burrell and Morgan (1979). Morgan
states that "forms of MBO are often used to impose a mechanistic system of goals and
objectives on an organisation" (p. 21).
The view of human nature implied in this bureaucratic approach and this idea of
motivation to fulfil goals can be called a view of rational beings (e.g., Taylorism and
Weberianism). This is because it sees human beings as recognising what is the most
efficient way of organising the workplace and then complying with what is required to
practise such efficiency. Employees are seen as rational beings directed towards the
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achievement of goals. Cantor and Fleeson (1994), more recently have attempted to build a
view of people which also rests on seeing them as intelligent goal-pursuers. They suggest
that:
We are interested not only in those people who seem to feel already in control
in a task context but also, or perhaps more so, in those people for whom the
task is an important challenge that requires marshalling their resources,
cultivating their intelligence, and overcoming their uncertainties. (Cantor and
Fleeson, 1994, p.155)
They note that a view of people as goal-directed in this way bears analogy with ideas on
expert problem solving. Employees can become experts in fulfilling tasks. This also
implies that employees orient themselves rationally to do a specialised task that they want
to fulfil -- towards some goal that has been set. The view fits in with ideas of organising
behaviour according to the dictate of efficient pursuit of goals by rational beings.
However, my approach has to ask this question. One way to look at achievement is to
realise that it might not be the only way of organising a modern society. There may be
other factors that are ignored when human beings are seen as simply rational beings able
to organise according to competencies.
As noted in Chapter 2, while theories around economic beings and rational beings have
been developed, other theories have also been suggested. Another theory -- underpinned
by another view of human nature -- is that of the human relations approach. Theorists such
as Mayo and Herzberg have been important contributors here.
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9. 2. 3 Social beings
As already mentioned, Yang (1992) states that in Taiwan today, employees tend to orient
themselves more towards individualism than in the past. The human relations approach
argues that employees are more socially oriented than theories of economic beings or
rational beings imply; as Morgan (1997) notes, motivation is not merely a technical
problem. Studies on aspects of the workplace such as the workers relationships with one
,
another have portrayed people as primarily social beings who find it important to have
support from colleagues. It has been found that rather than fulfil production schedules that
are demanding but physically possible, employees prefer to adhere to the lower norms of
colleagues so as not to become isolated from the group and shunned by colleagues.
The question of motivation is therefore redefined in terms of a view of social beings, such
as in the human relations approach. Researchers (e.g., Lee and Lawrence, 1991; Swieringa
and Wierdsma, 1992; Argyris, 1993) have found that the perceptions and meanings that
people give to their work is important. Employees in the organisation self-organise
according to the norms that they develop in their groups. The human relations approach
concentrates on the human side of the workplace and on the way employees' attitudes to
their work and to each other affect their production. Instead of thinking that management
alone could set criteria for objective observation to check rates of work, it was realised
that the social element in the workplace could not be ignored. Employees there organise
into groups developing group culture in the process. They do not work for bonuses if they
feel that this would invite disapproval by their group. The human relations approach was
interpreted by Mayo (1949) to show that human needs go beyond material motivation;
employees are seen as social beings and not motivated only by material rewards.
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The human relations approach later became associated with Herzberg's interpretations of
how employees could be motivated by intrinsic rewards. This meant that the way to deal
with them was through "encouraging them to exercise their capacities for self-control and
creativity" (Morgan, 1997, p.36). So it became associated with an approach used to find
out how motivation could be developed in order to make employees control themselves.
The aim was to create conditions allowing employees to exercise self-control and
creativity within the demands of their job. As Morgan (190) states, much of this
theorising has proved extremely attractive in management circles, for it offers the
possibility of motivating employees through 'higher level' needs (such as their need for
some autonomy in their work performance).
Critics of the conceptions of economic and rational beings as well as of social beings say
that all these views of people have become developed to allow managers to set
performance objectives. The idea in all these views is that employees can be controlled
either through using work-rate schedules combined with bonuses for hard work (e.g.,
Taylor or Weber) or by letting employees define their work so that they can be more
productive (e.g., human relations approach). As noted in Chapter 3, therefore, it is not
possible to subscribe uncritically to a view of people as social beings -- which could be
just as narrow as a view of them as economic or rational beings. The social beings view
can be used to support practices which have not been sufficiently considered regarding the
implications for those involved. Issues such as the fairness of the way performance criteria
are set, who sets them, and how employees can be 'made' to conform, are still issues that
need to be further looked into (e.g., as described by the equity theory discussed in Chapter
3). These issues are not resolved simply by appealing to a view of human beings as social
beings.
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As shown in Chapter 2, there have been other approaches developed. Some of these
approaches have another view of people, namely, psychological beings. This view can be
seen, for example, in Vroom's expectancy theory.
9. 2. 4 Psychological beings
Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory has some similarity with the view of people as able to
make rational and conscious choices (rational beings) -- but it adds the belief that
employees perceive circumstances in the light of their psychological make-up. For
example, as in the case of the industrial modernisation in Taiwan, employees are
increasingly adopting more individualism to satisfy their needs and desires. Therefore, it
is impossible to say what would be rational behaviour, for employees' choices of how to
behave depend on how they see possibilities and on how they assign value to rewards.
Managers should provide adequate challenge to allow employees to use their talents fully,
and enough understanding of employees to know when and how to challenge them. It
follows that employees cannot all be motivated by, for example, economic rewards or
incentives; this will depend on how they are valued by themselves. Or again, employees
might not simply be motivated to perform in accordance with what are socially sanctioned
standards. This depends on how they view the standards. There are subtle mixtures of
extrinsic and intrinsic motivations that go into employees' choices.
But employees might not be fully conscious of what is motivating them. There are
psychological processes that might be influencing them without their being fully aware of
them. Psychological beings (e.g., Vroom's expectancy theory) is useful in that it provides
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a tool for employees to begin to reflect more on what they find rewarding and why. This
process of reflection can be undertaken by employees as they self-reflect, but also in
groups where they can learn to reflect together through dialogue. This leads onto another
view of people (a related view) as complex beings who do not have fixed motivations or
fixed ways of orienting themselves in the world. Their ideas and motivations can be a
dynamic process fuelled by self-reflection and reflection with others. It is this view of
-	 ipeople -- as complex beings -- that forms the basis of what is described in the next section.
9. 2. 5 Complex beings
As spelled out in Chapter 2, there are learning-based motivation theories that have been
developed to explain employees' behaviour. But these theories need to be taken much
further in order to support a view of people as complex beings who can exercise capacities
for self-reflection and reflection with others. Managers need a critical systemic view that
allows, in Gregory's (1992) terms, for a discordant pluralism where employees are faced
with and learn to cope with divergent theories about their behaviour -- theories that they
come to terms with as they reflect critically on what they can learn from them all.
A CLO as I describe it, hopes to contribute by showing how people can operate as
complex beings. Before making this description, I show what can be offered specifically
by Argyris (1993) and also by Schein (1987a) to help us in defining the substance of a
critically oriented learning organisation. Neither of these authors states that his approach
is a CLO. But their models of learning organisations help to point in this direction.
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9. 3 To build a critical learning organisation
To begin my discussion of the development of a CLO, I give an outline of some of
Argyris's and Schein's views which have helped me in my formulation of what a learning
organisation should look like. I have chosen these two authors because their ideas, though
requiring some extension to build a CLO, are consistent in many ways with the arguments
that I have been pursuing in the thesis so far. However, as indicated in the rest of the
thesis, views of learning also need to be supplemented by many of the ideas that have been
presented by critical systems thinkers such as Flood and Jackson (1991a), Gregory (1992),
Flood (1995), Midgley (1997), and Flood and Romm (1996a). They can be supplemented
with literature more generally on ideology-critique and power and on the way that selves
can operate in societies as explained in Chapter 5.
After discussing the view of Argyris in this regard, I move on to discuss the view of
Schein. I show how these views of a learning organisation can be extended in the light of
the discussion that I have provided in the rest of my thesis and also in view of the re-
categorisation of motivation theories that I offer in this chapter. This re-categorisation is
what allowed me to draw attention to the conception of complex beings, in support of the
idea (i.e., I use it to support my agreement with the idea) that it is possible to build a CLO.
9. 3. 1 Argyris's view of what is meant by organisational learning
In Chapter 2 some ideas were given about how Argyris and Schän (1978) developed views
on organisational learning. It was pointed out that they see theories-in-use as affecting the
way that managers behave. They argue that when managers have theories-in-use that are
anti-learning, this affects their relationship with others. They react to others by trying to
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defend their own ideas, rather than allowing these ideas to be subjected to more public
testing. Argyris (1993) has offered more thought on this to help managers to see what is
required if they want to move beyond these patterns, towards patterns where managers can
use "double loop reasoning" (following on from Argyris and Schtin, 1978). Argyris
recognises that "double loop reasoning" is a type of learning where managers learn to
question the theories-in-use that they have been using. He states, "double loop reasoning"
allows managers to question their defences so that they can "encourage inquiry into or
testing of the validity of their claims" (p.10). He argues that "double loop reasoning"
means that managers do not expect to use the same logic that was used when formulating
ideas and claims in the first place; managers are allowed rather to look at these claims
from different perspectives. He describes the process which managers must avoid:
Craft your conversation in ways that, in order to test the validity of your
claims, others will have to use the same logic that you used to produce the
claim in the first place. These are recipes for self-fulfilling, self-sealing anti-
learning processes. They are the hallmarks of defensive reasoning. (Argyris,
1993, p.10)
He recognises that in order to create productive learning, managers need to learn to use
logic and data "that are independent of those making the claims" (p.11). This means that
managers can bring in new data and new logic to show a different angle. Managers then
can make up their own minds instead of having to use the original logic and data. He also
notes that for "double loop reasoning" to be operating, managers must be willing to
encourage inquiry into the testing of different views, and they also need to be able to
change their reasoning processes. Moreover, managers must be alert to others'
inconsistencies and gaps in their perspectives. Argyris suggests that people in turn must
not try to cover up these by defending their position dishonestly, because when they are
being defensive they are trying to cover up inconsistencies.
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Argyris (1993) shows that in many organisations this kind of defensiveness is in fact
rewarded, and that organisations reward employees for actions that "limit the very
learning that leading learning requires" (p.13). This is how a non-learning organisation
develops. Argyris states that it is important for managers to be aware of how the reward
system can encourage defensive behaviour and be aware of how their own actions might
produce a "highly limited learning organisation" (p.14). He also notes that when managers
-	 itry to develop the skill of double loop reasoning themselves and practise t, they often find
that this skill is not valued in the current organisational culture. He therefore appeals to all
those who feel responsible for this to begin to create new organisational cultures.
We can see in Argyris's view many similarities to what has been described in this thesis as
critical appreciation and critical systemic learning (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). Critique
is enhanced when managers can, for example, question organisational cultures
(ideologies) that uphold theories-in-use in an uncritical manner. Critique can be used to
show up where theories-in-use are creating defence mechanisms, at an employee and/or
organisational level. Critique can be used to try to show inconsistencies in points of view,
which can lead managers to reflect again on such points of view. Critique can also be used
to show implications of not reflecting on points of view (theories-in-use). Furthermore,
Argyris (1993) shows that theories and logics are not all the same, and recognises that we
can use different logic and data to question existing theories ( different from the person
espousing the theory). He argues that if we try to see all types of reasoning as the same,
then we will not realise the discordance between different theories. Thus, we will impose
one logic on all the other logics.
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The one problem with Argyris's view, is that he still seems to think that it is possible to
test the validity of theories, once managers use "independent" reasoning -- that is,
independent of the person whose logic is being questioned. But managers need to
remember that this logic will also be dependent on the criticiser's use of logic. This is
what Gregory (1992) means when she states that all ideologies need to be challenged (see
Chapter 5). We cannot assume that ideology-critique can take place from a neutral
perspective. That is also why Flood and Romm (1996a) state that in "double loop
learning", as Argyris and Schtin (1978) describe it, there may be a tendency to rely on the
scientific model as a way of testing theories. They note that this does not create sufficient
allowance for managers to criticise radically what it means to test a theory.
A CLO as I envisage it should not appeal to independent testing. Rather, it should appeal
to personal ability -- as complex beings -- to appreciate a diversity of theories and to learn
from them all.
9. 3. 2 Schein's interpretation of organisational learning
Schein (1987b) in a similar way to Argyris and SchOn (1978) focuses on the defence
mechanisms which can lead managers to "hear more or less what we expect or anticipate
based on prior experience" (p.64). He notes that in this way managers block off "a great
deal of information that is potentially available" (p.64). He states that this is linked to the
defence mechanisms of denial, which lets managers deny things that do not fit their
prejudgements. He recognises that such denial is anti-learning, and that what is most
difficult about managers' emotional responses to situations where they deny what they do
not want to acknowledge, is that they do not notice their denials. He believes that
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managers control, suppress, delete or deny their feelings, and this is because in their
culture they learn that "feelings should not influence judgement" (p.65). So, he argues,
managers do not acknowledge how they feel about situations and how this might in fact be
affecting their judgements, they simply pretend to see the situation. This is a paradox, and
managers end up acting on their feelings.
Schein (1987b) therefore takes the position that it is important that part of the process of
consultation should help managers to recognise the feelings that they are having and also
what might have triggered these feelings. He believes that managers do not need to be
"victims of them"; if they can consciously understand their impulses then they can learn
better about how to deal with situations (p.65). He states that once managers understand
more about themselves, they will be less likely to distort the informational input available
to them and can "minimise the distortions on the initial information input" (p.66). He also
notes that one of the reasons why managers seem to be unable to do this, is that they are
afraid of being "attacked and put at a disadvantage" (p.66). So when managers disagree
with a point which is being made, they take it as a sign of attack and do not treat the
disagreement as part of a learning experience that will help them to learn more about ways
of seeing the situation. Managers therefore make judgements based on emotional
impulses instead of thinking more (reflecting more critically) in communication with
others.
Schein (1987b) argues that when managers act in this way, it is not that their actions are
"irrational", it is rather that their critical reactions are based on data observed through a
distorted vision of too much prejudgement. Managers' critical reactions have been based
on "incorrect initial observation" (p.68). Schein's point is that all managers are emotional.
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Managers react to situations by way of their emotions. But managers should be more
aware of this so that they can learn better about their prejudgements and therefore modify
them. Managers can do this by communication and listening also to others -- and not
seeing others' disagreements with them as a sign that others are attacking them. Managers
should come to know more about their own "personal defensive filters" so that they can
take greater care in "checking out before reacting" (Schein, 1987b, p.71). Managers must
also be careful to remember that different cultural contexts encompass radical differences
about values. So managers must not simply interpret according to their own cultural
perceptions. For example, as Schein notes, in some cultures it is a sign of respect for the
importance of a meeting, if managers take as long as they need to discuss the matter, even
though it might mean they are late for other appointments. The idea of being on time for
appointments therefore has different meanings in different cultural contexts. Managers
must be aware of this when they interpret situations. This agrees with Hofstede's (1980a)
idea that managers need to be aware not only of different theories, but also of different
cultural patterns as part of the process of critical systemic learning. In Chapter 7 it was
indicated why it is important not to believe that only one set of cultural patterns is the best
way to organise. Managers can listen to other cultural beliefs as a way of thinking again
about their own.
All in all, Schein's view of defence mechanisms that inhibit us from learning from others
and from other cultures, has many similarities with that of Argyris. But he draws more
attention to the emotional side of what makes managers cognitively defensive. As Argyris
(1993) notes, learning organisations cannot be developed unless managers in the
organisations try to create learning orientations. He does not discuss what it means to
harness ideas from contradictory ways of seeing, he only asks managers to check their
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observations. Neither does he consider the hermeneutic process of deciding how to look at
data nor does he recognise that there can always be new interpretations (which might
contradict one another). This is where the discordant pluralist position has more strength
in building a CLO.
-
9. 3. 3 A critical learning organisation with the complex beings concept
developed
In the above discussions, I have shown that ideas on critical systemic learning can be taken
from some authors (e.g., Schein, 1987a, b; Argyris, 1993). But these need to be further
developed to provide for a more discordant pluralist position as described in other parts of
this thesis. For example, contradictions between theories (e.g., motivation theories) must
become a starting point for learning on the part of all the inhabitants of a CLO. This is not
just the same as Argyris's view of testing theories, because he does not consider what can
be done when logics of testing contradict one another (in a discordant way). Also, it is not
simply rational beings who can test theories, because as Schein shows, managers have
emotions which influence the way they see information. But Schein does not draw out the
full significance of this for complex beings. He assumes that once managers know their
emotions they will be better able to read the real situation. He does not consider that
complex beings always interpret the world, which means that there may be very many
different interpretations at play at any one time in an organisation.
Critical appreciation works on many levels and is not merely a process of correctly
accepting data, but a process of promoting communication with different interpretations,
so that our thinking can become more appreciative of variety. As 'Gregory (1996b) notes,
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discordant pluralism does not try to reconcile theories and interpretations; it is a matter of
learning to deal with diversity on both intra- and inter- paradigmatic levels. Managers
need within a way of thinking to explore its inconsistences and also between ways of
thinking (logics) to explore where they are discordant. A CLO is also not simply a matter
of cognitive function, however, managers are also involved in making ethical judgements
in the process (Gregory, 1996b). Therefore, in some respects the equity theory of
motivation can be used to support the process of learning in a CLO. But this is not simply
to say that employees are motivated by feelings of equity. Learning has to be set up in
organisations so that employees can learn from another's experiences of what they took to
be inequities. This can also be done through setting up ways of discussing grievance
procedures, as noted in Chapter 6. Multiloguing about grievances procedures and other
procedures is all part of to build a CLO (see Chapter 6).
Burrell (1992) points out that managers are talking about a whole new approach to the
world, when they see organisations as complex patterns in which many motivations may
play a part. This gives an opportunity also for exploring new lifestyles through what
Burrell calls a more eroticised relationship with reality, where managers' aim is not to
control it by understanding it -- as in rational beings's conception of the world. Complex
beings are able to appreciate that no one way of becoming motivated appreciate the variety
of approaches to motivation that exist and are being developed.
The analysis of different motivations and lifestyles also has to take into account that belief
systems can intersect with relations of power in organisations. As this chapter has shown
when building up the categories of economic beings, rational beings, social beings and
psychological beings, these can all assume an ideological function in organisations when
they are accepted uncritically. Even the category of complex beings could become
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ideological if accepted uncritically. But the point about the category of complex beings is
that it expects managers to be complex enough to reflect critically on themselves,
developing them further as complex beings, able to absorb and deal with many ideas and
feelings.
When used uncritically, any of the above views of humankind carry implications that they
may become a type of power in an organisation (and a whole culture), as the specific
conception of people and their capacities comes to be dominant. Therefore by studying
ideology in a critical way, managers can examine how ideas can be used to entrench
patterns of domination in society and learn how to avoid this. Ideology is defined by the
fact that it sustains relations of domination (see Chapter 5). I have shown above why it is
important to criticise the potential ideological symbolism of adhering to a conception of
beings as any of the categories identified above. It is therefore preferable to be more fluid
in our view of what human beings are and what can motivate them.
It is possible that we will not try to challenge ideological conceptions because of
conceptions of humankind which have become accepted. But Gregory (1992) notes that
all people in society can in principle become involved in this process. She goes so far as to
state that managers should become involved, because this is part of the way in which a
dynamic self-society relationship can be sustained. Managers then do not become puppets
of a belief system handed to us by others. They can communicate and listen to others as the
basis for their own learning and their own action.
271
9. 4 Can we develop a fixed method to apply a critical systemic approach to
motivation?
The above discussions about how complex beings can be involved in society imply that it
is possible to utilise a critical systemic approach to motivation. I have shown what it
means to build a CLO where managers can continually learn from one another by
appreciating their different domain theories, their experiences, their cultural patterns, their
feelings, and their values. This has to be supported by complex beings, who are able to
operate with and deal with diversity (through a discordant pluralist position).
On this basis, I now ask the question whether it is possible to develop a fixed method that
supports my approach in a CLO-- just as other authors have developed approaches to
support their motivation theories or models? It is clear that the development of such a
fixed method cannot be of the same type as offered by other authors. One of the criticisms
of their methods is that they are unable to capture the complexity of a dynamic view of
human beings and of their self-society relationships. So developing any method for a CLO
runs the risk of being criticised for its anti-dynamism. Nevertheless, managers can
consider the kinds of themes that would be asked as guidelines to build a CLO.
Managers can consider whether there are any situations in which specific motivation
theories (and views of beings) might be more appropriate than others. Are there any such
situations? Managers could say that as long as they have reflected on the implications of
adopting a view of humankind as, for example, economic beings, then it is appropriate to
work with this style of offering incentives (on the basis of economic reward). But if any
organisation consistently and unquestioningly adopts only this line, without checking to
see how employees find this acceptable and without organising for continued dialogue
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about incentives, then this use of the view of beings is in danger of slipping into
unreflective use. Also, as far as possible in an organisation, there should be room for
employees to be rewarded on the basis of different incentives. For example, some
employees at points in time might gain greater reward from intrinsic satisfaction and thus
choose to take less economic rewards. The flexibility of the CLO will allow these options
always to be put on the table. Employees who suggest different options for incentives
should be regarded as employees from whom they can learn aboutmotivation. In this way
a CLO will continually refine its view of the complexity of motivation. There is no
method for determining which view of motivation is more "appropriate" -- other than the
critical systemic learning that has been explored throughout this thesis. Nothing is more or
less appropriate than employees in the situation learning from one another and acting
accordingly. So it is impossible to say that managers can match motivation to appropriate
situations. This is the importance of Gregory's (1992) and also Midgley's (1995a, b)
critique of TSI(1) which tried to match theories to situations.
Rather than this matching of motivation to situation, it is preferable to have some
understanding of different theories and on the basis of this understanding, developed with
participants in the situation, to see what can be learnt about how to deal with motivations
that are defined as relevant. Flood and Romm's (1996a) 'triple loop learning' develops
this idea by arguing that managers need to have a consciousness that can loop between
different ways of seeing. Once managers have this consciousness, they are able to think
better about how to proceed in given situations. There is no recipe that can tell managers
that such and such a theory matches such and such a situation. This mechanistic . approach
is out of keeping with to build a CLO. A CLO develops managers' critical capacities so
that they can judge better how to act in specific situations with which they are faced (e.g.,
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Midgley, 1995b, 1997). There may be some sense in trying to assess how to look at the
current situation. Managers can look, as a start, at:
• Employees' positions in the organisation and whether there are possibilities for them
to develop their capacities;
• Employees' qualifications and whether these are relevant to their jobs, and if not,
whether they might prefer to get on-the-job training that is more relevant for what they
want to do;
• The sources of motivation -- what is important for them at present;
• What evidence there may be for the interpretation that they are demotivated at present;
• What possibilities can be explored for helping to motivate them in accordance with
how they define what is important to them.
As shown above, these rewards can differ from person to person: while some might value
economic reward, others might value the chance for some training towards some other
skills; others again might want to see opportunities for getting promoted to a position
which is more challenging for them. On the basis of starting points such as these, and other
questions which could be discussed with employees in the workplace (and with other
stakeholders), managers could as facilitators or intervenors try to map out a perception of
the different motivations operating in the current situation, the resources available to deal
with these, and the opportunities that exist for creating a situation which is more in
keeping with managers' ideas of how they could operate in a CLO.
Given that the aim of motivation is to lead towards 'improvement' (Midgley's usage),
managers need also to find a way of thinking about improvements -- what desired future
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situation is being looked towards. Here again, managers could operate with a starting list
such as:
• More dialogical communication between employees in different levels of
organisation, across sectors and with other stakeholders;
• More dialogue about possible training needs that can be pursued;
• More learning about different things that can motivate employees and how these
differences can be dealt with in a CLO;
• More learning about how employees can operate in organisations without the
organisation expecting compliance with predetermined ends. This could involve, for
example, dialogue about levels of profit to be pursued, types of productivity that are
regarded as important, and ways of pursuing profit or productivity.
Once critical systemic learning is encouraged, then it is also possible to set up an appraisal
system that allows for continued learning about itself. This is important. Otherwise,
appraisal systems run the risk of being inherently conservative, being set up to conserve
reward systems culturally already operating. An appraisal system in a CLO would have the
characteristic that it would allow employees not to become fixed in present reward
incentives. They should always look forward to moving from the current situation (as they
perceive it) to some desired future state that they believe will be more satisfying.
In order to be able to facilitate the process towards a CLO similar skills to those discussed
by Argyris (1993) and by Schein (1987b) (and described earlier in this chapter) would
need to be cultivated on the part of managers. The additional skill of being open to
discordance (Gregory, 1992) and to triple loop learning (Flood and Romm, 1996a) would
also be needed. These skills are critical reflection with others and self-reflection, as
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outlined in my thesis (especially in Chapter 6). However, the methods presented in this
section are an ideal; in practice, managers will need to modify and adapt them, and/or
introduce other methods, according to in a given organisational context.
In the following section, I indicate why there is a need for a critical systemic approach to
motivation in Taiwanese enterprises.
9. 5 The need for a critical systemic approach to motivation in Taiwanese
enterprises
So far, I argue that in order to tackle the problems of motivation, managers need to be
aware of a diversity of personalities and communicate with others so that they can develop
appropriate response approaches to motivation. Taiwanese enterprises have followed
traditional Chinese culture which involves specific social circumstances. For example,
Chen (1984) describes the characteristics of Taiwanese enterprises as follows: 1. Personal
relatior2shipis em_pliaj_NA,2, Owners are regarded as sole rulers. 3. Nepotism is common.
4. `Ij-Le_n_ploy_er_ha_s_a kind of!`power" or authority, derived from respect, and ties of duty
and obligation. Cheng and Kleiner (1993) emphasise that the Chinese normally stress a
rational commitment to motivation rather than an emotional one. Moreover, during the
1990's Taiwanese enterprises have been subject to dynamic external change and the influx
of multiple effects of the combination_of Chinese and Western cultures, both of which
have produced large internal tensions. There has been a growing appreciation of the
importance of effective motivation. Taiwanese enterprises have to become aware of how
to make full use of their human resource in order to ensure their viability and
competitiveness. In the past decade, with social, political and economic changes, most
Taiwanese enterprises have been facing rapid change. For example:
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• Changes in cultural values
The majority of Taiwanese immigrated from mainland China over the past several
centuries and they retain their Chinese cultural traditions. From 1884 - 1934 Japan
occupied Taiwan, so that the older generation of Taiwan were educated by the Japanese
and were influenced by that culture. Over the past twenty-five years or so, the new
management generation have been educated in the thinking of western countries, mainly
in the USA. Yeh (1991) observes that the type of management practices used by
.,
Taiwanese firms are the choices of their Chief Executive Officers. Their different
backgrounds such as family origin (mainlanders or local natives), education (American or
Taiwanese education), and age, all influence the type of management style that they use.
He also looks at these three types of influences in terms of organizational structure,
decision making and human resource management practices.
In a classic study, Meade (1970) examined the difference between Chinese and American
cultures. He found that the Chinese people of the older generation have values based on
obeying authority. Consequently, traditional style bosses always use power rather than
democracy otherwise they would lose face. However, the new generation of managers are
more individualistic, suggesting that new ideas of motivation intervention are needed.
• Market structure changes
After the second world war, due to lack of natural resources, Taiwan depended on US
financial aid to develop its economic independence by increasing the productivity of its
industry and exported agriculture products. Jacoby (1966) states that
The joint Chinese-U.S. strategy was to use the bulk of aid money in other
sectors to create external economics for private investment in agriculture and
industry. (Jacoby,1966, p.190)
However, the growth of the importance of the domestic service sector with the rise in
spending power of the people has changed the market structure. Taiwanese enterprises
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will have to adapt to these new circumstances change. For example, Yang (1992) notices
that what is happening in the course of the modernisation of Taiwan, is that employees are
tending to "change from social orientation to individual orientation in their need for
achievement" (p.153). This means that "the Chinese people become gradually more like
people in a modern industrialised society such as the United States, where the
individual-oriented type of achievement motivation prevails" (p. 153). Yang (1992)
believes that in countries such as the USA there is typically this kind of motivation
-
directing personal orientations.
Again taking the example of Taiwan as a way of seeing the application of this view of
people, we can see that the idea of Rational Beings also features when Taiwanese "move
away from the traditional syndrome of social oriented traits" -- and increasingly towards
achievement itself (Yang, 1992, p.153). As this occurs, there is also some movement -- as
described by Weber (1947) -- away from traditional authority towards the authority of
experts. Managers who are experts at something are given status for this in the more
modern organisations. As Yang (1992) notes, there is thus a "central trend of Chinese
psychological transformation due to modernisation" (p.160). Whether or not this trend is
something to be desired, is a matter that is not considered by Yang.
• The recognition of labour rights
The Labour Standards Law (LSL) became law in 1984. The LSL is a law that establishes
wage and hour requirements and working conditions. Workers have begun to demand
changes resulting in a number of industrial conflicts between employers and employees
which were unknown before the law was introduced. For example in 1986 there were
1458 conflict cases rising to 1621 cases by 1987. The reasons for the industrial conflicts
were mainly due to disagreements regarding working conditions, salary, annual bonus,
annual leave.
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This is also partly as a result of the repeal of the Enforcement Law of 1951 which banned
strikes and workers unions. Since 1986, workers can legally strike and organise unions.
This reflects changes in society more generally both politically and socially. This freedom
may mean that organisations become less effective at carrying out their business and as a
result labour problems have become the major issue in investment (Industry
Bulletin;1993). We see that Taiwanese enterprises are facing many challenges from both
within the organisation (different values between generations, owner-workers' conflicts)
and outside the boundaries of the organisation (social liberalisation and global market
competition) and they will need to find new ways to survive. For example, Ferdinand
(1996) points out that not all employees see themselves as simply working hard in order to
get more financial reward. Moreover, he states, as the opportunities increase for
employees' self-fulfilment through means other than work, they are not prepared to work
as hard as the older generation did (in Taiwan) "in the aftermath of the Second World War
and the civil war against the communists" (p.59). There therefore seems to be some
evidence that, at least as Ferdinand sees it, the ideology of Economic Beings does not
penetrate completely into all sectors of the society. Just as Burrell (1992) also points out,
there are tendencies for resistance to this ideology through the creation of different
lifestyles. This seems also to have some substance in the context of Taiwan -- judging
from Ferdinand's work.
Taiwanese enterprises are presently facing rapid social, political and economic change,
which is producing many challenges, from both inside the organisation (different values
between generations, owner-workers' conflicts) and outside it (social liberalization and
global market competition). For these reasons, it is considered that an examination of the
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potential for using a critical systemic approach to motivation in Taiwanese enterprises
would be beneficial.
Given the complexities of the evolving work place relations in Taiwan, it may be that
organisations (and particularly the older generation of managers within them) are not yet
ready for the introduction of a critical systemic approach to motivation. However, in my
view the younger generation of well educated and rising managers are ready both to be
motivated differently and to use new motivation approaches. Hence, on balance, I feel that
Taiwan is ready for the introduction of a critical systemic approach to motivation which
will facilitate the development of a critical learning organisation.
9. 6 Conclusion
In this chapter I moved towards a re-categorisation of motivation approaches in order to
lead toward the category of complex beings. It was shown how this last category allows
managers to appreciate the discordant relationship between the avaialable motivation
approaches which imply different views of human beings and their capacities. Managers
can appreciate that employees are complex enough to be able to be understood not in
terms of any single one of the views of beings. Human beings (in terms of complex
beings) can be understood as capable of dynamically altering personal views. This
dynamism implies that managers appreciate different ways of seeing employees
(including ways in which they can become motivated) and that in organisations there is
scope for dialoguing (multiloguing) between different languages about what is possible
and desirable.
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I then moved on to consider whether managers can develop a method for building a CLO.
I showed that such a method should allow pluralist systemic approaches in interventions
(as described in Chapter 4), encourage critically reflection on power relations and question
ideology conflicts in organisations (as described in Chapter 5), need critical systemic
learning during interventions (as described in Chapter 6), and take into consideration
cross-cultural influences on motivation (as described in Chapter 7). A CLO allows people
to learn from one another in a constant process which implies also a- dynamic self-society
relationship. No organisational contexts should become fixed and unquestioned. No way
of assigning rewards should be seen as fixed. No way of organising work should become
permanent. Any fixing means that the organisation is not a CLO. I offered a set of starting
issues regarding motivation that a facilitator (together with others) could use to begin to
assess situations in any particular organisation; and also a set of questions that could allow
managers to think about improvements. These, I suggest, would provide a way in for
facilitators hoping to set about building a CLO.
In the next and final chapter I provide a summary of what I believe I have achieved
through this study as a whole in terms of showing the need for a critical systemic approach
to motivation and what such an approach could offer.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
10. 1 Introduction
-
Throughout this thesis we have learned about the internal and external issues of
motivation interventions. We have seen the importance of working with human nature,
social contexts, and encouraging critical reflexivity in our employees. We have learned
the critical nature and importance of values, synergy, and critical learning. I have used
critical systems thinking (CST) to inform my understanding of the issues in motivation
interventions. Motivation is not a simple matter. In fact, as this thesis has discussed,
motivation interventions involve a lot of issues. In Chapter 1, the following aims of this
thesis were established:
1. to critically analyse the literature on motivation;
2. to evaluate and organise the range of approaches available;
3. to develop a means by which managers can utilise the plurality of motivation methods
available to them;
4. to show why managers need to be socially aware when seeking to motivate people;
5. to show why managers (and others) need to adopt a critical systemic learning
approach during motivation interventions; and
6. to show how cross-cultural influences should be addressed in a motivation
intervention.
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7. to show why a critical systemic approach to motivation is necessary; and,
8. to demonstrate the importance for each of the strands of the critical systemic approach
to motivation.
In this chapter, I will show how these aims have been met.
10. 2 Meeting the aims of the thesis
	 -
The first aim was to critically analyse the literature on motivation. In Chapter 3, I
examined the assumptions of different motivation approaches in terms of their
implications for the organisation of working life in a society. In order to evaluate and
differentiate the approaches, I drew on the 'sociological paradigms' framework developed
by Burrell and Morgan (1979). I showed that Burrell and Morgan's framework gives us
one method for evaluating motivation approaches, but that as practising managers we
really need a more practical way to relate the approaches to the specific situations facing
us in order to make choice between methods. An alternative approach, that of Jackson and
Key's (1984), later extended by Jackson (1987), provides a "system of systems
methodologies" framework which focuses on problem-situation characteristics, and I also
used this framework to organise and evaluate the range of motivation approaches (the
second aim) available. Through the use of the two frameworks a number of persisting
problems with the range of motivation approaches were hightlighted and these formed the
starting points for each of the next four chapters.
The third aim was to develop a means by which managers could utilise the plurality of
motivation methods available to them. In Chapter 4, I reviewed some more recent critical
284
systems literature and showed how ideas about pluralism drawn from CST could be used
to help managers in utilising the full range of motivation approaches available. As CST
considers the ethics of using specific approaches, it was argued that it can provide a more
just approach when dealing with motivation in organisations.
The fourth aim was to show why managers need to be socially aware when seeking to
motivate people. Here, I argued that it is necessary to take the 'whole' social situation into
,
account when managers are dealing with the issues of motivation. Initally, I suggested that
it is important for managers to consider the widest possible set of affected people, instead
of only direct participants. I then argued that any change will affect different interest
groups in different ways. Indeed, this thesis recognises that social pressures will affect
whether motivation interventions can be implemented properly, and that certain
approaches may be unsuitable when dealing with the issues of motivation in certain
ideological or social circumstances. In Chapter 5, it was suggested that it is worthwhile to
understand the power relations and ideology conflicts in organisations which allow us to
reflect on existing ways of life. This thesis argued that ideology-critique is a dynamic
process which depends on the interaction among people, alien ideologies, and
interpretations of social circumstances. It also emphasised that personal and social
ideology affect both our view of reality and choice of approaches to motivation
interventions. Critique is important, because it allows us to expand our understanding. I
therefore proposed that Gregory's (1992) critical appreciation model should be used as a
basis for development of an approach for motivation interventions. Through this
discussion the fourth aim was met.
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The fifth aim of this thesis was to show why managers (and others) need to adopt a
critical systemic learning approach during motivation interventions. I argued that
managers should be critically aware of the needs and desires of employees, so as to help
release their potential. In Chapter 6, I argued that only critical systemic learning would be
sufficiently open to the possible radical differences that exist within alien paradigms or
cultures. Altogether, this thesis argues that learning should be improved by means of an
ideology-critique process to communicate with and learn from -alien paradigms (or
different cultures). Ideas on critical systemic learning developed in Chapter 6 were
applied further in Chapter 7, where it was shown how this kind of learning also needs to
be both culturally sensitive and able to extend the boundaries of different cultures. This
thesis emphasises that managers should learn to go beyond patterns which are becoming
entrenched, such as those associated with ideas of influence and control applied to the
social context, in order to prevent them from spreading across all of our ways of thinking.
The sixth aim of the thesis was to show how cross-cultural influences should be
addressed in a motivation intervention. Here, I argued that different approaches are based
upon particular meta-theoretical assumptions about social reality, which are also
informed by specific cultural influrences. This thesis uses CST as a basic philosophy to
explore how to create a critical process for motivation interventions which seeks to
expose cultural differences and build upon them. In Chapter 4, I argued by allowing
pluralist systemic approaches in interventions that the issues of motivation can be
considered from wider points of view than other "traditional" motivation approaches
have done. In Chapter 7, I considered the consequences of changes in cultural norms
within a society especially as they related to issues of motivation. I showed that a critical
systemic approach which draws on ideas about dialogue between alien perspectives
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would be a more useful approach for managers to adopt in their motivation interventions.
Specifically, I argued for people to adopt a more open approach to understanding other
perspctives. Through such an approach, learning that draws on cross-cultural features of a
situation can be achieved.
The seventh and eighth aims were to show why a critical systemic approach to motivation
is necessary and to demostrate the complementary importance of each of the strands of
the approach. In Chapter 8, I pulled together the strands of my approach: pluralism, social
awareness, an ethical, learning perspective and open-ness to cross-cutural influences.
Then, in order to aid the task of showing how to apply my approach, in Chapter 9, I
focussed on the need to build a critical learning organisation (CLO). To do this, I
recategorised some of the motivation approaches. I argued that it is preferable, as part of
my approach, to view people as complex beings who do not have fixed motivations or
fixed ways of directing themselves. Complex beings also exercise self-reflection and
reflection with others, and learn from discord to develop in a dynamic way as part of their
involvement in organisations (or society). I argued that managers (and others) must be
committed to continually developing themselves and others. When managers give
employees the opportunity to learn, develop, and grow, they expand their horizons and
make connections. They find new motivation in what they do and in their work
environment.
I believe that my approach could be useful for managers, especially in Taiwanese
enterprises. During my experience of working as a manager in Taiwan for thirteen years, I
was troubled by unsuccessful attempts by our management team to motivate 'employees'
(that is, those under our direction). I have realised that these shortcoming have often
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resulted from a failure to appreciate the circumstances of Taiwanese enterprises and a
desire to be guided instead by motivation approaches used in other cultures. At the same
time, I have seen that we managers lacked awareness of the influence of other cultures
(such as the U.S.A) on employees, who were not motivated entirely by external rewards.
Having considered these and other matters, my approach would consider Taiwanese
enterprises' needs rather than approaches which merely copy alien thinking.
10.3 Contributions to Knowledge
Contributions have made through the critical analysis of the motivation literature in
Chapter 3. My review of the literature on motivation revealed a wide diversity of
approaches. Given the wide variety of motivation approaches, I felt that it was necessary
somehow to evaluate the different methods, to assess whether, how and when any single
approach might be better than another. A further contribution was made in Chapter 4
where I considered how the literature on pluralism and intervention methods might inform
a manager's approach to dealing with the diversity of motivation methods available. In
Chapter 5, I showed that motivation takes place in an ideological arena where people have
different views about what it is morally right to do. Here, a contribution was made by
suggesting that managers need to be socially aware, to adopt an ethical stance when
dealing with motivation issues. Chapter 6 pointed to the need for guidance on processes of
critical reflection and learning whilst Chapter 7 contributed to an appreciation of how
alien and discordant cross-cultural aspects can be utilised and learning between different
perspectives achieved. Finally, the most significant contribution that my research makes
to the field of motivation is in the model of a critical systemic approach (detailed in
288
Chapter 8 and evaluated in Chapter 9) which I argued can be used by managers in Taiwan
to address the problems currently being experienced there.
10. 9 Thoughts for the future
The existing motivation approaches in general fail to uncover the assumptions which are
-
behind their ideologies and ignore power relations in society. These approaches often
criticise and oppose alien ideologies. Moreover, these approaches ignore our capability for
critical reflexivity which exposes the ideological base of different motivation approaches,
leading to resistance. In contrast, this thesis argues that the diversity of available
motivation approaches, ideological differences, organisational (even social) constraints,
and cultural diversity can be managed using my approach enlightened by social and
critical awareness, pluralism, and critical reflexivity, to improve motivation interventions.
Especially, my approach emphasises that we should have the notion of critical systemic
learning which facilitates communication with and learning from different cultures (or
alien paradigms). This would overcome the transient nature of many 'solutions' and
increase `sustainability' of motivation.
In this thesis I have concerned myself with the abstract rather than the concrete. Thus, a
further gap still exists between theory and practice. Specifically, there is a clear need to
educate managers to understand and utilise my approach -- in my case, in Taiwanese
enterprises. One obvious problem is that of translating academic concepts and language
into practical terms that managers can understand. This is a challenge which would need
further work in close contact with organisations and management practitioners.
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